Editing Parmenides (section)

==== B8.53-64: Primordial Elements ====
[[File:Olympians.jpg|thumb|The cosmology of Parmenides gave a [[theogony]], a story of the origin of the gods.]]
In fragment 8, the elements that make up the opposition to which the world of appearance can be reduced have been presented: φλογός αἰθέριον πῦρ (''phlogós aitherion pŷr'', «ethereal fire of the flame», v. 56) and νύξ (''nýx'', «night», v. 59).  Mortals have distinguished two forms, πῦρ (''pŷr'', "fire", v. 56) and νῦξ (''nŷx'', "night", v. 59). In relation to these opposites, the goddess says that "the mortals have erred", however line 54, which contains the reason for the error, presents three possibilities of translation. She literally says τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστιv. These three interpretations exhaust the possibilities of the text, and all have been supported by specialists.

These, the mortals, have given names to two forms, with which they have gone astray, because it is only lawful to name one (v. 54). They assigned these forms different properties, and considered them opposite: on the one hand, fire, soft, light and homogeneous; on the other, the night, compact and heavy (vv. 55–59). The goddess declares this speech no longer true, but plausible in appearance, and communicates it so that, in the order of opinions, the sage is not surpassed either (vv. 60-61). [[Simplicius of Cilicia|Simplicius]], pointed out that in this passage Parmenides transits from the objects of reason to sensible objects.<ref>''Commentary on Physics'' 30, 14</ref> The goddess calls the content of this second part βροτῶν δόξας (''brotôn dóxas'', "opinions of mortals", v. 51). Keep in mind that δόξα means ''what seems real'' or is presented to the senses; ''what seems true'' constituting the beliefs of all men; and ''what seems right'' to man.<ref name="Cornford p. 100"/> The speech does not pretend to be "true", since everything that could be said reliably has already been said. On the contrary, what he will present will be a κόσμος ἀπατηλός (''kósmos apatēlós'', «deceitful order»), since he presents beliefs as if they were presided over by an order.{{sfn|Kirk|Raven|Schofield|1982}}

# The first interpretation consists in indicating that the error is to name the two forms, since only one must be named.
##[[Aristotle]] understood that, once Parmenides considered that outside of what is nothing there is, he was forced to take phenomena into account, and to explain them he postulated opposites: cold and hot, or fire and earth , and that hot is «what is» and cold «what is not» (''Met'' I 5, 986b30 = A 24).
## [[Eduard Zeller|Zeller]] translated the passage as "one of which should not be named". This means that the other exists and can be named.<ref>Zeller, ''Die Philosophie der Griechen'', p. 701.</ref>
## Burnet followed this interpretation, adding that these forms can be identified with the Pythagorean principles of limit and limitlessness.{{sfn|Burnet|1892|p=186}}
## Schofield reflects this interpretation by translating the passage "of which they must not necessarily name more than one".{{sfn|Kirk|Raven|Schofield|1982}}
# In contrast to this, another interpretation indicates that none of the forms should be named.
# The most accepted interpretation indicates that the error is not to consider these two forms at the same time, but to name only one.
##Simplicius, who transmits the quote, thought that the error consists in not naming both contraries in the description of the physical world. The sentence would then say "of which it is not proper to name a single one." Modern philology has followed this interpretation in some of its exponents, such as Coxon and [[John Raven]].
## The first indicates that Parmenides knows that starting from a single form necessarily leads to uniformity, since only one element can originate itself. He begins in two ways, deliberately, in order to explain not only the multiplicity, but the contradiction in the world.<ref>Coxon, «The Philosophy of Parmenides», p. 142.</ref>

[[Hermann Fränkel|Fränkel]], even deciding on an intertextual interpretation that corresponds to the first exposed here: «only one should be named», does so without this implying that one of the two forms is more real than the other. The Light must not be identified with the first way. Men name two forms, light and night, and this is the mistake, since one should be named, "what is".<ref>Fränkel, ''Wege und Formen des frühgriechischen Denkens'', p. 180</ref> Guthrie, who makes a critical compilation of all the positions on the matter, does not find Cornford and Diels' objection to Zeller's translation convincing, since Parmenides' expression is irregular. Cornford's translation would also be better represented by the textual presence of a οὐδὲ μίαν (''udé mían'', «none») and that of Simplicius and Raven by a μίαν μόνην (''mían mónēn'', «only one» ).{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=64}} Guthrie argues that Parmenides thinks that it is illogical to accept, on the one hand, that the world contains a plurality of things, and on the other, that this plurality can arise from a single principle.{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=68}} The passage from the way of truth to the deceptive words of mortal opinions is a real problem for specialists. Even when the goddess tells the "man who knows" that she reveals this order to him as plausible, so that no mortal can outdo him (vv. 60–61), this reason has been interpreted in various ways. In antiquity, [[Aristotle]] conceived the first part of the poem as the consideration of the One κατὰ τὸν λόγον (''katá tón lógon'', «regarding the concept»<ref>García Yebra, ''Metaphysics of Aristotle'', p.41</ref> or "as to definition" or "as to reason"<ref>Guthrie, ''History of Greek Philosophy'', II, p. 70, n. 67</ref>), and the second as the consideration of the world according to the senses (''Met'' 986b31 = A 24). [[Theophrastus]] followed him at this point,<ref>Theophrastus in [[Alexander of Aphrodisias]], ''in Met.'' A 3, 984b3 (A7).</ref> and Simplicius adds that, although the goddess calls the speech of the second part "conjectural" and "misleading", she does not consider it completely false (''Physics'' 39, 10–12 = A 34). [[Werner Jaeger|Jaeger]], following Reinhardt,{{sfn|Reinhardt|p=90}} he thought that Parmenides was presented with the need to explain the origin of the deceptive appearance. And he had no other means than to narrate the origin of the world constituted by appearances, that is, to compose a cosmogony.<ref>Jaeger, ''The Theology of the First Greek Philosophers'', p. 106</ref> Owen argues that the content of the second part is merely a dialectical device, and does not imply an ontological claim.<ref>Owen, «Eleatic Questions», p. 85</ref>