Editing Nikita Khrushchev (section)

====Eastern Europe====
[[File:Gheorghiu-Dej & Khrushchev at Bucharest's Baneasa Airport (June 1960).jpg|thumb|left|Khrushchev and [[Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej]] at Bucharest's [[Băneasa Airport]] in June 1960. [[Nicolae Ceaușescu]] can be seen at Gheorghiu-Dej's right-hand side.]]

The Secret Speech, combined with the death of the Polish communist leader [[Bolesław Bierut]], who suffered a heart attack while reading the Speech, sparked considerable liberalization in [[Polish People's Republic|Poland]] and [[Hungarian People's Republic|Hungary]]. In Poland, a worker's strike in [[Poznań]] [[Poznań 1956 protests|developed into disturbances]] that left more than 50 dead in June 1956.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=166–168}} When Moscow blamed the disturbances on Western agitators, Polish leaders ignored the claim and made concessions to the workers. With anti-Soviet displays becoming more common in Poland, and crucial Polish leadership elections upcoming, Khrushchev and other Presidium members flew to Warsaw on 19 October to meet with the Polish Presidium. The Soviets agreed to allow the new Polish leadership to take office, on the assurance there would be no change to the Soviet-Polish relationship.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=166–168}}<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://dziennikpolski24.pl/trzy-dni-pazdziernika/ar/2447598|title=Trzy dni października|date=19 October 2001|website=Dziennik Polski}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://histar.pl/2019/06/07/1956-sowieci-ida-na-warszawe/|title=1956: Sowieci idą na Warszawę!|first=Bartłomiej|last=Michalczyk|date=7 June 2019}}</ref> A period of at least partial liberalization, known as the [[Polish October]], followed.

The Polish settlement emboldened the Hungarians.{{sfn|Fursenko|2006|p=122}} A mass demonstration in Budapest on 23 October turned into [[Hungarian Revolution of 1956|a popular uprising]]. In response, Hungarian Party leaders installed reformist [[Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Hungary|Premier]] [[Imre Nagy]].{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=168–170}} Soviet forces in the city clashed with Hungarians and fired on demonstrators, with hundreds of both Hungarians and Soviets killed. Nagy called for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of Soviet troops, which a Khrushchev-led majority in the Presidium decided to obey, choosing to give the new Hungarian government a chance.{{sfn|Fursenko|2006|pp=123–124}} Khrushchev assumed that if Moscow announced liberalization in how it dealt with its allies, Nagy would adhere to the alliance with the Soviet Union.

On 30 October Nagy announced multiparty elections, and the next morning that Hungary would leave the Warsaw Pact.{{sfn|Fursenko|2006|p=125}} On 3 November, two members of the Nagy government appeared in Ukraine as the self-proclaimed heads of a provisional government and demanded Soviet intervention, which was forthcoming. The next day, Soviet troops crushed the Hungarian uprising, with a death toll of 4,000 Hungarians and several hundred Soviet troops. Nagy was arrested and later executed. Despite the international outrage over the intervention, Khrushchev defended his actions for the rest of his life. Damage to Soviet foreign relations was severe and would have been greater were it not for the timing of the [[Suez crisis]], which distracted world attention.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=168–170}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-B0116-0010-043, Berlin, VI. SED-Parteitag, 2.Tag.jpg|thumb|alt=Two smiling men raise bouquets of flowers over their heads.|Khrushchev (left) and East German leader [[Walter Ulbricht]], 1963]]
In the aftermath of these crises, Khrushchev made the statement for which he became well-remembered, "[[We will bury you]]". While many in the West took this statement as a threat, Khrushchev made the statement in a speech on peaceful coexistence with the West.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=427–428}} When questioned about the statement during his 1959 U.S. visit, Khrushchev stated that he was not referring to a literal burial, but that, through inexorable historical development, communism would replace capitalism.{{sfn|Carlson|2009|p=96}}

Khrushchev greatly improved relations with [[Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia|Yugoslavia]], which had been entirely sundered in 1948 when Stalin realized he could not control Yugoslav leader [[Josip Tito]]. Khrushchev led a Soviet delegation to Belgrade in 1955. Though a hostile Tito did everything he could to make the Soviets look foolish, Khrushchev was successful in warming relations, ending the [[Informbiro]] period.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=145–147}} During the Hungarian crisis, Tito initially supported Nagy, but Khrushchev persuaded him of the need for intervention.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=169}} Still, the intervention in Hungary damaged Moscow's relationship with Belgrade, which Khrushchev spent several years trying to repair. He was hampered by the fact that China disapproved of Yugoslavia's [[Reformism#Socialism|reformist socialism]] and attempts to conciliate Belgrade resulted in an angry Beijing.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=189}}