Editing Mind–body dualism (section)

==Arguments against dualism==

===Arguments from causal interaction===
[[File:Dualism-vs-Monism.png|320px|thumb|right|Cartesian dualism compared to three forms of monism]]

One argument against dualism is with regard to causal interaction. If consciousness (''the mind'') can exist independently of physical reality (''the brain''), one must explain how physical memories are created concerning consciousness. Dualism must therefore explain how consciousness affects physical reality. One of the main objections to dualistic interactionism is lack of explanation of how the material and immaterial are able to interact. Varieties of dualism according to which an immaterial mind causally affects the material body and vice versa have come under strenuous attack from different quarters, especially in the 20th century. Critics of dualism have often asked how something totally immaterial can affect something totally material—this is the basic '''problem of causal interaction'''.

First, it is not clear ''where'' the interaction would take place. For example, burning one's finger causes pain. Apparently there is some chain of events, leading from the burning of skin, to the stimulation of nerve endings, to something happening in the peripheral nerves of one's body that lead to one's brain, to something happening in a particular part of one's brain, and finally resulting in the sensation of pain. But pain is not supposed to be spatially locatable. It might be responded that the pain "takes place in the brain." But evidently, the pain is in the finger. This may not be a devastating criticism.

However, there is a second problem about the interaction. Namely, the question of ''how'' the interaction takes place, where in dualism "the mind" is assumed to be non-physical and by definition outside of the realm of science. The ''mechanism'' which explains the connection between the mental and the physical would therefore be a philosophical proposition as compared to a scientific theory. For example, compare such a mechanism to a physical mechanism that ''is'' well understood. Take a very simple causal relation, such as when a cue ball strikes an eight ball and causes it to go into the pocket. What happens in this case is that the cue ball has a certain amount of momentum as its mass moves across the pool table with a certain velocity, and then that momentum is transferred to the eight ball, which then heads toward the pocket. Compare this to the situation in the brain, where one wants to say that a decision causes some neurons to fire and thus causes a body to move across the room. The intention to "cross the room now" is a mental event and, as such, it does not have physical properties such as force. If it has no force, then it would seem that it could not possibly cause any neuron to fire. However, with Dualism, an explanation is required of how something without any physical properties has physical ''effects''.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|title=c. Problems of Interaction|url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/dualism/#SH7c|encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy|access-date=15 November 2012|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121028131436/http://www.iep.utm.edu/dualism/#SH7c|archive-date=28 October 2012}}</ref>

====Replies====
[[Alfred North Whitehead]], and later [[David Ray Griffin]], framed a new ontology (''[[process philosophy]]'') seeking precisely to avoid the pitfalls of ontological dualism.<ref>[[Michel Weber|Weber, Michel]], and Anderson Weekes, eds. 2009. ''[https://www.academia.edu/279961/Process_Approaches_to_Consciousness_in_Psychology_Neuroscience_and_Philosophy_of_Mind Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind]'', Whitehead Psychology Nexus Studies II. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150408022540/http://www.academia.edu/279961/Process_Approaches_to_Consciousness_in_Psychology_Neuroscience_and_Philosophy_of_Mind|date=2015-04-08}}</ref>

The explanation provided by [[Arnold Geulincx]] and [[Nicolas Malebranche]] is that of [[occasionalism]], where all mind–body interactions require the direct intervention of God.

At the time [[C. S. Lewis]] wrote ''[[Miracles (book)|Miracles]]'',<ref>{{cite book
 |author= Lewis, C.S
 |title= Miracles
 |year= 1947
 |publisher= HarperCollins
 |isbn= 978-0-688-17369-2
 |url= https://archive.org/details/giftofmiraclesma00mill
 }}</ref> [[quantum mechanics]] (and physical [[Quantum indeterminacy|indeterminism]]) was only in the initial stages of acceptance, but still Lewis stated the logical possibility that, if the physical world was proved to be indeterministic, this would provide an entry (interaction) point into the traditionally viewed closed system, where a scientifically described physically probable/improbable event could be philosophically described as an action of a non-physical entity on physical reality. He states, however, that none of the arguments in his book will rely on this. Although some [[interpretations of quantum mechanics]] consider [[wave function collapse]] to be indeterminate, in others this event is defined as deterministic.<ref name="SEPQD">{{cite encyclopedia|title=Causal Determinism of Quantum Mechanics|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/#QuaMec|encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|access-date=16 November 2012}}</ref>

===Argument from physics===
The argument from physics is closely related to the argument from causal interaction. Many physicists and consciousness researchers have argued that any action of a nonphysical mind on the brain would entail the violation of physical laws, such as the [[conservation of energy]].<ref>Wilson, D. L. 1999. "Mind-brain interaction and the violation of physical laws." pp. 185–200 in ''The Volitional Brain'', edited by B. Libet, A. Freeman, and K. Sutherland. Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic.</ref><ref>Mohrhoff, U. 1999. "The physics of interaction." pp. 165–184 in ''The Volitional Brain'', edited by B. Libet, A. Freeman, and K. Sutherland. Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic.</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Jaswal | first1 = L | year = 2005 | title = Isolating disparate challenges to Hodgson's account of free will | journal = Journal of Consciousness Studies | volume = 12 | issue = 1 |pages = 43–46}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Clark | first1 = T. W. | year = 2005a | title = Hodgson's black box | journal = Journal of Consciousness Studies | volume = 12 | issue = 1 |pages = 38–59}}</ref>

By assuming a deterministic physical universe, the objection can be formulated more precisely. When a person decides to walk across a room, it is generally understood that the decision to do so, a mental event, immediately causes a group of neurons in that person's brain to fire, a physical event, which ultimately results in his walking across the room. The problem is that if there is something totally non-physical ''causing'' a bunch of neurons to fire, then there is no ''physical'' event which causes the firing. This means that some physical energy is required to be generated against the physical laws of the deterministic universe—this is by definition a miracle and there can be no scientific explanation of (repeatable experiment performed regarding) where the ''physical'' energy for the firing came from.<ref>Baker, Gordon and Morris, Katherine J. (1996) ''Descartes' Dualism'', London: Routledge.</ref> Such interactions would violate the fundamental [[physical law|laws of physics]]. In particular, if some external source of energy is responsible for the interactions, then this would violate the law of the [[conservation of energy]].<ref>[[William Lycan|Lycan, William]]. 1996. "Philosophy of Mind." In ''[[The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy]]'', edited by N. Bunnin and E. P. Tsui-James. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.</ref> Dualistic interactionism has therefore been criticized for violating a general [[heuristic]] principle of science: the [[causal closure]] of the physical world.

====Replies====
The ''[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]''<ref name="SEP" /> and the ''[[New Catholic Encyclopedia]]''<ref name="CathEn">Maher, Michael (1909) "The Law of Conservation of Energy", ''Catholic Encyclopedia'', vol. 5, pp. 422 ff, {{cite web |url=http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05422a.htm |title=Catholic Encyclopedia: The Law of Conservation of Energy |access-date=2007-05-20 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070701235022/http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05422a.htm |archive-date=2007-07-01}}.</ref> provide two possible replies to the above objections. The first reply is that the mind may influence the ''distribution'' of energy, without altering its quantity. The second possibility is to deny that the human body is causally closed, as the [[conservation of energy]] applies only to closed systems. However, physicalists object that no evidence exists for the causal non-closure of the human body.<ref>{{cite book|last=Murphy|first=Nancy|title=Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will|year=2009|publisher=Springer|isbn=978-3642032042}}</ref> [[Robin Collins]] responds<ref>[[Robin Collins|Collins, Robin]]. 2008. "Modern Physics and the Energy Conservation Objection to Mind-Body Dualism." ''The American Philosophical Quarterly'' 45(1):31–42.</ref> that energy conservation objections misunderstand the role of energy conservation in physics. Well understood scenarios in general relativity violate energy conservation and quantum mechanics provides precedent for causal interactions, or correlation without energy or momentum exchange.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.newdualism.org/papers/R.Collins/EC-PEC.htm |title=Modern Physics and the Energy Conservation Objection to Mind-Body Dualism, by Robin Collins |access-date=2017-07-01 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170625152408/http://www.newdualism.org/papers/R.Collins/EC-PEC.htm |archive-date=2017-06-25}}</ref> However, this does not mean the mind spends energy and, despite that, it still doesn't exclude the supernatural.

Another reply is akin to parallelism—Mills holds that behavioral events are causally [[overdetermination|overdetermined]], and can be explained by either physical or mental causes alone.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Mills|first=E.|title=Interactionism and Overdetermination|journal=American Philosophical Quarterly|year=1996|volume=33|pages=105–117}}</ref> An overdetermined event is fully accounted for by multiple causes at once.<ref>{{cite book|last=Althusser|first=Louis|title="Contradiction and Overdetermination," in For Marx|year=1985|publisher=Verso |isbn=978-0-902308-79-4}}</ref> However, [[J. J. C. Smart]] and [[Paul Churchland]] have pointed out that if physical phenomena fully determine behavioral events, then by [[Occam's razor]] an unphysical mind is unnecessary.<ref>{{cite book|last=Churchland|first=Paul|title=Matter and Consciousness, Revised Edition|year=1984|publisher=MIT Press|isbn=978-0262530743}}</ref>

Howard Robinson suggests that the interaction may involve [[dark energy]], [[dark matter]] or some other currently unknown scientific process.<ref name="Rob" />

Another reply is that the interaction taking place in the human body may not be described by "billiard ball" [[classical mechanics]]. If a nondeterministic interpretation of [[quantum mechanics]] is correct then microscopic events are [[indeterminism|indeterminate]], where the degree of [[determinism]] increases with the scale of the system. Philosophers [[Karl Popper]] and [[John Carew Eccles|John Eccles]] and physicist [[Henry Stapp]] have theorized that such indeterminacy may apply at the macroscopic scale.<ref>[[Karl Popper|Popper, Karl R.]], and [[John Eccles (neurophysiologist)|John C. Eccles]]. 1977. ''The Self and Its Brain''. Berlin: Springer.</ref> However, [[Max Tegmark]] has argued that classical and quantum calculations show that [[quantum decoherence]] effects do not play a role in brain activity.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Tegmark|first=Max|title=Importance of quantum decoherence in brain processes|journal=Phys. Rev. E|date=April 2000|volume=61|issue=4|pages=4194–4206|doi=10.1103/PhysRevE.61.4194|pmid=11088215|arxiv=quant-ph/9907009|bibcode=2000PhRvE..61.4194T|s2cid=17140058}}</ref>

Yet another reply to the interaction problem is to note that it doesn't seem that there is an interaction problem for all forms of substance dualism. For instance, [[Thomism|Thomistic]] dualism doesn't obviously face any issue with regards to interaction, for in this view the soul and the body are related as form and matter.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2016/09/mind-body-interaction-whats-problem.html |title=Edward Feser: Mind-body interaction: What's the problem? |access-date=2017-04-24 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170425032034/http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2016/09/mind-body-interaction-whats-problem.html |archive-date=2017-04-25 |date=2016-09-17}}</ref>

===Argument from brain damage===
This argument has been formulated by [[Paul Churchland]], among others. The point is that, in instances of some sort of brain damage (e.g. caused by automobile accidents, drug abuse, pathological diseases, etc.), it is always the case that the mental substance and/or properties of the person are significantly changed or compromised. If the mind were a completely separate substance from the brain, how could it be possible that every single time the brain is injured, the mind is also injured? Indeed, it is very frequently the case that one can even predict and explain the kind of mental or psychological deterioration or change that human beings will undergo when specific parts of their brains are damaged. So the question for the dualist to try to confront is how can all of this be explained if the mind is a separate and immaterial substance from, or if its properties are ontologically independent of, the brain.<ref>[[Paul Churchland|Churchland, Paul]]. 1988. ''Matter and Consciousness'' (rev. ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.</ref>

[[Phineas Gage]], who suffered destruction of one or both frontal lobes by a projectile iron rod, is often cited as an example illustrating that the brain causes mind. Gage certainly exhibited some mental changes after his accident, suggesting a correlation between brain states and mental states. It has been noted, however, that Gage's most serious mental changes were only temporary,<ref>(September 2008). "Phineas Gage – Unravelling the myth". The Psychologist. 21 (9): 828–31.</ref> and that he made a reasonable social and mental recovery.<ref>Lena, M. L. (2010). "Rehabilitating Phineas Gage". Neuropsychological Rehabilitation. 20 (5): 641–58.</ref> The changes in question have almost always been distorted and exaggerated by scientific and popular literature, often relying on hearsay.<ref>Macmillan, Malcolm B. (2014). "Phineas Gage". Encyclopedia of the Neurological Sciences. Academic Press. p. 383.</ref><ref>Kotowicz, Z. (2007). "The strange case of Phineas Gage". History of the Human Sciences. 20 (1): 115–31.</ref><ref>Grafman, J. (2002). "The Structured Event Complex and the Human Prefrontal Cortex". In Stuss, D. T.; Knight, R. T. (eds.). Principles of Frontal Lobe Function. pp. 292–310.</ref> Similar examples abound; neuroscientist [[David Eagleman]] describes the case of another individual who exhibited escalating [[pedophile|pedophilic]] tendencies at two different times, and in each case was found to have tumors growing in a particular part of his brain.<ref>Choi, Charles. 21 October 2002. "[https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn2943-brain-tumour-causes-uncontrollable-paedophilia.htmlNewScientist.com, Brain tumour causes uncontrollable paedophilia]." ''[[New Scientist]]''. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150412195711/http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn2943-brain-tumour-causes-uncontrollable-paedophilia.htmlNewScientist.com,|date=2015-04-12}}.</ref><ref>[[Nigel Warburton|Warburton, Nigel]], and [[David Edmonds (philosopher)|David Edmonds]], hosts. 22 May 2011. "[https://philosophybites.com/2011/05/david-eagleman-on-morality-and-the-brain.html David Eagleman on Morality and the Brain]." ''[[Philosophy Bites]]'' (podcast).</ref>

Case studies aside, modern experiments have demonstrated that the relation between brain and mind is much more than simple correlation. By damaging, or manipulating, specific areas of the brain repeatedly under controlled conditions (e.g. in monkeys) and reliably obtaining the same results in measures of mental state and abilities, neuroscientists have shown that the relation between damage to the brain and mental deterioration is likely causal. This conclusion is further supported by data from the effects of neuro-active chemicals (e.g., those affecting [[neurotransmitters]]) on mental functions,<ref>{{cite journal|pmid=11190987 | volume=25 | issue=1 | title=Verbal and visual memory improve after choline supplementation in long-term total parenteral nutrition: a pilot study | year=2001 | journal=JPEN J Parenter Enteral Nutr | pages=30–35 |vauthors=Buchman AL, Sohel M, Brown M |doi=10.1177/014860710102500130|display-authors=etal}}</ref> but also from research on [[neurostimulation]] (direct electrical stimulation of the brain, including [[transcranial magnetic stimulation]]).<ref>''Alterations of sociomoral judgement and glucose use in the frontomedial cortex induced by electrical stimulation of the subthalamic nucleus (STN) in Parkinsonian patients (2004):'' {{cite journal |journal=Genman Medical Science |url=http://www.egms.de/de/meetings/dgnc2004/04dgnc0207.shtml |title=Alterations of sociomoral judgement and glucose utilization in the frontomedial cortex induced by electrical stimulation of the subthalamic nucleus (STN) in Parkinsonian patients |pages=DocDI.06.06 |access-date=2008-09-08 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040903084719/http://www.egms.de/de/meetings/dgnc2004/04dgnc0207.shtml |archive-date=2004-09-03 |date=2004-04-23}}</ref>

====Replies====

[[Property dualism]] and [[William Hasker]]'s "emergent dualism"<ref>[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Emergent Properties"]. Excerpt: "William Hasker (1999) goes one step further in arguing for the existence of the mind conceived as a non-composite substance which 'emerges' from the brain at a certain point in its development. He dubs his position 'emergent dualism,' and claims for it all the philosophical advantages of traditional, Cartesian substance dualism while being able to overcome a central difficulty, viz., explaining how individual brains and mental substances come to be linked in a persistent, 'monogamous' relationship. Here, Hasker, is using the term to express a view structurally like one (vitalism) that the British emergentists were anxious to disavow, thus proving that the term is capable of evoking all manner of ideas for metaphysicians."</ref> seek to avoid this problem. They assert that the mind is a property or substance that emerges from the appropriate arrangement of physical matter, and therefore could be affected by any rearrangement of matter.

Writing in the 13th century, St. [[Thomas Aquinas]] writes that "the body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as {{as written|i|t's}} origin of action." Thus, if the body is dysfunctional, the intellect will not actualize as it intends to.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1075.htm|title=Summa Theologiae: Man who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal substance: and in the first place, concerning what belongs to the essence of the soul}} Article 2, Reply to Objection 3.</ref> According to the philosopher [[C. Stephen Evans|Stephen Evans]]:

{{blockquote|We did not need [[neurophysiology]] to come to know that a person whose head is bashed in with a club quickly loses his or her ability to think or have any conscious processes. Why should we not think of neurophysiological findings as giving us detailed, precise knowledge of something that human beings have always known, or at least could have known, which is that the mind (at least in this mortal life) requires and depends on a functioning brain? We now know a lot more than we used to know about precisely ''how'' the mind depends on the body. However, ''that'' the mind depends on the body, at least prior to death, is surely not something discovered in the 20th century".<ref>[[C. Stephen Evans]], "Separable Souls: Dualism, Selfhood, and the Possibility of Life After Death." ''Christian Scholars Review'' 34 (2005): 333–34.</ref>}}

===Argument from neuroscience===
{{anchor|Argument from brain scans' ability to discern mental states}}
{{see also|Neurophilosophy|Neuroscience of free will|Neuroscience of free will#Criticisms|Thought identification}}
In some contexts, the decisions that a person makes can be detected up to 10 seconds in advance by means of scanning their brain activity.<ref>{{cite journal |title=Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain |journal=Nature Neuroscience |volume=11 |issue=5 |pages=543–545 |doi=10.1038/nn.2112 |pmid=18408715 |date=May 2008 |last1=Haynes |first1=John-Dylan |last2=Heinze |first2=Hans-Jochen |last3=Brass |first3=Marcel |last4=Soon |first4=Chun Siong|s2cid=2652613 }}</ref> Subjective experiences and covert attitudes can be detected,<ref name=readstates>{{cite journal|last=Haynes|first=John-Dylan|author2=Rees, Geraint|title=Decoding mental states from brain activity in humans|journal=Nature Reviews Neuroscience|date=July 2006|volume=7|pages=523–534|doi=10.1038/nrn1931|issue=7|pmid=16791142|s2cid=16025026}}</ref> as can mental imagery.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://despolab.berkeley.edu/files/publications/pdf/imagerot.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=2011-06-29 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110921093335/http://despolab.berkeley.edu/files/publications/pdf/imagerot.pdf |archive-date=2011-09-21}}</ref> This is strong [[empirical evidence]] that [[cognitive processes]] have a physical basis in the brain.<ref name=Cognition>{{cite journal|last=Dehaene|first=Stanislas|author2=Naccache, Lionel|title=Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework|journal=Cognition|date=April 2001|volume=79|issue=1–2|pages=1–37|doi=10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00123-2 |pmid=11164022|s2cid=1762431}}<!--|access-date=21 February 2013--></ref><ref name="Dehaene">{{cite book|last=Dehaene|first=Stanislas|publisher=MIT|title=The Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness|year=2002|page=4|isbn=978-0262541312}}</ref>

===Argument from simplicity===
The argument from simplicity is probably the simplest and also the most common form of argument against dualism of the mental. The dualist is always faced with the question of why anyone should find it necessary to believe in the existence of two, ontologically distinct, entities (mind and brain), when it seems possible and would make for a simpler thesis to test against scientific evidence, to explain the same events and properties in terms of one. It is a heuristic principle in science and philosophy not to assume the existence of more entities than is necessary for clear explanation and prediction.

This argument was criticized by [[Peter Glassen]] in a debate with [[J. J. C. Smart]] in the pages of ''[[Philosophy (journal)|Philosophy]]'' in the late 1970s and early 1980s.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Glassen | first1 = Peter | year = 1976 | title = J. J. C. Smart, Materialism and Occam's Razor | journal = Philosophy | volume = 51 | issue = 197| pages = 349–352 | doi=10.1017/s0031819100019392| s2cid = 170163667 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Smart | first1 = J. J. C. | year = 1978 | title = Is Occam's Razor a Physical Thing? | journal = Philosophy | volume = 53 | issue = 205| pages = 382–385 | doi=10.1017/s0031819100022439| s2cid = 170593277 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Glassen | first1 = Peter | year = 1983 | title = Smart, Materialism and Believing | journal = Philosophy | volume = 58 | issue = 223| pages = 95–101 | doi=10.1017/s0031819100056291| s2cid = 170472361 }}</ref> Glassen argued that, because it is not a physical entity, [[Occam's razor]] cannot consistently be appealed to by a physicalist or materialist as a justification of mental states or events, such as the belief that dualism is false. The idea is that Occam's razor may not be as "unrestricted" as it is normally described (applying to all qualitative postulates, even abstract ones) but instead concrete (only applies to physical objects). If one applies Occam's Razor unrestrictedly, then it recommends monism until pluralism either receives more support or is disproved. If one applies Occam's Razor only concretely, then it may not be used on abstract concepts (this route, however, has serious consequences for selecting between hypotheses ''about'' the abstract).<ref name=Stanford>[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/ Plato Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Simplicity]. Excerpt: "Perhaps scientists apply an unrestricted version of Occam's Razor to that portion of reality in which they are interested, namely the concrete, causal, spatiotemporal world. Or perhaps scientists apply a 'concretized' version of Occam's Razor unrestrictedly. Which is the case? The answer determines which general philosophical principle we end up with: ought we to avoid the multiplication of objects of whatever kind, or merely the multiplication of concrete objects? The distinction here is crucial for a number of central philosophical debates. Unrestricted Occam's Razor favors monism over dualism, and nominalism over platonism. By contrast, 'concretized' Occam's Razor has no bearing on these debates, since the extra entities in each case are not concrete".</ref>

This argument has also been criticized by Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad, who argues that the principle of simplicity could only be applied when there is no need for an additional entity. Despite arguments indicating the need for the soul, the principle of simplicity does not apply. Therefore, if there were no argument establishing the existence of the soul, one could deny its existence based on the principle of simplicity. However, various arguments have been put forth to establish its existence. These arguments demonstrate that while neuroscience can explain the mysteries of the material brain, certain significant issues, such as personal identity and free will, remain beyond the scope of neuroscience. The crux of the matter lies in the essential limitations of neuroscience and the potency of substance dualism in explaining these phenomena.<ref name="Mousavirad 2023"/>