Editing Korean Air Lines Flight 007 (section)

==Investigations==
===NTSB===
Since the aircraft had departed from U.S. soil and U.S. nationals had died in the incident, the [[National Transportation Safety Board]] (NTSB) was legally required to investigate. On the morning of September 1, the NTSB chief in Alaska, James Michelangelo, received an order from the NTSB in Washington at the behest of the State Department requiring all documents relating to the NTSB investigation to be sent to Washington and notifying him that the State Department would now conduct the investigation.<ref>Pearson, p. 127</ref>

The U.S. State Department, after closing the NTSB investigation on the grounds that it was not an accident, pursued an ICAO investigation instead. Commentators such as Johnson point out that this action was illegal, and that in deferring the investigation to the ICAO, the Reagan administration effectively precluded any politically or militarily sensitive information from being [[subpoena]]ed that might have embarrassed the administration or contradicted its version of events.<ref>Johnson, p. 227</ref> Unlike the NTSB, ICAO can subpoena neither persons nor documents and is dependent on the governments involved—in this incident, the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and South Korea—to supply evidence voluntarily.

===Initial ICAO investigation (1983)===
The [[International Civil Aviation Organization]] (ICAO) had only one experience of investigation of an air disaster before the KAL&nbsp;007 shoot-down. This was the incident of February 21, 1973, when [[Libyan Arab Airlines Flight 114]] was shot down by Israeli F-4 jets over the Sinai Peninsula. ICAO convention required the state in whose territory the incident had taken place (the Soviet Union) to conduct an investigation together with the country of registration (South Korea), the country whose air traffic control the aircraft was flying under (Japan), as well as the country of the aircraft's manufacturer (US).

The ICAO investigation, led by Caj Frostell,<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.isasi.org/reachout_members.html#Frostell |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100402225923/http://www.isasi.org/reachout_members.html |archive-date=April 2, 2010 |title=ISASI – Air Safety Through Accident Investigation |publisher=Isasi.org |date=January 1, 2004 |access-date=August 15, 2012 |url-status=dead}}</ref> did not have the authority to compel the states involved to hand over evidence, instead having to rely on what they voluntarily submitted.<ref>Johnson, p. 231</ref> Consequently, the investigation did not have access to sensitive evidence such as radar data, intercepts, ATC tapes, or the [[Flight Data Recorder]] (FDR) and [[Cockpit Voice Recorder]] (CVR) (whose discovery the U.S.S.R. had kept secret). A number of simulations were conducted with the assistance of Boeing and [[Litton Industries|Litton]] (the manufacturer of the navigation system).<ref>Johnson, p. 232</ref>

The ICAO released their report on December 2, 1983, which concluded that the violation of Soviet airspace was accidental: One of two explanations for the aircraft's deviation was that the [[autopilot]] had remained in <small>HEADING</small> hold instead of [[Inertial navigation|<small>INS</small> mode]] after departing [[Anchorage, Alaska|Anchorage]]. They postulated that this [[Air navigation|inflight navigational error]] was caused by either the crew's failure to select <small>INS</small> mode or the inertial navigation not activating when selected because the aircraft was already too far off track.<ref name="NASA"/> It was determined that the crew did not notice this error or subsequently perform navigational checks, which would have revealed that the aircraft was diverging further and further from its assigned route. This was later deemed to be caused by a "lack of situational awareness and flight deck coordination".<ref name="ICAO 2"/>

The report included a statement by the Soviet Government claiming "no remains of the victims, the instruments or their components or the flight recorders have so far been discovered".<ref>Appendix F, ICAO 83</ref> This statement was subsequently shown to be untrue by [[Boris Yeltsin]]'s release in 1993 of a November 1983 [[Memorandum|memo]] from [[KGB]] head [[Viktor Chebrikov]] and Defence Minister Dmitriy Ustinov to Yuri Andropov. This memo stated, "In the third decade of October this year the equipment in question (the recorder of in-flight parameters and the recorder of voice communications by the flight crew with ground air traffic surveillance stations and between themselves) was brought aboard a search vessel and forwarded to Moscow by air for decoding and translation at the Air Force Scientific Research Institute."<ref>[[Izvestia]] #228, October 16, 1992</ref> The Soviet Government statement would further be contradicted by Soviet civilian divers who later recalled that they viewed the wreckage of the aircraft on the bottom of the sea for the first time on September 15, two weeks after the plane had been shot down.<ref>May 7, 1991, p. 6</ref>

Following the publication of the report, the ICAO adopted a resolution condemning the Soviet Union for the attack.<ref name="Merrills">Merrills, p. 61</ref> Furthermore, the report led to a unanimous amendment in May 1984—though not coming into force until October 1, 1998—to the [[Convention on International Civil Aviation]] that defined the use of force against civilian airliners in more detail.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.icao.int/ICDB/HTML/English/Representative%20Bodies/Council/Working%20Papers%20by%20Session/158/C.158.WP.11186.en/C.158.WP.11186.EN.HTM |publisher=[[International Civil Aviation Organization]] |date=March 5, 1999 |title=Infractions of the Convention On International Civil Aviation |access-date=January 6, 2009 |location=Montreal |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20030924015049/http://www.icao.int/ICDB/HTML/English/Representative%20Bodies/Council/Working%20Papers%20by%20Session/158/C.158.WP.11186.en/C.158.WP.11186.EN.HTM |archive-date=September 24, 2003}}</ref> The amendment to section 3(d) reads in part: "The contracting States recognize that every State must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, in case of interception, the lives of persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered."<ref>{{cite web |url=http://intelligence.senate.gov/perureport.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040124025158/http://intelligence.senate.gov/perureport.pdf |archive-date=January 24, 2004 |title=A Review of United States Assistance to Peruvian Counter-Drug Air Interdiction Efforts and the Shootdown of a Civilian Aircraft on April 20, 2001 |publisher=Select Committee on Intelligence |date=October 2001 |access-date=February 14, 2009}}</ref>

===U.S. Air Force radar data===
It is customary for the Air Force to impound radar trackings involving possible litigation in cases of aviation accidents.<ref name="Pearson, p. 309">Pearson, p. 309</ref> In the civil litigation for damages, the [[United States Department of Justice]] explained that the tapes from the Air Force radar installation at King Salmon, Alaska, pertinent to KAL&nbsp;007's flight in the Bethel area had been destroyed and could therefore not be supplied to the plaintiffs. At first Justice Department lawyer Jan Van Flatern stated that they were destroyed 15 days after the shoot-down. Later, he said he had "misspoken" and changed the time of destruction to 30 hours after the event. A [[The Pentagon|Pentagon]] spokesman concurred, saying that the tapes are recycled for re-use from 24–30 hours afterward;<ref>U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, ''In re: Korean Airlines disaster of September 1, 1983'', February 28, 1985</ref> the fate of KAL&nbsp;007 was known inside this timeframe.<ref name="Pearson, p. 309"/>

===Interim developments===
[[File:Boris Yeltsin 21 February 1989-1.jpg|thumb|[[Boris Yeltsin]]]]
Hans Ephraimson-Abt, whose daughter Alice Ephraimson-Abt had died on the flight, chaired the ''American Association for Families of KAL&nbsp;007 Victims''. He single-handedly pursued three U.S. administrations for answers about the flight, flying to Washington 250 times and meeting with 149 [[United States Department of State|State Department]] officials. Following the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., Ephraimson-Abt persuaded U.S. Senators [[Ted Kennedy]], [[Sam Nunn]], [[Carl Levin]], and [[Bill Bradley]] to write to the Soviet President, [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] requesting information about the flight.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Witkin |first1=Richard |title=Soviets Raise Hopes on Answers to Korean Crash |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/07/world/soviets-raise-hopes-on-answers-to-korean-crash.html |access-date=June 21, 2019 |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=January 7, 1991}}</ref>

''[[Glasnost]]'' reforms in the same year brought about a relaxation of [[Media freedom in Russia|press censorship]]; consequently reports started to appear in the Soviet press suggesting that the Soviet military knew the location of the wreckage and had possession of the flight recorders.<ref name="Illesh-Eng"/><ref>Charles, p. 16</ref> On December 10, 1991, Senator [[Jesse Helms]] of the [[United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations|Committee on Foreign Relations]], wrote to Boris Yeltsin requesting information concerning the survival of passengers and crew of KAL&nbsp;007 including the fate of Congressman Larry McDonald.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.rescue007.org/helms_letter.htm |title=Helms' letter to Yeltsin |publisher=Rescue007.org |date=October 25, 2008 |access-date=April 5, 2010}}</ref>

On June 17, 1992, President Yeltsin revealed that after the [[1991 Soviet coup attempt|1991 failed coup attempt]], concerted attempts were made to locate Soviet-era documents relating to KAL&nbsp;007. He mentioned the discovery of "a memorandum from K.G.B. to the Central Committee of the Communist Party," stating that a tragedy had taken place and adding that there are documents "which would clarify the entire picture." Yeltsin said the memo continued to say that "these documents are so well concealed that it is doubtful that our children will be able to find them."<ref name="NYT1992">{{cite news |url=https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE6D61138F93BA25755C0A964958260 |work=[[The New York Times]] |title=Summit In Washington: Reporter's Notebook; The 'Burly' Yeltsin Acquires a New Kind of Stature: Major World Figure |author=Wines, Michael |date=June 18, 1992 |access-date=January 30, 2009}}</ref> On September 11, 1992, Yeltsin officially acknowledged the existence of the recorders and promised to give the South Korean government a transcript of the flight recorder contents as found in KGB files.

In October 1992, Hans Ephraimson-Abt led a delegation of families and U.S. State Department officials to Moscow at the invitation of President Yeltsin.<ref name="Hoffman"/> During a state ceremony at St. Catherine's Hall in the [[Kremlin]], the KAL family delegation was handed a portfolio containing partial transcripts of the KAL&nbsp;007 cockpit voice recorder, translated into Russian, and documents of the [[Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Politburo]] pertaining to the tragedy.

During an official visit to Seoul in November 1992 to improve bilateral relations, President Yeltsin handed the two recorder containers to Korean President [[Roh Tae-woo]], but not the tapes themselves. The following month, the ICAO voted to reopen the KAL&nbsp;007 investigations in order to take the newly released information into account. The tapes were handed to ICAO in Paris on January 8, 1993.<ref name="tapes">{{cite press release |url=http://legacy.icao.int/icao/en/nr/1993/pio199301_e.pdf |title=KAL Tapes To Be Handed Over To ICAO |date=January 1993 |publisher=[[International Civil Aviation Organization]] |access-date=January 31, 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121209114516/http://legacy.icao.int/icao/en/nr/1993/pio199301_e.pdf |archive-date=December 9, 2012}}</ref> Also handed over at the same time were tapes of the ground-to-air communications of the Soviet military.<ref name="Sayle"/> The tapes were transcribed by the [[Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety]] (BEA) in Paris in the presence of representatives from Japan, The Russian Federation, South Korea, and the United States.<ref name="Sayle">{{cite news |title=Closing The File On Flight 007 |url=https://www.newyorker.com/archive/1993/12/13/1993_12_13_090_TNY_CARDS_000368996 |date=December 13, 1993 |access-date=January 31, 2009 |author=Sayle, Murray |magazine=The New Yorker}}</ref>

A 1993 official enquiry by the Russian Federation absolved the Soviet hierarchy of blame, determining that the incident was a case of mistaken identity.<ref name="Pry">Pry, pp. 27–32</ref> On May 28, 1993, the ICAO presented its second report to the [[Secretary-General of the United Nations]].

====Soviet memoranda====
[[File:Mikhail Merchink.jpg|thumb|''Mikhail Merchink'', lead Soviet vessel in simulated search]]

In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin disclosed five top-secret memos dating from a few weeks after the downing of KAL&nbsp;007 in 1983.<ref group="note">These memos were published in the Soviet news magazine, [[Izvestia]] #228, October 15, 1992, shortly after being made public by Yeltsin.</ref> The memos contained Soviet communications (from KGB Chief [[Viktor Chebrikov]] and Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov to General Secretary Yuri Andropov) that indicated that they knew the location of KAL&nbsp;007's wreckage while they were simulating a search and harassing the American Navy; they had found the sought-after [[cockpit voice recorder]] on October 20, 1983 (50 days after the incident),<ref name="Bohlen">{{cite news |url=https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE1D91030F935A25753C1A964958260 |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=October 16, 1992 |title=Tape Displays the Anguish On Jet the Soviets Downed |author=Bohlen, Celestine |access-date=February 1, 2009}}</ref> and had decided to keep this knowledge secret, the reason being that the tapes could not unequivocally support their firmly held view that KAL&nbsp;007's flight to Soviet territory was a deliberately planned intelligence mission.<ref>Daniloff, p. 303</ref><ref>Andrew, p. 60</ref>

{{quote box|align=right|width=33%|quote=Simulated search efforts in the Sea of Japan are being performed by our vessels at present in order to dis-inform the U.S. and Japan. These activities will be discontinued in accordance with a specific plan...

Therefore, if the flight recorders shall be transferred to western countries their objective data can equally be used by the U.S.S.R. and the western countries in proving the opposite viewpoints on the nature of the flight of the South Korean airplane. In such circumstances, a new phase in anti-Soviet hysteria cannot be excluded.

In connection with all mentioned above, it seems highly preferable not to transfer the flight recorders to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) or any third party willing to decipher their contents. The fact that the recorders are in possession of the U.S.S.R. shall be kept secret...

As far as we are aware neither the U.S. nor Japan has any information on the flight recorders. We have made necessary efforts in order to prevent any disclosure of the information in the future.

Looking to your approval.|author=D. Ustinov, V. Chebrikov (photo)<ref group="note">{{cite web |url=http://www.airliners.net/articles/graphics/chebrikov.jpg |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060623025748/http://www.airliners.net/articles/graphics/chebrikov.jpg |archive-date=2006-06-23 |title=Photo of Chebrikov |publisher=Airliners.net |access-date=5 April 2010}}</ref> December 1983}}

The third memo acknowledges that analysis of the recorder tapes showed no evidence of the Soviet interceptor attempting to contact KAL&nbsp;007 via radio nor any indication that the KAL&nbsp;007 had been given warning shots.

<blockquote>However in case the flight recorders shall become available to the western countries their data may be used for Confirmation of no attempt by the intercepting aircraft to establish radio contact with the intruder plane on 121.5&nbsp;MHz and no tracers warning shots in the last section of the flight<ref>Conclusions by the Group of Experts of the Defense Ministry, KGB of the U.S.S.R. and Ministry of Aerospace Industry, Head of the Group Lieutenant-General of Aviation Makarov
The staff of the Group
Lieutenant-General Engineer Tichomirov
Major-General Engineer Didenko
Major-General of Aviation Stepanov
Major-General of Aviation Kovtun
Corresponding Member of Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. Fedosov
November 28, 1983</ref>
</blockquote>

That the Soviet search was simulated (while they knew the wreckage lay elsewhere) also is suggested by the article of Mikhail Prozumentshchikov, Deputy Director of the [[Russian State Archives of Recent History]], commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the airplane's shoot-down. Commenting on the Soviet and American searches: "Since the U.S.S.R., for natural reasons, knew better where the Boeing had been downed...it was very problematical to retrieve anything, especially as the U.S.S.R. was not particularly interested".<ref>{{cite web |author=Prozumentshchikov |first=Mikhail |date=September 1, 2003 |title=Commentary: 20th Anniversary of Flight 007 |url=http://www.jamesoberg.com/09012003commentarymikhailkal.html |access-date=January 13, 2009 |work=jamesoberg.com |publisher=[[RIA Novosti]]}}</ref>

===Revised ICAO report (1993)===
On November 18, 1992, Russian President [[Boris Yeltsin]], in a goodwill gesture to South Korea during a visit to Seoul to ratify a new [[treaty]], released both the flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) of KAL&nbsp;007.<ref>Ross, ''East Asia in Transition: Toward a New Regional Order''</ref> Initial South Korean research showed the FDR to be empty and the CVR to have an unintelligible copy. The Russians then released the recordings to the ICAO Secretary General.<ref>{{cite press release |url=http://legacy.icao.int/icao/en/nr/1993/pio199301_e.pdf |title=KAL Tapes to be Handed Over to ICAO |access-date=January 14, 2009 |date=January 1993 |location=Montreal |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121209114516/http://legacy.icao.int/icao/en/nr/1993/pio199301_e.pdf |archive-date=December 9, 2012}}</ref> The ICAO report continued to support the initial assertion that KAL&nbsp;007 accidentally flew in Soviet airspace,<ref name="ICAO 2">{{cite press release |title=ICAO Completes Fact-Finding Investigation |url=http://www.icao.int/cgi/goto_m.pl?icao%2Fen%2Ftrivia%2Fkal_flight_007.htm |date=June 16, 1993 |access-date=January 16, 2009 |location=Montreal |archive-date=September 27, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110927014036/http://www.icao.int/cgi/goto_m.pl?icao%2Fen%2Ftrivia%2Fkal_flight_007.htm |url-status=dead}}</ref> after listening to the flight crew's conversations recorded by the CVR, and confirming that either the aircraft had flown on a constant magnetic heading instead of activating the INS and following its assigned waypoints, or, if it had activated the INS, it had been activated when the aircraft had already deviated beyond the 7{{sfrac|1|2}}-[[nautical mile]] Desired Track Envelope within which the waypoints would have been captured.

[[File:Grossi-7.png|thumb|left|A typical digital [[flight data recorder]] and [[cockpit voice recorder]]<ref group="note">For illustration only – KAL&nbsp;007 did not necessarily use this type of recorder.</ref>]]

In addition, the Russian Federation released "Transcript of Communications. U.S.S.R. Air Defence Command Centres on Sakhalin Island" transcripts to ICAO—this new evidence triggered the revised ICAO report in 1993 "The Report of the Completion of the Fact-Finding Investigation",<ref>{{cite press release |url=http://www.icao.int/icao/en/nr/1993/pio199308_e.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090305141141/http://www.icao.int/icao/en/nr/1993/pio199308_e.pdf |title=ICAO Completes Fact-Finding Investigation |year=1993 |publisher=[[International Civil Aviation Organization]] |archive-date=March 5, 2009 |location=Montreal}}</ref> and is appended to it. These transcripts (of two reels of tape, each containing multiple tracks) are time specified, some to the second, of the communications between the various command posts and other military facilities on Sakhalin from the time of the initial orders for the shoot-down and then through the stalking of KAL&nbsp;007 by Major Osipovich in his Su-15 interceptor, the attack as seen and commented on by General Kornukov, Commander of [[Sokol Air Base]], down the ranks to the Combat Controller Captain Titovnin.<ref name="ICAO pp. 48">ICAO '93, Information Paper No. 1, pp. 48–208</ref>

The transcripts include the post-attack flight of KAL&nbsp;007 until it had reached Moneron Island, the descent of KAL&nbsp;007 over Moneron, the initial Soviet SAR missions to Moneron, the futile search of the support interceptors for KAL&nbsp;007 on the water, and ending with the debriefing of Osipovich on return to base. Some of the communications are the telephone conversations between superior officers and subordinates and involve commands to them, while other communications involve the recorded responses to what was then being viewed on radar tracking KAL&nbsp;007. These multi-track communications from various command posts telecommunicating at the same minute and seconds as other command posts were communicating provide a "composite" picture of what was taking place.<ref name="ICAO pp. 48"/>

The data from the CVR and the FDR revealed that the recordings broke off after the first minute and 44&nbsp;seconds of KAL&nbsp;007's post-missile detonation 12&nbsp;minute flight. The remaining minutes of the flight would be supplied by the Russia 1992 submission to ICAO of the real-time Soviet military communication of the shoot-down and aftermath. The fact that both recorder tapes stopped exactly at the same time 1&nbsp;minute and 44&nbsp;seconds after missile detonation (18:38:02 UTC) without the tape portions for the more than 10 minutes of KAL&nbsp;007's post-detonation flight before it descended below radar tracking (18:38 UTC) finds no explanation in the ICAO analysis: "It could not be established why both flight recorders simultaneously ceased to operate 104 seconds after the attack. The power supply cables were fed to the rear of the aircraft in raceways on opposite sides of the fuselage until they came together behind the two recorders."<ref name="ICAO93-55"/>

===Passenger pain and suffering===
Passenger [[pain and suffering]] was an important factor in determining the level of compensation that was paid by Korean Air Lines.

Fragments from the [[proximity fuse]]d R-98 medium range air-to-air missile exploding {{convert|50|m|ft}} behind the tail caused punctures to the [[Cabin pressurization|pressurized passenger cabin]].<ref name="ICAO93-93"/> When one of the flight crew radioed [[Tokyo Area Control Center|Tokyo Area Control]] one minute and two seconds after missile detonation his breathing was already "accentuated", indicating to ICAO analysts that he was speaking through the microphone located in his oxygen mask, "Korean Air 007 ah... We are... Rapid compressions. Descend to 10,000."<ref name="ICAO '93, p. 35">ICAO '93, p. 35</ref>

Two expert witnesses testified at a trial before then Magistrate Judge [[Naomi Reice Buchwald]] of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They addressed the issue of pre-death pain and suffering. Captain James McIntyre, an experienced Boeing 747 pilot, and aircraft accident investigator, testified that shrapnel from the missile caused [[Uncontrolled decompression|rapid decompression]] of the cabin, but left the passengers sufficient time to don oxygen masks: "McIntyre testified that, based upon his estimate of the extent of damage the aircraft sustained, all passengers survived the initial impact of the shrapnel from the missile explosion. In McIntyre's expert opinion, at least 12&nbsp;minutes elapsed between the impact of the shrapnel and the crash of the plane, and the passengers remained conscious throughout."<ref>''See Hollie v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd.'', 60 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1995) (decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Nos. 907, 1057 August Term, 1994 (Argued: April 5, 1995, Decided: July 12, 1995, Docket Nos. 94–7208, 94–7218)).</ref>