Editing James G. Blaine (section)

=== Latin America and reciprocity ===
Soon after taking office, Blaine revived his old idea of an international conference of Western hemisphere nations.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=118–122|Muzzey||2pp=426–437|Pletcher||3pp=56–57}} The result was the [[First International Conference of American States]], which met in Washington in 1890.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=118–122|Muzzey||2pp=426–437|Pletcher||3pp=56–57}} Blaine and Harrison had high hopes for the conference, including proposals for a [[customs union]], a pan-American railroad line, and an arbitration process to settle disputes among member nations.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=118–122|Muzzey||2pp=426–437|Pletcher||3pp=56–57}} Their overall goal was to extend trade and political influence over the entire hemisphere; some of the other nations understood this and were wary of deepening ties with the United States to the exclusion of European powers.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=118–122|Muzzey||2pp=426–437|Pletcher||3pp=56–57}} Blaine said publicly that his only interest was in "annexation of trade," not annexation of territory, but privately he wrote to Harrison of a desire for some territorial enlargement of the United States:

{{blockquote|I think there are only three places that are of value enough to be taken&nbsp;... One is Hawaii and the others are [[Cuba]] and [[Puerto Rico|Porto Rico]] {{sic}}. Cuba and Porto Rico are not now imminent and will not be for a generation. Hawaii may come up for decision at an unexpected hour and I hope we shall be prepared to decide it in the affirmative.{{sfn|Crapol|pp=122–124}}}}

Congress was not as enthusiastic about a customs union as Blaine and Harrison were, but tariff reciprocity provisions were ultimately included in the [[McKinley Tariff]] that reduced duties on some inter-American trade.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=120–122|Calhoun||2pp=81–82}} Otherwise, the conference achieved none of Blaine's goals in the short-term, but did lead to further communication and what would eventually become the [[Organization of American States]].{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=120–122|Calhoun||2pp=81–82}}

[[File:Uss baltimore c-3.jpg|thumb|left|Sailors from the {{USS|Baltimore|C-3|6}} caused the major foreign affairs crisis of Blaine's second term as Secretary of State.]]

In 1891, [[Baltimore Crisis|a diplomatic crisis]] arose in [[Chile]] that drove a wedge between Harrison and Blaine. The American minister to Chile, [[Patrick Egan (land reformer and diplomat)|Patrick Egan]], a political friend of Blaine's, granted asylum to Chileans who were seeking refuge from the [[1891 Chilean Civil War|Chilean Civil War]].{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=415–416|Socolofsky & Spetter||2p=146|Healy||3p=207}} Chile was already suspicious of Blaine because of his War of the Pacific diplomacy ten years earlier, and this incident raised tensions even further.{{sfn|Crapol|pp=130–131}} When sailors from the ''[[USS Baltimore (C-3)|Baltimore]]'' took [[shore leave]] in [[Valparaíso]], a fight broke out, resulting in the deaths of two American sailors and three dozen arrested.{{sfnm|Muzzey||1p=418|Calhoun||2p=127}} When the news reached Washington, Blaine was in Bar Harbor recuperating from a bout of ill health and Harrison himself drafted a demand for reparations.{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=419–421|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=147–149}} The Chilean foreign minister, [[Manuel Antonio Matta]], replied that Harrison's message was "erroneous or deliberately incorrect" and said that the Chilean government was treating the affair the same as any other criminal matter.{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=419–421|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=147–149}} Tensions increased as Harrison threatened to break off diplomatic relations unless the United States received a suitable apology.{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=419–421|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=147–149}} Blaine returned to the capital and made conciliatory overtures to the Chilean government, offering to submit the dispute to arbitration and recall Egan.{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=419–421|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=147–149}} Harrison still insisted on an apology and submitted a special message to Congress about the threat of war.{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=421–423|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=150–152}} Chile issued an apology for the incident, and the threat of war subsided.{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=421–423|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=150–152}}