Editing James Callaghan (section)

==Historiography==
His contribution and legacy are still contested. The left-wing of the Labour Party considers him a traitor whose betrayals of true socialism laid the foundations for [[Thatcherism]].<ref>Ken Coates, ''What Went Wrong?: Explaining the Fall of the Labour Government'' (2008).</ref> They point to his decision in 1976 to allow the IMF to control the government budget. They accuse him of abandoning the traditional Labour commitment to full employment. They blame his rigorous pursuit of a policy of controlling income growth for the Winter of Discontent.<ref>David Loades, ed., ''Reader's Guide to British History'' (2003) 1:213–15.</ref> Writers on the right of the Labour Party complained that he was a weak leader who was unable to stand up to the left.<ref>Stephen Haseler, ''Tragedy of Labour'' (1981).</ref> New Labour writers who admire [[Tony Blair]] identify Callaghan with the old-style partisanship that was a dead end, and which a new generation of modernisers had to repudiate.<ref>Philip Gould, ''The Unfinished Revolution: How the Modernisers Saved the Labour Party'' (1998).{{page needed|date=November 2024}}</ref>

Practically all commentators agree that Callaghan made a serious mistake by not calling an election in the autumn of 1978. [[Bernard Donoughue]], a senior official in his government, depicts Callaghan as a strong and efficient administrator who stood heads above{{Sic}} his predecessor [[Harold Wilson]].<ref>Bernard Donoughue, ''Prime Minister: The Conduct of Policy Under Harold Wilson and James Callaghan'' (1987)</ref> The standard scholarly biography by [[Kenneth O. Morgan]] is generally favourable{{snd}}at least for the middle of his premiership{{snd}}while admitting failures at the beginning, at the end, and in his leadership role following [[Margaret Thatcher]]'s victory. The treatment found in most textbooks and surveys of the period remains largely negative.<ref>[[Kenneth O. Morgan]], ''Callaghan: A Life'' (1998).</ref>

Historians [[Alan Sked]] and Chris Cook have summarised the general consensus of historians regarding Labour in power in the 1970s:

{{blockquote|If Wilson's record as prime minister was soon felt to have been one of failure, that sense of failure was powerfully reinforced by Callaghan's term as premier. Labour, it seemed, was incapable of positive achievements. It was unable to control inflation, unable to control the unions, unable to solve the Irish problem, unable to solve the Rhodesian question, unable to secure its proposals for Welsh and Scottish devolution, unable to reach a popular ''modus vivendi'' with the Common Market, unable even to maintain itself in power until it could go to the country at the date of its own choosing. It was little wonder, therefore, that Mrs Thatcher resoundingly defeated it in 1979.<ref>Sked, Alan, and Chris Cook, ''Post-War Britain: A Political History'' (4th edn 1993), p. 324.</ref>}}