Editing Hamas (section)

===Social services wing===
Hamas developed its social welfare programme by replicating the model established by Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. For Hamas, charity and the development of one's community are both prescribed by religion and to be understood as forms of resistance.{{sfn|Dunning|2016|p=136}} In Islamic tradition, {{transliteration|ar|dawah}} ({{translation|literal=yes|"the call to God"}}) obliges the faithful to reach out to others by both proselytising and by charitable works, and typically the latter centre on the mosques which make use of both {{transliteration|ar|[[waqf]]}} endowment resources and charitable donations ({{transliteration|ar|[[zakat]]}}, one of the five pillars of Islam) to fund grassroots services such as nurseries, schools, orphanages, soup kitchens, women's activities, library services and even sporting clubs within a larger context of preaching and political discussions.{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=16–23}} In the 1990s, some 85% of its budget was allocated to the provision of social services.{{sfn|Phillips|2011|p=78}} Hamas has been called perhaps the most significant social services actor in Palestine. By 2000, Hamas or its affiliated charities ran roughly 40% of the social institutions in the West Bank and Gaza and, with other Islamic charities, by 2005, was supporting 120,000 individuals with monthly financial support in Gaza.{{sfn|Shitrit|2015|p=71}} Part of the appeal of these institutions is that they fill a vacuum in the administration by the PLO of the Palestinian territories, which had failed to cater to the demand for jobs and broad social services, and is widely viewed as corrupt.{{sfn|Phillips|2011|p=75}} As late as 2005, the budget of Hamas, drawing on global charity contributions, was mostly tied up in covering running expenses for its social programmes, which extended from the supply of housing, food and water for the needy to more general functions such as financial aid, medical assistance, educational development and religious instruction. A certain accounting flexibility allowed these funds to cover both charitable causes and military operations, permitting transfer from one to the other.{{sfn|Davis|2016|pp=47ff}}

The {{transliteration|ar|dawah}} infrastructure itself was understood, within the Palestinian context, as providing the soil from which a militant opposition to the occupation would flower.{{efn|'In a 1995 lecture, Sheikh Jamil Hamami, a party to the foundation of Hamas and a senior member of its West Bank leadership, expounded the importance of Hamas' {{transliteration|ar|dawa}} infrastructure as the soil from which militancy would flower.'{{sfn|Levitt|2006|p=23}}}} In this regard it differs from the rival [[Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine|Palestinian Islamic Jihad]] which lacks any social welfare network, and relies on spectacular terrorist attacks to recruit adherents.{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=25–26}} In 2007, through funding from Iran, Hamas managed to allocate at a cost of $60&nbsp;million, monthly stipends of $100 for 100,000 workers, and a similar sum for 3,000 fishermen [[Blockade of the Gaza Strip#Effect on the fishing industry|laid idle by Israel's imposition of restrictions]] on fishing offshore, plus grants totalling $45&nbsp;million to detainees and their families.<ref>Mohsen Saleh, [https://books.google.com/books?id=LGVkCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA198 ''The Palestinian Strategic Report 2006''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320154908/https://books.google.com/books?id=LGVkCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA198 |date=20 March 2024 }}, Al Manhal, 2007 p. 198.</ref> [[Matthew Levitt]] argues that Hamas grants to people are subject to a rigorous cost-benefit analysis of how beneficiaries will support Hamas, with those linked to terrorist activities receiving more than others.<ref>James J.F. Forrest, "Conclusion", in James Dingley, [https://books.google.com/books?id=CVJ_AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA290 ''Combating Terrorism in Northern Ireland''], Routledge, 2008 pp. 280–300 [290].</ref> Israel holds the families of suicide bombers accountable and bulldozes their homes, whereas the families of Hamas activists who have been killed or wounded during militant operations are given an initial, one-time grant varying between $500–$5,000, together with a $100 monthly allowance. Rent assistance is also given to families whose homes have been destroyed by Israeli bombing though families unaffiliated with Hamas are said to receive less.{{sfn|Phillips|2011|p=81}}{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=122–23}}

Until 2007, these activities extended to the West Bank, but, after a PLO crackdown, now continue exclusively in the Gaza Strip.{{sfn|Davis|2016|p=48}} After the [[2013 Egyptian coup d'état]] deposed the elected Muslim Brotherhood government of [[Mohamed Morsi]] in 2013, Hamas found itself in a financial straitjacket and has since endeavoured to throw the burden of responsibility for public works infrastructure in the Gaza Strip back onto the Palestinian National Authority, but without success.{{sfn|Davis|2016|pp=48–49}}