Editing H. H. Asquith (section)

===July Crisis and outbreak of World War I===
{{main|Causes of World War I|July Crisis}}
[[File:Portrait of Edward Grey, 1st Viscount Grey of Fallodon.jpg|thumb|left|[[Sir Edward Grey]]]]
The assassination of [[Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria]] in [[Sarajevo]] on 28 June 1914 initiated a month of unsuccessful diplomatic attempts to avoid war.{{sfn|Cassar|p=11}} These attempts ended with Grey's proposal for a four-power conference of Britain, Germany, France and Italy, following the Austrian ultimatum to [[Serbia]] on the evening of 23 July. Grey's initiative was rejected by Germany as "not practicable".{{sfn|Gilbert 1995|p=23}} During this period, George Cassar considers that "the country was overwhelmingly opposed to intervention."{{sfn|Cassar|p=19}} Much of Asquith's cabinet was similarly inclined, Lloyd George told a journalist on 27 July that "there could be no question of our taking part in any war in the first instance. He knew of no Minister who would be in favour of it."{{sfn|Gilbert 1995|p=23}} and wrote in his ''War Memoirs'' that before the German ultimatum to Belgium on 3 August "The Cabinet was hopelessly divided—fully one third, if not one half, being opposed to our entry into the War. After the German ultimatum to Belgium the Cabinet was almost unanimous."{{sfn|Lloyd George Volume I|p=66}} Asquith himself, while growing more aware of the impending catastrophe, was still uncertain of the necessity for Britain's involvement. On 24 July, he wrote to Venetia, "We are within measurable, or imaginable, distance of a real [[Armageddon]]. Happily there seems to be no reason why we should be anything more than spectators."{{sfn|Asquith 1985|p=123}}

During the continuing escalation Asquith "used all his experience and authority to keep his options open"{{sfn|Cassar|p=20}} and adamantly refused to commit his government by saying, "The worst thing we could do would be to announce to the world at the present moment that in ''no circumstances'' would we intervene."{{sfn|Asquith 1985|p=133}} But he recognised Grey's clear commitment to Anglo-French unity and, following Russian mobilisation on 30 July,{{sfn|Gilbert 1995|p=27}} and the [[Wilhelm II, German Emperor|Kaiser's]] ultimatum to the [[Nicholas II|Tsar]] on 1 August, he recognised the inevitability of war.{{sfn|Cassar|p=15}} From this point, he committed himself to participation, despite continuing Cabinet opposition. As he said, "There is a strong party reinforced by Ll George[, ] Morley and Harcourt who are against any kind of intervention. Grey will never consent and I shall not separate myself from him."{{sfn|Asquith 1985|p=146}} Also, on 2 August, he received confirmation of Conservative support from Bonar Law.{{sfn|Koss|p=159}} In one of two extraordinary Cabinets held on that Sunday, Grey informed members of the 1912 Anglo-French naval talks and Asquith secured agreement to mobilise the fleet.{{sfn|Hastings|p=88}}

On Monday 3 August, the Belgian Government rejected the German demand for free passage through its country and in the afternoon, "with gravity and unexpected eloquence",{{sfn|Koss|p=159}} Grey spoke in the Commons and called for British action "against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any power".{{sfn|Hastings|p=93}} [[Basil Liddell Hart]] considered that this speech saw the "hardening (of) British opinion to the point of intervention".{{sfn|Liddell Hart|p=50}} The following day Asquith saw the King and an ultimatum to Germany demanding withdrawal from Belgian soil was issued with a deadline of midnight Berlin time, 11.00&nbsp;p.m. ([[GMT]]). Margot Asquith described the moment of expiry, somewhat inaccurately, in these terms: "(I joined) Henry in the Cabinet room. [[Robert Crewe-Milnes, 1st Marquess of Crewe|Lord Crewe]] and Sir Edward Grey were already there and we sat smoking cigarettes in silence&nbsp;... The clock on the mantelpiece hammered out the hour and when the last beat of midnight struck it was as silent as dawn. We were at War."{{sfn|Margot Asquith 1962|pp=294–295}}