Editing Free will (section)

====Free will as a pragmatically useful concept====
[[William James]]' views were ambivalent. While he believed in free will on "ethical grounds", he did not believe that there was evidence for it on scientific grounds, nor did his own introspections support it.<ref>See Bricklin, Jonathan, "A Variety of Religious Experience: William James and the Non-Reality of Free Will", in Libet (1999), ''The Volitional Brain: Toward a Neuroscience of Free Will'' (Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic).</ref> Ultimately he believed that the problem of free will was a metaphysical issue and, therefore, could not be settled by science. Moreover, he did not accept incompatibilism as formulated below; he did not believe that the indeterminism of human actions was a prerequisite of moral responsibility. In his work ''[[Pragmatism]]'', he wrote that "instinct and utility between them can safely be trusted to carry on the social business of punishment and praise" regardless of metaphysical theories.<ref name="JW">James, W. (1907) ''Pragmatism'' (1979 edition). Cambridge, MA: [[Harvard University Press]]</ref> He did believe that indeterminism is important as a "doctrine of relief"&nbsp;– it allows for the view that, although the world may be in many respects a bad place, it may, through individuals' actions, become a better one. Determinism, he argued, undermines [[meliorism]]&nbsp;– the idea that progress is a real concept leading to improvement in the world.<ref name="JW"/>