Editing Determinism (section)

=== Generative processes ===
{{Main|Emergence}}
Although it was once thought by scientists that any indeterminism in quantum mechanics occurred at too small a scale to influence biological or neurological systems, there is indication that [[nervous system]]s are influenced by quantum indeterminism due to [[chaos theory]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Lewis |first1=Edwin R. |last2=Macgregor |first2=Ronald J. |date=2006-06-01 |title=On indeterminism, chaos, and small number particle systems in the brain |url=https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219635206001112 |journal=Journal of Integrative Neuroscience |volume=05 |issue=2 |pages=223–247 |doi=10.1142/S0219635206001112 |pmid=16783870 |issn=0219-6352}}</ref> It is unclear what implications this has for the problem of [[free will]] given various possible reactions to the problem in the first place.<ref>{{cite journal | doi=10.1142/S0219635206001112 | last=Lewis | first=E.R. |author2=MacGregor, R.J. | year=2006 | title=On Indeterminism, Chaos, and Small Number Particle Systems in the Brain | journal=[[Journal of Integrative Neuroscience]] | volume=5 | issue=2 | pages=223–247 |url=http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~lewis/LewisMacGregor.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110608034826/http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~lewis/LewisMacGregor.pdf |archive-date=2011-06-08 |url-status=live | citeseerx=10.1.1.361.7065 | pmid=16783870 }}</ref> Many biologists do not grant determinism: [[Christof Koch]], for instance, argues against it, and in favour of [[Libertarianism (metaphysics)|libertarian free will]], by making arguments based on generative processes ([[emergence]]).<ref name=Koch>{{cite book |last1=Koch |first1=Christof |author-link1=Christof Koch |editor1-first=Nancy|editor1-last=Murphy |editor2-first=George |editor2-last=Ellis |editor3-first=Timothy|editor3-last=O'Connor |title=Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will |year=2009 |publisher=[[Springer Science+Business Media|Springer]] |location=New York|isbn=978-3-642-03204-2 |chapter=Free Will, Physics, Biology and the Brain|bibcode=2009dcnf.book.....M }}</ref> Other proponents of emergentist or [[Generative science|generative philosophy]], [[cognitive science]]s, and [[evolutionary psychology]], argue that a certain form of determinism (not necessarily causal) is true.<ref name="Kenrick">{{cite journal | last1 = Kenrick | first1 = D. T. | last2 = Li | first2 = N. P. | last3 = Butner | first3 = J. | year = 2003 | title = Dynamical evolutionary psychology: Individual decision rules and emergent social norms | url = http://www.mysmu.edu/faculty/normanli/KenrickLiButner2003.pdf| journal = Psychological Review | volume = 110 | issue = 1| pages = 3–28 | doi=10.1037/0033-295x.110.1.3 | pmid=12529056| citeseerx = 10.1.1.526.5218 | s2cid = 43306158 }}</ref><ref name="Nowak">Nowak A., Vallacher R.R., Tesser A., Borkowski W., (2000) "Society of Self: The emergence of collective properties in self-structure", Psychological Review 107.</ref><ref name="Axtell">{{Cite book |last1=Epstein |first1=Joshua M. |title=Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up |last2=Axtell |first2=Robert |date=1996 |publisher=Brookings Institution Press |isbn=9780262272360 |location=Washington, D.C. |language=en |oclc=42854515}}</ref><ref name="Epstein">Epstein J.M. (1999) "Agent Based Models and Generative Social Science". ''Complexity'', IV (5)</ref> They suggest instead that an illusion of free will is experienced due to the generation of infinite behaviour from the interaction of finite-deterministic set of rules and [[parameter]]s. Thus the unpredictability of the emerging behaviour from deterministic processes leads to a perception of free will, even though free will as an [[Ontology|ontological]] entity does not exist.<ref name= "Kenrick"/><ref name= "Nowak"/><ref name= "Axtell"/><ref name= "Epstein"/>

[[File:Gospers glider gun.gif|thumb|right|120px|An animation of [[Conway's Game of Life]], where the interaction of just four simple rules creates patterns that seem somehow "alive".]]

As an illustration, the strategy board-games [[chess]] and [[Go (game)|Go]] have rigorous rules in which no information (such as cards' face-values) is hidden from either player and no [[randomness|random]] events (such as dice-rolling) happen within the game. Yet, chess and especially Go with its extremely simple deterministic rules, can still have an extremely large number of unpredictable moves. When chess is simplified to 7 or fewer pieces, however, endgame tables are available that dictate which moves to play to achieve a perfect game. This implies that, given a less complex environment (with the original 32 pieces reduced to 7 or fewer pieces), a perfectly predictable game of chess is possible. In this scenario, the winning player can announce that a checkmate will happen within a given number of moves, assuming a perfect defense by the losing player, or fewer moves if the defending player chooses sub-optimal moves as the game progresses into its inevitable, predicted conclusion. By this analogy, it is suggested, the experience of free will emerges from the interaction of finite rules and deterministic parameters that generate nearly infinite and practically unpredictable behavioural responses. In theory, if all these events could be accounted for, and there were a known way to evaluate these events, the seemingly unpredictable behaviour would become predictable.<ref name= "Kenrick"/><ref name= "Nowak"/><ref name= "Axtell"/><ref name= "Epstein"/> Another hands-on example of generative processes is [[John Horton Conway]]'s playable [[Conway's Game of Life|Game of Life]].<ref>{{cite web| url = http://www.bitstorm.org/gameoflife/| title = John Conway's Game of Life}}</ref> [[Nassim Nicholas Taleb|Nassim Taleb]] is wary of such models, and coined the term "[[ludic fallacy]]."