Editing Dean Rusk (section)

===Bombing pause discussed===
In December 1965, when McNamara first told Johnson that the "military action approach is an unacceptable way to a successful conclusion" and urged him to pause the bombing of North Vietnam, Rusk advised the president that there was only a 1 in 20 chance that a bombing pause would lead to peace talks.<ref name="Karnow 482">Karnow, Stanley ''Vietnam: A History'', New York: Viking, 1983 p.482</ref> However, Rusk argued for the bombing pause, saying "You must think about the morale of the American people if the other side keeps pushing. We must be able to say that all has been done."<ref name="Karnow 482"/> When Johnson announced the bombing pause on Christmas Day 1965, Rusk told the press "We have put everything into the basket of peace except the surrender of South Vietnam."<ref name="Karnow 483">Karnow, Stanley ''Vietnam: A History'', New York: Viking, 1983 p.483</ref> Some of the language that Rusk included in his offer for peace talks seemed to calculate to inspire rejection such as the demand that Hanoi must publicly vow "to cease aggression" and the bombing pause was "a step toward peace, although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped."<ref name="Langguth 410"/> On December 28, 1965, Rusk sent a cable to [[Henry Cabot Lodge Jr]], the ambassador in Saigon, presenting the bombing pause as merely a cynical exercise in public relations as he wrote: "The prospect of large-scale reinforcements in men and defense budget increases for the next eighteen-month period requires solid preparation of the American public. A crucial element will be a clear demonstration that we have explored fully every alternative but the aggressors has left us no choice."<ref name="Karnow 483"/> Rusk ordered [[Henry A. Byroade]], the ambassador in Rangoon, to make contact with the North Vietnamese ambassador to Burma with the offer that the bombing pause might be extended if North Vietnam made "a serious contribution to peace".<ref name="Karnow 483"/> The offer was rejected as the North Vietnamese refused to open peace talks until the bombing raids were stopped "unconditionally and for good".<ref name="Karnow 483"/> Like the other newly independent states in Africa and Asia, the North Vietnamese were extremely sensitive to any violation, real or perceived, of their newly achieved sovereignty, and the North Vietnamese Politburo regarded the bombing as a major violation of their nation's sovereignty.<ref name="Langguth 413">Langguth, A.J. ''Our Vietnam 1954–1975'', New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.413</ref> In a way that the Johnson administration had much trouble understanding, the North Vietnamese felt to negotiate with the Americans reserving the right to resume the bombing would be to accept a diminution of their country's independence, hence the demand for an unconditional bombing halt.<ref name="Langguth 413"/> In January 1966, Johnson ordered the Rolling Thunder bombing raids to resume.<ref name="Karnow 483"/>