Editing David Hume (section)

==== Problem of miracles ====
{{main|Of Miracles}}

In his discussion of [[miracle]]s, Hume argues that we should not believe miracles have occurred and that they do not therefore provide us with any reason to think God exists.{{sfn|Bailey|O'Brien|2006|p=101}} In ''An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding'' (Section 10), Hume defines a miracle as "a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent". Hume says we believe an event that has frequently occurred is likely to occur again, but we also take into account those instances where the event did not occur:{{sfn|Hume|1777|pp=110–111}}

<blockquote>A wise man ... considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments. ... A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments ... and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence.</blockquote>

Hume discusses the testimony of those who report miracles. He wrote that testimony might be doubted even from some great authority in case the facts themselves are not credible: "[T]he evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits of a diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual."{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=113}}

Although Hume leaves open the possibility for miracles to occur and be reported, he offers various arguments against this ever having happened in history.{{sfn|Hume|1777|pp=116–131|ps=, Part II of Section X}} He points out that people often lie, and they have good reasons to lie about miracles occurring either because they believe they are doing so for the benefit of their religion or because of the fame that results. Furthermore, people by nature enjoy relating miracles they have heard without caring for their veracity and thus miracles are easily transmitted even when false. Also, Hume notes that miracles seem to occur mostly in "ignorant and barbarous nations"{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=119}} and times, and the reason they do not occur in the civilised societies is such societies are not awed by what they know to be natural events. Hume recognizes that over a long period of time, various coincidences can provide the appearance of intention. Finally, the miracles of each religion argue against all other religions and their miracles, and so even if a proportion of all reported miracles across the world fit Hume's requirement for belief, the miracles of each religion make the other less likely.{{sfn|Bailey|O'Brien|2006|pp=105–108}}

Hume was extremely pleased with his argument against miracles in his ''Enquiry''. He states, "I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures."{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=110}} Thus, Hume's argument against miracles had a more abstract basis founded upon the scrutiny, not just primarily of miracles, but of all forms of belief systems. It is a commonsense notion of veracity based upon epistemological evidence, and founded on a principle of rationality, proportionality and reasonability.{{sfn|Bailey|O'Brien|2006|pp=105–108}}

The criterion for assessing Hume's belief system is based on the balance of probability whether something is more likely than not to have occurred. Since the weight of empirical experience contradicts the notion for the existence of miracles, such accounts should be treated with scepticism. Further, the myriad of accounts of miracles contradict one another, as some people who receive miracles will aim to prove the authority of Jesus, whereas others will aim to prove the authority of Muhammad or some other religious prophet or deity. These various differing accounts weaken the overall evidential power of miracles.{{sfn|Ahluwalia|2008|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-PCV11VQ8PYC&dq=%22Understanding+Philosophy+of+Religion%22+hume&pg=PA104 pp. 104–106]}}{{failed verification|date=April 2015}}

Despite all this, Hume observes that belief in miracles is popular, and that "the gazing populace… receive greedily, without examination, whatever soothes superstition, and promotes wonder."{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=126}}

Critics have argued that Hume's position assumes the character of miracles and [[natural law]]s prior to any specific examination of miracle claims, thus it amounts to a subtle form of [[begging the question]]. To assume that testimony is a homogeneous reference group seems unwise- to compare private miracles with public miracles, unintellectual observers with intellectual observers and those who have little to gain and much to lose with those with much to gain and little to lose is not convincing to many. Indeed, many have argued that miracles not only do not contradict the laws of nature but require the laws of nature to be intelligible as miraculous, and thus subverting the law of nature. For example, William Adams remarks that "there must be an ordinary course of nature before anything can be extraordinary. There must be a stream before anything can be interrupted."<ref>{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/stream/essayinanswertom00adamiala#page/14/mode/2up |title=An essay in answer to Mr. Hume's Essay on miracles |access-date=16 March 2017|publisher=London : White |year=1767 }}</ref> They have also noted that it requires an appeal to inductive inference, as none have observed every part of nature nor examined every possible miracle claim, for instance those in the future. This, in Hume's philosophy, was especially problematic.{{sfn|Levine|1989|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=fC3-d89f7qoC&q=%22hume+with+a+glaring%22 p. 3]}}

Little appreciated is the voluminous literature either foreshadowing Hume, in the likes of [[Thomas Sherlock]]<ref>{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/trialwitnessesr00shergoog |quote=witnesses Thomas SHerlock. |title=The Trial of the Witnesses of the Resurrection of Jesus – Internet Archive |publisher=John Eliot |access-date=16 March 2017|last1=Sherlock |first1=Thomas |year=1809 }}</ref> or directly responding to and engaging with Hume—from [[William Paley]],<ref>{{cite web|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vqcRAAAAYAAJ&q=Nairne+intitle:Evidences+inauthor:William+inauthor:Paley |title=Paley's Evidences of Christianity: With Notes and Additions – William Paley, Charles Murray Nairne| via= Google Books |access-date=16 March 2017|last1=Paley |first1=William |last2=Nairne |first2=Charles Murray |year=1858 }}</ref> William Adams,<ref>{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/essayinanswertom00adamiala |title=An essay in answer to Mr. Hume's Essay on miracles : Adams, William, 1706–1789 |access-date=16 March 2017|publisher=London : White |year=1767 }}</ref> John Douglas,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Y4UNAAAAQAAJ&q=douglas+the+criterion+miracles&pg=PR1 |title=The criterion: or, Miracles examined with a view to expose the pretensions ... – John Douglas, John Douglas (bp. of Salisbury.)| via= Google Books |access-date=16 March 2017|last1=Douglas |first1=John |year=1832 }}</ref> [[John Leland (Baptist)|John Leland]],<ref>{{cite web|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Rt9JAAAAMAAJ&q=intitle:View+intitle:Principal+intitle:Deistical+inauthor:Leland |title=A view of the principal deistical writers that have appeared in England in ... – John Leland, William Laurence Brown| via= Google Books |access-date=16 March 2017|last1=Leland |first1=John |last2=Brown |first2=William Laurence |year=1837 }}</ref> and [[George Campbell (minister)|George Campbell]],<ref>{{cite web|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ddsOAAAAIAAJ |title=A Dissertation on Miracles: Containing an Examination of the Principles ... – George Campbell| via= Google Books |access-date=16 March 2017|last1=Campbell |first1=George |year=1823 }}</ref> among others. Regarding the latter, it is rumoured that, having read Campbell's Dissertation, Hume remarked that "the Scotch theologue had beaten him."<ref>{{cite web|title=Campbell, George|url=http://historicalapologetics.org/campbell-george/|author=Huitt, Kyle|date=25 December 2016|website=Library of Historical Apologetics|access-date=16 May 2020}}</ref>

Hume's main argument concerning miracles is that miracles by definition are singular events that differ from the established laws of nature. Such natural laws are codified as a result of past experiences. Therefore, a miracle is a violation of all prior experience and thus incapable on this basis of reasonable belief. However, the probability that something has occurred in contradiction of all past experience should always be judged to be less than the probability that either one's senses have deceived one, or the person recounting the miraculous occurrence is lying or mistaken, Hume would say, all of which he had past experience of. For Hume, this refusal to grant credence does not guarantee correctness. He offers the example of an Indian Prince, who, having grown up in a hot country, refuses to believe that water has frozen. By Hume's lights, this refusal is not wrong and the prince "reasoned justly;" it is presumably only when he has had extensive experience of the freezing of water that he has warrant to believe that the event could occur.{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=113}}

So, for Hume, either the miraculous event will become a recurrent event or else it will never be rational to believe it occurred. The connection to religious belief is left unexplained throughout, except for the close of his discussion where Hume notes the reliance of Christianity upon testimony of miraculous occurrences. He makes an ironic remark that anyone who "is moved by faith to assent" to revealed testimony "is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience."{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=131|ps=, emphasis removed}}{{sfn|MacKie|1982|p=29}} Hume writes that "All the testimony whichever was really given for any miracle, or ever will be given, is a subject of derision."{{sfn|Hume|1777|p=113}}