Editing Consciousness (section)

===Biological function and evolution===
The emergence of consciousness during [[Evolution|biological evolution]] remains a topic of ongoing scientific inquiry. The survival value of consciousness is still a matter of exploration and understanding. While consciousness appears to play a crucial role in human cognition, decision-making, and self-awareness, its adaptive significance across different species remains a subject of debate.

Some people question whether consciousness has any survival value. Some argue that consciousness is a [[Spandrel (biology)|by-product of evolution]]. [[Thomas Henry Huxley]] for example defends in an essay titled "On the Hypothesis that Animals are [[Automata]], and its History" an [[epiphenomenalist]] theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness is a causally inert effect of neural activity—"as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery".<ref>{{cite journal|author=T.H. Huxley|title=On the hypothesis that animals are automata, and its history|journal=The Fortnightly Review|volume=16|issue=253|pages=555–580|year=1874|author-link=T.H. Huxley|bibcode=1874Natur..10..362.|doi=10.1038/010362a0|doi-access=free}}</ref> To this [[William James]] objects in his essay ''Are We Automata?'' by stating an evolutionary argument for mind-brain interaction implying that if the preservation and development of consciousness in the biological evolution is a result of [[natural selection]], it is plausible that consciousness has not only been influenced by neural processes, but has had a survival value itself; and it could only have had this if it had been efficacious.<ref>{{cite journal|author=W. James|title=Are we automata?|journal=Mind|volume=4|issue=13|pages=1–22|year=1879|doi=10.1093/mind/os-4.13.1|author-link=William James|url=https://zenodo.org/record/1431809|access-date=2019-07-05|archive-date=2019-12-24|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191224150924/https://zenodo.org/record/1431809|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|author=B.I.B. Lindahl|title=Consciousness and biological evolution|journal=Journal of Theoretical Biology|volume=187|issue=4|pages=613–629|year=1997|doi=10.1006/jtbi.1996.0394|pmid=9299304|bibcode=1997JThBi.187..613L}}</ref> [[Karl Popper]] develops a similar evolutionary argument in the book ''The Self and Its Brain''.<ref name=Popper1977>{{cite book|title=The Self and Its Brain|author=[[Karl Popper|Karl R. Popper]], [[John Eccles (neurophysiologist)|John C. Eccles]]|publisher=Springer International|year=1977|isbn=978-0-387-08307-0|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/selfitsbrain0000popp}}</ref>

Opinions are divided on when and how consciousness first arose. It has been argued that consciousness emerged (i) exclusively with the first humans, (ii) exclusively with the first mammals, (iii) independently in mammals and birds, or (iv) with the first reptiles.<ref>{{cite book|author=Peter Århem|author2=B.I.B. Lindahl|author3=Paul R. Manger|author4=Ann B. Butler|year=2008|editor=Hans Liljenström|editor2=Peter Århem|chapter=On the origin of consciousness—some amniote scenarios|title=Consciousness Transitions: Phylogenetic, Ontogenetic, and Physiological Aspects|publisher=Elsevier.|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OQGJz1DVQNMC&pg=PA77|isbn=978-0-444-52977-0}}</ref> Other authors date the origins of consciousness to the first animals with nervous systems or early vertebrates in the Cambrian over 500 million years ago.<ref name="FeinbergMallat">{{cite journal|last1=Feinberg|first1=TE|last2=Mallatt|first2=J|date=October 2013|title=The evolutionary and genetic origins of consciousness in the Cambrian Period over 500 million years ago.|journal=Frontiers in Psychology|doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00667|pmid=24109460|volume=4|pages=667|pmc=3790330|doi-access=free}}</ref> [[Donald Griffin]] suggests in his book ''Animal Minds'' a gradual evolution of consciousness.<ref name="Griffin2001"/> Further exploration of the origins of consciousness, particularly in molluscs, has been done by Peter Godfrey Smith in his book ''Metazoa''.<ref>{{Cite book |title=Metazoa |last=Godfrey Smith |first=Peter |year=2021 |isbn=9780008321239}}</ref>

Regarding the primary function of conscious processing, a recurring idea in recent theories is that phenomenal states somehow integrate neural activities and information-processing that would otherwise be independent.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Bernard Baars|title=The conscious access hypothesis: Origins and recent evidence|journal=Trends in Cognitive Sciences|volume=6|pages=47–52|pmid=11849615|doi=10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01819-2|issue=1|date=January 2002|s2cid=6386902|author-link=Bernard Baars}}</ref> This has been called the ''integration consensus''. Another example has been proposed by Gerald Edelman called dynamic core hypothesis which puts emphasis on [[reentry (neural circuitry)|reentrant]] connections that reciprocally link areas of the brain in a massively parallel manner.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Seth|first=Anil|author2=Eugene Izhikevich|author3=George Reeke|author4=Gerald Edelman|title=Theories and measures of consciousness: An extended framework|journal=Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences|year=2006|volume=103|issue=28|doi=10.1073/pnas.0604347103|pages=10799–10804|pmid=16818879|pmc=1487169|bibcode=2006PNAS..10310799S|doi-access=free}}</ref> Edelman also stresses the importance of the evolutionary emergence of higher-order consciousness in humans from the historically older trait of primary consciousness which humans share with non-human animals (see ''[[#Neural correlates|Neural correlates]]'' section above). These theories of integrative function present solutions to two classic problems associated with consciousness: differentiation and unity. They show how our conscious experience can discriminate between a virtually unlimited number of different possible scenes and details (differentiation) because it integrates those details from our sensory systems, while the integrative nature of consciousness in this view easily explains how our experience can seem unified as one whole despite all of these individual parts. However, it remains unspecified which kinds of information are integrated in a conscious manner and which kinds can be integrated without consciousness. Nor is it explained what specific causal role conscious integration plays, nor why the same functionality cannot be achieved without consciousness. Not all kinds of information are capable of being disseminated consciously (e.g., neural activity related to vegetative functions, reflexes, unconscious motor programs, low-level perceptual analyzes, etc.), and many kinds of information can be disseminated and combined with other kinds without consciousness, as in intersensory interactions such as the [[ventriloquism effect]].<ref name="ReferenceA">{{cite journal|author=Ezequiel Morsella|year=2005|title=The function of phenomenal states: Supramodular Interaction Theory|journal=Psychological Review|volume=112|pages=1000–1021|pmid=16262477|issue=4|doi=10.1037/0033-295X.112.4.1000|s2cid=2298524|url=http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/fdd7/81a15d0405a888abe4584a99ed9cbc6fb3ff.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201118022838/http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/fdd7/81a15d0405a888abe4584a99ed9cbc6fb3ff.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-date=2020-11-18}}</ref> Hence it remains unclear why any of it is conscious. For a review of the differences between conscious and unconscious integrations, see the article of Ezequiel Morsella.<ref name="ReferenceA"/>

As noted earlier, even among writers who consider consciousness to be well-defined, there is [[Animal consciousness|widespread dispute]] about which animals other than humans can be said to possess it.<ref name = "ingvww">{{cite book|author=S. Budiansky|title=If a Lion Could Talk: Animal Intelligence and the Evolution of Consciousness|year=1998|publisher=The Free Press|isbn=978-0-684-83710-9|url=https://archive.org/details/iflioncouldtalka00budi}}</ref> Edelman has described this distinction as that of humans possessing higher-order consciousness while sharing the trait of primary consciousness with non-human animals (see previous paragraph). Thus, any examination of the evolution of consciousness is faced with great difficulties. Nevertheless, some writers have argued that consciousness can be viewed from the standpoint of [[evolutionary biology]] as an [[adaptation]] in the sense of a [[Phenotypic trait|trait]] that increases [[Fitness (biology)|fitness]].<ref>{{cite journal|author=S. Nichols|author2=T. Grantham|title=Adaptive Complexity and Phenomenal Consciousness|year=2000|journal=Philosophy of Science|volume=67|issue=4|pages=648–670|doi=10.1086/392859|url=http://dingo.sbs.arizona.edu/~snichols/Papers/evolcons(final).pdf|citeseerx=10.1.1.515.9722|s2cid=16484193|access-date=2017-10-25|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170813055023/http://dingo.sbs.arizona.edu/~snichols/Papers/evolcons(final).pdf|archive-date=2017-08-13|url-status=dead}}</ref> In his article "Evolution of consciousness", John Eccles argued that special anatomical and physical properties of the mammalian [[cerebral cortex]] gave rise to consciousness ("[a] psychon ... linked to [a] dendron through quantum physics").<ref>{{cite journal|author=John Eccles|title=Evolution of consciousness|journal=Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA|volume=89|issue=16|pages=7320–7324|year=1992|pmid=1502142|pmc=49701|doi=10.1073/pnas.89.16.7320|bibcode=1992PNAS...89.7320E|author-link=John Eccles (neurophysiologist)|doi-access=free}}</ref> Bernard Baars proposed that once in place, this "recursive" circuitry may have provided a basis for the subsequent development of many of the functions that consciousness facilitates in higher organisms.<ref name=Baars>{{cite book|author=Bernard Baars|title=A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness|year=1993|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-42743-2|author-link=Bernard Baars}}</ref> [[Peter Carruthers (philosopher)|Peter Carruthers]] has put forth one such potential adaptive advantage gained by conscious creatures by suggesting that consciousness allows an individual to make distinctions between appearance and reality.<ref>{{cite book|last=Carruthers|first=Peter|title=Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory|year=2004|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=Cambridge}}</ref> This ability would enable a creature to recognize the likelihood that their perceptions are deceiving them (e.g. that water in the distance may be a mirage) and behave accordingly, and it could also facilitate the manipulation of others by recognizing how things appear to them for both cooperative and devious ends.

Other philosophers, however, have suggested that consciousness would not be necessary for any functional advantage in evolutionary processes.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Owen Flanagan|author2=T.W. Polger|year=1995|title=Zombies and the function of consciousness|journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies|volume=2|pages=313–321|author-link=Owen Flanagan}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Rosenthal|first=David|title=Consciousness and its function|journal=Neuropsychologia|year=2008|volume=46|issue=3|pages=829–840|doi=10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2007.11.012|pmid=18164042|s2cid=7791431}}</ref> No one has given a causal explanation, they argue, of why it would not be possible for a functionally equivalent non-conscious organism (i.e., a philosophical zombie) to achieve the very same survival advantages as a conscious organism. If evolutionary processes are blind to the difference between function ''F'' being performed by conscious organism ''O'' and non-conscious organism ''O*'', it is unclear what adaptive advantage consciousness could provide.<ref>{{cite book|author=Stevan Harnad|year=2002|chapter=Turing indistinguishability and the Blind Watchmaker|editor=J.H. Fetzer|title=Consciousness Evolving|publisher=John Benjamins|chapter-url=http://cogprints.org/1615|access-date=2011-10-26|author-link=Stevan Harnad|archive-date=2011-10-28|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111028162407/http://cogprints.org/1615/|url-status=live}}</ref> As a result, an exaptive explanation of consciousness has gained favor with some theorists that posit consciousness did not evolve as an adaptation but was an [[exaptation]] arising as a consequence of other developments such as increases in brain size or cortical rearrangement.<ref name="FeinbergMallat"/> Consciousness in this sense has been compared to the blind spot in the retina where it is not an adaption of the retina, but instead just a by-product of the way the retinal axons were wired.<ref>{{cite journal|author1=Zack Robinson|author2=Corey J. Maley|author3=Gualtiero Piccinini| year = 2015|title = Is Consciousness a Spandrel?.|journal = Journal of the American Philosophical Association|volume = 1|issue = 2| pages = 365–383|doi = 10.1017/apa.2014.10|s2cid=170892645}}</ref> Several scholars including [[Steven Pinker|Pinker]], [[Noam Chomsky|Chomsky]], [[Gerald Edelman|Edelman]], and [[Salvador Luria|Luria]] have indicated the importance of the emergence of human language as an important regulative mechanism of learning and memory in the context of the development of higher-order consciousness (see ''[[#Neural correlates|Neural correlates]]'' section above).