Editing Battle of Monte Cassino (section)

===Clark captures Rome but fails to trap the German Tenth Army===
By 25 May, with the German 10th Army in full retreat, Truscott's VI Corps was, as planned, driving eastwards to cut them off. By the next day, they would have been astride the line of retreat, and the 10th Army, with all of Kesselring's reserves committed to them, would have been trapped. At this point, astonishingly, Clark ordered Truscott to change his line of attack from a northeasterly one to [[Valmontone]] on Route 6 to a northwesterly one directly towards Rome. The reasons for Clark's decision are unclear, and controversy surrounds the issue.{{Citation needed|date=December 2018}} Most commentators point to Clark's ambition to be the first to arrive in Rome, although some suggest he was concerned to give a necessary respite to his tired troops (notwithstanding the new direction of attack that required his troops to make a frontal attack on the Germans' prepared defences on the [[Caesar C line]]). Truscott later wrote in his memoirs that Clark "was fearful that the British were laying devious plans to be first into Rome",<ref name="Majdalany, p. 256">{{harvnb|Majdalany|1957|p=256}}</ref> a sentiment somewhat reinforced in Clark's own writings. However, General Alexander, the C-in-C of the AAI, had clearly laid down the army boundaries before the battle, and Rome was allocated to the Fifth Army. Leese's British Eighth Army was constantly reminded that their job was to engage the 10th Army, destroy as much of it as possible, and then bypass Rome to continue the pursuit northwards (which in fact they did, harassing the retreating 10th Army for some {{convert|225|mi|km}} towards [[Perugia]] in 6 weeks).<ref>{{harvnb|Hingston|1946|p=81}}</ref>

At the time, Truscott was shocked, writing later:{{blockquote|I was dumbfounded. This was no time to drive to the northwest where the enemy was still strong; we should pour our maximum power into the Valmontone Gap to insure the destruction of the retreating German Army. I would not comply with the order without first talking to General Clark in person.&nbsp;... [However] he was not on the beachhead and could not be reached even by radio.&nbsp;... such was the order that turned the main effort of the beachhead forces from the Valmontone Gap and prevented destruction of Tenth Army. On the 26th the order was put into effect.<ref name="Majdalany, p. 256"/>}} He went on to write:{{blockquote|There has never been any doubt in my mind that had General Clark held loyally to General Alexander's instructions, had he not changed the direction of my attack to the northwest on 26 May, the strategic objectives of Anzio would have been accomplished in full. To be first in Rome was a poor compensation for this lost opportunity.<ref>{{harvnb|Majdalany|1957|p=259}}</ref>}} An opportunity was indeed missed, and seven divisions of the 10th Army<ref>{{harvnb|Clark|2006|p=304}}</ref> were able to make their way to the next line of defence, the [[Trasimene Line]], where they were able to link up with the 14th Army and then make a fighting withdrawal to the formidable [[Gothic Line]] north of [[Florence]].

Rome was captured on 4 June 1944, just two days before the Normandy invasion.