Editing The Blitz (section)

===RAF night fighters===
German [[air supremacy]] at night was also now under threat. British night-fighter operations out over the Channel were proving successful.<ref>Faber 1977, p. 205.</ref> This was not immediately apparent.<ref>Mackay 2003, p. 88.</ref> The [[Bristol Blenheim]] F.1 carried four {{convert|.303|in|mm|1|abbr=on}} machine guns which lacked the firepower to easily shoot down a Do&nbsp;17, Ju&nbsp;88 or Heinkel He&nbsp;111.<ref name="Mackay 2003, pp. 86–87.">Mackay 2003, pp. 86–87.</ref> The Blenheim had only a small speed advantage to overtake a German bomber in a stern-chase. Added to the fact an interception relied on visual sighting, a kill was most unlikely even in the conditions of a moonlit sky.<ref name="Mackay 2003, pp. 86–87."/> The [[Boulton Paul Defiant]], despite its poor performance during daylight engagements, was a much better night fighter. It was faster, able to catch the bombers and its configuration of four machine guns in a turret could (much like German night fighters in 1943–1945 with {{lang|de|[[Schräge Musik]]}}) engage the German bomber from beneath. Attacks from below offered a larger target, compared to attacking tail-on, as well as a better chance of not being seen by the crew (so less chance of evasion), as well as greater likelihood of detonating its bomb load. In subsequent months a steady number of German bombers would fall to night fighters.<ref name="Mackay 2003, p. 87.">Mackay 2003, p. 87.</ref>

Improved aircraft designs were in the offing with the [[Bristol Beaufighter]], then under development. It would prove formidable but its development was slow.<ref name="Mackay 2003, p. 87."/> The Beaufighter had a maximum speed of {{convert|320|mph|km/h|abbr=on}}, an operational ceiling of {{convert|26000|ft|m|abbr=on}}, a climb rate of {{convert|2500|ft|m|abbr=on}} per minute, and its battery of four {{convert|20|mm|in|2|abbr=on}} [[Hispano-Suiza HS.404|Hispano]] cannon and six .303&nbsp;in [[M1919 Browning machine gun|Browning]] machine guns was much more lethal.<ref name="Mackay 2003, p. 93.">Mackay 2003, p. 93.</ref> On 19 November, John Cunningham of [[No. 604 Squadron RAF]] shot down a bomber flying an AI-equipped Beaufighter, the first air victory for the airborne radar.<ref name="Mackay 2003, p. 93."/> In November and December 1940, the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} flew 9,000 sorties against British targets and RAF night fighters claimed only six shot down. In January 1941, Fighter Command flew 486 sorties against 1,965 made by the Germans. Just three and twelve were claimed by the RAF and AA defences respectively.<ref>Ray 1996, p. 190.</ref> In the bad weather of February 1941, Fighter Command flew 568 sorties to counter the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} which flew 1,644 sorties. Night fighters could claim only four bombers for four losses.<ref>Ray 1996, p. 191.</ref>

By April and May 1941, the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} was still getting through to their targets, taking no more than one- to two-percent losses per mission.<ref name="Mackay 2003, p. 98.">Mackay 2003, p. 98.</ref> On 19/20 April 1941, in honour of Hitler's 52nd birthday, 712 bombers hit Plymouth with a record 1,000&nbsp;tons ({{convert|1000|LT|t|0|disp=out|sigfig=3}}) of bombs.<ref name="Mackay 2003, p. 98."/> Losses were minimal. In the following month, 22 German bombers were lost with 13 confirmed to have been shot down by night fighters.<ref name="Mackay 2003, p. 98."/> On 3/4 May, nine were shot down in one night.<ref name="Mackay 2003, p. 98."/> On 10/11 May, London suffered severe damage, but 10 German bombers were downed.<ref name="Mackay 2003, p. 98."/> In May 1941, RAF night fighters shot down 38 German bombers.<ref>Ray 1996, p. 208.</ref> By the end of May, Kesselring's {{lang|de|Luftflotte}} 2 had been withdrawn, leaving Hugo Sperrle's {{lang|de|Luftflotte}} 3 as a token force to maintain the illusion of strategic bombing.<ref name="Hooton 1997, p. 37."/> Hitler now had his sights set on attacking the USSR with [[Operation Barbarossa]], and the Blitz came to an end.<ref>Air, 2001, pp. 95–96</ref>