Editing Suez Crisis (section)

=== Western diplomacy ===
On 1 August 1956, a tripartite meeting was opened at [[10 Downing Street]] between British Foreign Secretary [[Selwyn Lloyd]], U.S. Ambassador [[Robert Daniel Murphy|Robert D. Murphy]] and French Foreign Affairs Minister [[Christian Pineau]].<ref>{{Cite AV media |url=https://www.ina.fr/video/AFE85006880 |title=Le canal de Suez et la nationalisation par le Colonel Nasser |date=1 August 1956 |type=Television production |language=French |publisher=[[Institut national de l'audiovisuel]] |access-date=3 July 2021 |work=Les Actualités françaises}}</ref>

[[File:Portrait Menzies 1950s.jpg|thumb|upright|left|Australian Prime Minister [[Robert Menzies]] led an international committee in negotiations with Nasser in September 1956, which sought to achieve international management of the Suez Canal. The mission was a failure.]]

Almost immediately after the nationalisation, Eisenhower suggested to Eden a conference of maritime nations that used the canal. The British preferred to invite the most important countries, but the Americans believed that inviting as many as possible amid maximum publicity would affect world opinion. Invitations went to the eight surviving signatories of the [[Convention of Constantinople|Constantinople Convention]] and the 16 other largest users of the canal: Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, West Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All except Egypt—which sent an observer, and used India and the Soviet Union to represent its interests—and Greece accepted the invitation, and the 22 nations' representatives met in London from 16 to 23 August.<ref name="life19560827">{{Cite magazine |date=27 August 1956 |title=Compromise-Minded Conferees |magazine=Life |page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=6UcEAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA43 43]}}</ref>{{Sfn|Kingseed|1995|pp=66–67}}{{R|eayrs1964}}{{Rp|81–89}}

Fifteen of the nations supported the American-British-French position of international operation of the canal; Pakistan chose its western allies over its sympathy for Egypt's anti-western position despite resulting great domestic controversy. Ceylon, Indonesia, and the Soviet Union supported India's competing proposal—which Nasser had preapproved—of international supervision only. India criticised Egypt's seizure of the canal, but insisted that its ownership and operation now not change. The majority of 18 chose five nations to negotiate with Nasser in Cairo led by Menzies, while their proposal for international operation of the canal would go to the Security Council.{{R|eayrs1964}}{{Rp|81–89}}<ref name="ReferenceB">{{Cite book |last=Menzies |first=R. G. |title=Speech is of Time |date=1958 |publisher=Cassell |location=London}}</ref>{{Sfn|Kingseed|1995|pages=66–67}}

Menzies' 7 September official communique to Nasser presented a case for compensation for the Suez Canal Company and the "establishment of principles" for the future use of the canal that would ensure that it would "continue to be an international waterway operated free of politics or national discrimination, and with financial structure so secure and an international confidence so high that an expanding and improving future for the Canal could be guaranteed" and called for a convention to recognise Egyptian sovereignty of the canal, but for the establishment of an international body to run the canal. Nasser saw such measures as a "derogation from Egyptian sovereignty" and rejected Menzies' proposals.<ref name="ReferenceB"/> Menzies hinted to Nasser that Britain and France might use force to resolve the crisis, but Eisenhower openly opposed the use of force and Menzies left Egypt without success.<ref name="ReferenceC"/>

Instead of the 18-nation proposal, the United States proposed an association of canal users that would set rules for its operation. Whereas 14 of the other nations, not including Pakistan, agreed. Britain, in particular, believed that violation of the association rules would result in military force, but after Eden made a speech to this effect in parliament on 12 September, the US Ambassador Dulles insisted "...we do not intend to shoot our way through" the canal.{{R|eayrs1964}}{{Rp|89–92}} The United States worked through diplomatic channels to resolve the crisis without military conflict. "The British and French reluctantly agreed to pursue the diplomatic avenue but viewed it as merely an attempt to buy time, during which they continued their military preparations."<ref>{{Harvnb|Risse-Kappen|1997|p=86}}</ref> The British, [[Special Relationship|Washington's closest ally]], disregarded Eisenhower's argument that the American people would not accept a military solution.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Shaw |first=Tony |title=Eden, Suez and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion During the Suez Crisis |date=1996 |publisher=I.B. Tauris |isbn=978-1-8504-3955-4 |page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ElFPJNo3n6UC&pg=PA171 171]}}</ref>

On 25 September 1956 the Chancellor of the Exchequer [[Harold Macmillan]] met informally with Eisenhower at the [[White House]]. Macmillan doubted that Eisenhower had a determination to avoid war, and told Eden that the Americans would not in any way oppose the attempt to topple Nasser.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Williams |first=Charles |title=Harold Macmillan |date=2009 |pages=250–252}}</ref> The Americans refused to support any move that could be seen as [[imperialism]] or [[colonialism]], seeing the US as the champion of [[Decolonization|decolonisation]]. Eisenhower felt the crisis had to be handled peacefully; he told Eden that American public opinion, and the international community, "would be outraged" unless all peaceful routes had been exhausted, and even then "the eventual price might become far too heavy".<ref>{{Harvnb|James|1986|loc=pp. 462–465, quote p. 472 dated 31 July 1956}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Skardon |first=C. Philip |title=A Lesson for Our Times: How America Kept the Peace in the Hungary-Suez Crisis of 1956 |date=2010 |pages=194–195}}</ref> Eden and other leading British officials believed Nasser's support for [[Palestinian fedayeen]] against Israel, as well as his attempts to destabilise pro-western regimes in Iraq and other Arab states, would deter the US from intervening with the operation. London believed that Nasser's engagement with communist states would persuade the Americans to accept British and French actions if they were presented as a ''[[fait accompli]]''.{{fact|date=August 2024}}