Editing Strategic voting (section)

=== Plurality-runoff family (RCV, two-round, and partisan primaries) ===
{{See also|Instant-runoff voting#Resistance to tactical voting}}
Theoretical results indicate that, under two-round runoff voting with three candidates, strategic equilibria exist in which only two candidates receive votes.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bouton |first=Laurent |date=2013 |title=A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23469618 |journal=The American Economic Review |volume=103 |issue=4 |pages=1248–1288 |doi=10.1257/aer.103.4.1248 |issn=0002-8282 |jstor=23469618}}</ref> It has been shown experimentally that voters are influenced by a candidate's perceived likelihood of winning the election.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Blais |first1=André |last2=Labbé-St-Vincent |first2=Simon |last3=Laslier |first3=Jean-François |last4=Sauger |first4=Nicolas |last5=Van der Straeten |first5=Karine |date=2011 |title=Strategic Vote Choice in One-round and Two-round Elections: An Experimental Study |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23056381 |journal=Political Research Quarterly |volume=64 |issue=3 |pages=637–645 |doi=10.1177/1065912909358583 |issn=1065-9129 |jstor=23056381 |s2cid=14130949}}</ref>

[[Instant-runoff voting|Instant runoff voting]] is vulnerable to three of the four kinds of strategy discussed above. It is vulnerable to lesser-evil voting; to turkey-raising; and to strategic truncation.

There is a common misconception that instant-runoff is not affected by a kind of strategic voting called [[Truncation (voting)|truncation]] or [[bullet voting]].<ref>{{cite web |last1=The Non-majority Rule Desk |date=July 29, 2011 |title=Why Approval Voting is Unworkable in Contested Elections - FairVote |url=http://www.fairvote.org/why-approval-voting-is-unworkable-in-contested-elections |accessdate=11 October 2016 |website=FairVote Blog}}</ref> However, satisfying later-no-harm does not (by itself) provide resistance to such strategies, unless paired with the [[participation criterion]]. Systems like [[Instant runoff voting|instant runoff]] that pass later-no-harm but fail [[Participation criterion|participation]] still incentivize truncation or bullet voting in some situations.<ref name=":12" /><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Graham-Squire |first1=Adam |last2=McCune |first2=David |date=2023-06-12 |title=An Examination of Ranked-Choice Voting in the United States, 2004–2022 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00344893.2023.2221689 |journal=Representation |language=en |pages=1–19 |arxiv=2301.12075 |doi=10.1080/00344893.2023.2221689 |issn=0034-4893}}</ref>