Editing Soviet–Afghan War (section)

== Soviet exit and change of Afghan leadership, 1985–1989 ==
=== Foreign diplomatic efforts ===
As early as 1983, Pakistan's [[Foreign Ministry of Pakistan|Foreign Ministry]] began working with the Soviet Union to provide them an exit from [[Afghanistan]], initiatives led by [[Foreign Minister of Pakistan|Foreign Minister]] [[Sahabzada Yaqub Khan|Yaqub Ali Khan]] and [[Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri|Khurshid Kasuri]]. Despite an active support for [[Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen|insurgent groups]], Pakistanis remained sympathetic to the challenges faced by the Soviets in restoring the peace, eventually exploring the possibility of setting up an interim [[system of government]] under former [[King of Afghanistan|monarch]] [[Mohammad Zahir Shah|Zahir Shah]], but this was not authorized by President [[Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq|Zia-ul-Haq]] due to his stance on the issue of the [[Durand Line]].{{rp|247–248}}<ref name="Yale University Press, Rubin">{{cite book |last=Rubin |first=Barnett R. |date=2002 |title=The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=laG03iJF7t8C&pg=PA248 |publisher=Yale University Press |pages=248–|isbn=978-0-300-09519-7}}</ref> In 1984–85, Foreign Minister [[Sahabzada Yaqub Khan|Yaqub Ali Khan]] paid state visits to China, [[Saudi Arabia]], Soviet Union, France, United States and the United Kingdom in order to develop a framework. On 20 July 1987, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country was announced.

=== April 1985 – January 1987: Exit strategy ===
[[File:Evstafiev-Soviet-soldier-Afghanistan.jpg|thumb|Soviet soldier in Afghanistan, 1988]]

The first step of the Soviet Union's exit strategy was to transfer the burden of fighting the Mujahideen to the Afghan armed forces, with the aim of preparing them to operate without Soviet help. During this phase, the Soviet contingent was restricted to supporting the DRA forces by providing [[artillery]], air support and technical assistance, though some large-scale operations were still carried out by Soviet troops.

Under Soviet guidance, the DRA armed forces were built up to an official strength of 302,000 in 1986. To minimize the risk of a coup d'état, they were divided into different branches, each modeled on its Soviet counterpart. The ministry of defence forces numbered 132,000, the ministry of interior 70,000 and the ministry of state security ([[KHAD]]) 80,000. However, these were theoretical figures: in reality each service was plagued with [[desertion]]s, the army alone suffering over 10% annual losses, or 32,000 per year.

The decision to engage primarily Afghan forces was taken by the Soviets, but was resented by the PDPA, who viewed the departure of their protectors without enthusiasm. In May 1987 a DRA force [[Battle of Arghandab (1987)|attacked well-entrenched Mujahideen positions]] in the [[Arghandab District]], but the Mujahideen managed to hold their ground, and the attackers suffered heavy casualties.<ref>Urban, ''War in Afghanistan'', p. 219</ref> Meanwhile, the Mujahideen benefited from expanded foreign military support from the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and other Muslim-majority countries. Two [[The Heritage Foundation|Heritage Foundation]] foreign policy analysts, Michael Johns and James A. Phillips, championed [[Ahmad Shah Massoud]] as the Afghan resistance leader most worthy of US support under the [[Reagan Doctrine]].<ref>{{cite web|last=Sherk|first=James|url=http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/bu181.cfm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060118175119/http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/bu181.cfm|archive-date=18 January 2006|title="Winning the Endgame in Afghanistan," by James A. Phillips, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 181, May 18, 1992|publisher=Heritage.org|url-status=unfit|access-date=15 February 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last=Johns|first=Michael|url=http://michaeljohnsonfreedomandprosperity.blogspot.com.au/2008/01/charlie-wilsons-war-was-really-americas.html|title=Charlie Wilson's War Was Really America's War|publisher=Michaeljohnsonfreedomandprosperity.blogspot.com|date=19 January 2008|access-date=28 July 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://thedailycougar.com/2008/08/22/think-tank-fosters-bloodshed-terrorism/|title="Think tank fosters bloodshed, terrorism," ''The Daily Cougar'', August 25, 2008|publisher=thedailycougar.com|access-date=28 July 2011|date=22 August 2008}}</ref>

=== May 1986–1988: Najibullah and his reforms ===
The government of President Karmal, a [[puppet state]], was largely ineffective. It was weakened by divisions within the PDPA and the Parcham faction, and the regime's efforts to expand its base of support proved futile. Moscow came to regard Karmal as a failure and blamed him for the problems. Years later, when Karmal's inability to consolidate his government had become obvious, Mikhail Gorbachev, then General Secretary of the [[Soviet Communist Party]], said, "The main reason that there has been no national consolidation so far is that Comrade Karmal is hoping to continue sitting in Kabul with our help."<ref>{{cite book |last1=Kakar |first1=Hassan |last2=Kakar |first2=Mohammed |title=Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982 |date=1997 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-20893-3 |page=74}}</ref> Karmal's consolidation plan only involved those who had not raised arms against the regime, and even demanded Soviet troops to seal the border with Pakistan before any negotiations with Mujahideen. Eventually, the Soviet Union decided to dispose of Karmal from the leadership of Afghanistan.<ref name="cdlib" />
[[File:RIAN archive 644461 First stage in the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.jpg|thumb|A column of Soviet BTR armored personnel carriers departing from Afghanistan]]

In May 1986, [[Mohammad Najibullah]], former chief of the Afghan [[secret police]] ([[KHAD]]), was elected General Secretary and later as President of the Revolutionary Council. The relatively young new leader wasn't known that well to the Afghan population at the time, but he made swift reforms to change the country's situation and win support as devised by experts of the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]]. An eloquent speaker in both the Pashto and Dari languages, Najibullah engaged with elders and presented both himself and the state as Islamic, sometimes backing his speeches with excerpts from the [[Qur'an]]. A number of prisoners were released, while the night curfew in Kabul that had been in place since 1980 was finally lifted. He also moved against pro-Karmal Parchamites, who were expelled from the Revolutionary Council and the Politburo.<ref name="cdlib" />

President Najibullah launched the "[[National Reconciliation (Afghanistan)|National Reconciliation]]" program at the start of 1987, the goal of which was to unite the nation and end the war that had enveloped the nation for seven years. He expressed willingness to negotiate with the Mujahideen resistance, allow parties other than the PDPA to be active, and indicated that exiled King [[Zahir Shah]] could be part of the process. A six-month ceasefire also began in December 1986. His administration was also more open to foreign visitors outside the Soviet bloc.<ref name="cdlib" /> In November 1987, Najibullah convened a ''[[loya jirga]]'' selected by the authorities which successfully passed a new constitution for Afghanistan, creating a presidential system with an elective bicameral parliament. The constitution declared "the sacred religion of Islam" the official religion, guaranteed the democratic rights of the individual, made it legal to form "political parties", and promoted equality between the various tribes and nationalities.<ref name="cdlib" /> Despite high expectations, the new policy only had limited impact in regaining support from the population and the resistance, partly because of the high distrust and unpopularity of the PDPA and KHAD, as well as Najibullah's loyalty to Moscow.<ref name="cdlib" />

As part of the new structure, national [[1988 Afghan parliamentary election|parliamentary elections]] were held in 1988 to elect members of the new National Assembly, the first such elections in Afghanistan in 19 years.

==== Negotiations for a coalition ====
Ex-king Zahir Shah remained a popular figure to most Afghans. Diego Cordovez of the UN also recognized the king as a potential key to a political settlement to the war after the Soviet troops would leave. Polls in 1987 showed that he was a favored figure to lead a potential coalition between the DRA regime and Mujahideen factions, as well as an opposition to the unpopular but powerful guerrilla leader [[Gulbuddin Hekmatyar]], who was strongly against the King's return. Pakistan however was against this and refused to grant the ex-king a visa for potential negotiations with Mujahideen. Pakistan's President [[Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq|Zia-ul-Haq]] and his supporters in the military were determined to put a conservative Islamic ally in power in Kabul.<ref name="nsaessay" />

Negotiations continued and in 1988 through 1989, The Interim Afghan Government was formed in [[Peshawar|Pekhawar]] as an alliance of various Mujahadeen groups including [[Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin|Hezbi Islami]] and [[Jamiat-e Islami|Jamiat]], and would be involved in [[Operation Arrow]] and the [[siege of Khost]].<ref>{{Cite news |title=Afghan Interim Rule: Rocky Road |work=Christian Science Monitor |url=https://www.csmonitor.com/1992/0513/13181.html |access-date=2023-09-02 |issn=0882-7729}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web| title=Middle East Brief for 26 February 1988 | url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000258646.pdf | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230902145018/https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000258646.pdf | archive-date=2023-09-02}}</ref>

=== April 1988: The Geneva Accords ===
{{Main|Geneva Accords (1988)}}
Following lengthy negotiations, the [[Geneva Accords (1988)|Geneva Accords]] was signed in 1988 between Afghanistan and Pakistan.{{sfn|Amstutz|1994|p=335}} Supported by the Soviet Union and the United States respectively, the two Asian countries agreed to refrain from any form of interference in each other's territory. They also agreed to allow Afghan refugees in Pakistan to voluntarily return. The two superpowers agreed to halt their interference in Afghanistan, which included a Soviet withdrawal.<ref name="nsaessay" />

The United Nations set up a special [[United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan|mission]] to oversee the process. In this way, President Najibullah had stabilized his political position enough to begin matching Moscow's moves toward withdrawal. Among other things the Geneva Accords identified the US and Soviet non-intervention in the internal affairs of Pakistan and Afghanistan and a timetable for full Soviet withdrawal. The agreement on withdrawal held, and on 15 February 1989, the last Soviet troops departed on schedule from Afghanistan.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Mitchell |first1=Alison |title=Last Soviet Troops Leave Afghanistan intervention ends |work=Newsday Moscow Bureau |agency=Newsday |date=16 February 1989}}</ref>

=== January 1987 – February 1989: Withdrawal ===
{{Main|Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan}}
[[File:T-62 withdraws from Afghanistan.JPEG|thumb|Soviet [[T-62]]M main battle tank withdraws from Afghanistan]]

The promotion of [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] to General Secretary in 1985 and his 'new thinking' on foreign and domestic policy was likely an important factor in the Soviets' decision to withdraw. Gorbachev had been attempting to remove the Soviet Union from the economic stagnation that had set in under the leadership of Brezhnev, and to reform the Soviet Union's economy and image with the [[Glasnost]] and [[Perestroika]] policies. Gorbachev had also been attempting to ease cold war tensions by signing the [[Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty]] with the U.S. in 1987 and withdrawing the troops from Afghanistan, whose presence had garnered so much international condemnation.  Beijing had stipulated that a normalization of relations would have to wait until Moscow withdrew its army from Afghanistan (among other things), and in 1989 the first Sino-Soviet summit in 30 years took place.{{sfn|Maley|Saikal|1989|p=127}} At the same time, Gorbachev pressured his Cuban allies in Angola to scale down activities and withdraw even though Soviet allies were faring somewhat better there.<ref>{{cite book|last=Urban, Mark|title=War in Afghanistan|year=1990|publisher=St. Martin's Press|page= 300}}</ref> The Soviets also pulled many of their troops out of [[Mongolia]] in 1987, where they were also having a far easier time than in Afghanistan, and restrained the [[Cambodian–Vietnamese War|Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea]] to the point of an all-out withdrawal in 1988.{{sfn|Maley|Saikal|1989|p=132}} This massive withdrawal of Soviet forces from such highly contested areas shows that the Soviet government's decision to leave Afghanistan was based upon a general change in Soviet foreign policy – from one of confrontation to avoidance of conflict wherever possible.<ref name="britannica2001">{{cite web|url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War|title=Afghanistan War &#124; History, Combatants, Facts, & Timeline|website=Encyclopedia Britannica|date=7 June 2023 }}</ref><ref name="britannica1978">{{cite web|url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghan-War|title=Afghan War &#124; History & Facts|website=Encyclopedia Britannica|date=24 May 2023 }}</ref>

In the last phase, Soviet troops prepared and executed their withdrawal from Afghanistan, whilst limiting the launching of offensive operations by those who had not withdrawn yet.

By mid-1987 the Soviet Union announced that it would start withdrawing its forces. [[Sibghatullah Mojaddedi]] was selected as the head of the Interim Islamic State of Afghanistan, in an attempt to reassert its legitimacy against the Moscow-sponsored Kabul regime. Mojaddedi, as head of the Interim Afghan Government, met with then-Vice President of the United States [[George H. W. Bush]], achieving a critical diplomatic victory for the Afghan resistance. Defeat of the Kabul government was their solution for peace. This confidence, sharpened by their distrust of the United Nations, virtually guaranteed their refusal to accept a political compromise.

In September 1988, Soviet MiG-23 fighters shot down two Iranian [[Bell AH-1 SuperCobra|AH-1J Cobra]] helicopters which had intruded into Afghan airspace.<ref>"The Aviation History", Florian Ion Petrescu, Relly Victoria Petrescu, 2012, p. 82</ref>

[[Operation Magistral]] was one of the final offensive operations undertaken by the Soviets, a successful sweep operation that cleared the road between the towns of [[Gardez]] and [[Khost]]. This operation did not have any lasting effect on the outcome of the conflict nor on the soiled political and military status of the Soviets in the eyes of the West but was a symbolic gesture that marked the end of their widely condemned presence in the country with a victory.<ref>Isby, ''War in a Distant Country'', p. 47</ref>

The first half of the Soviet contingent was withdrawn from 15 May to 16 August 1988, and the second from 15 November to 15 February 1989. In order to ensure a safe passage, the Soviets had negotiated ceasefires with local Mujahideen commanders. The withdrawal was generally executed peacefully<ref>Urban, ''War in Afghanistan'', p. 251</ref> except for the operation "Typhoon".

[[File:RIAN archive 660671 Pullout of Soviet troops contingent from Afghanistan.jpg|thumb|left|[[Colonel General|CGen]] of [[40th Army (Soviet Union)|40th Army]], [[Boris Gromov]], announcing the withdrawal of Soviet contingent forces]]

General Yazov, the [[Minister of Defence (Soviet Union)|Defense Minister of Soviet Union]], ordered the 40th Army to violate the agreement with [[Ahmad Shah Massoud]], who commanded a large force in the Panjshir Valley, and attack his relaxed and exposed forces. The Soviet attack was initiated to protect Najibullah, who did not have a ceasefire in effect with Massoud, and who rightly feared an offensive by Massoud's forces after the Soviet withdrawal.<ref name="fmso.leavenworth.army.mil">{{cite web|url=http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Withdrawal.pdf|title=Breaking contact without leaving chaos: the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan|page=19|work=fmso.leavenworth.army.mil|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101225113905/http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Withdrawal.pdf|archive-date=25 December 2010}}</ref> General Gromov, the 40th Army Commander, objected to the operation, but reluctantly obeyed the order. "Typhoon" began on 23 January and continued for three days. To minimize their own losses, the Soviets abstained from close-range fighting. Instead, they used long-range artillery, surface-to-surface and air-to-surface missiles. Numerous civilian casualties were reported. Massoud had not threatened the withdrawal to this point and did not attack Soviet forces after they breached the agreement.<ref name="fmso.leavenworth.army.mil" /> Overall, the Soviet attack represented a defeat for Massoud's forces, who lost 600 fighters killed and wounded.<ref name="fmso.leavenworth.army.mil" />

After the withdrawal of the Soviets, the [[Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan|DRA forces]] were left fighting alone and had to abandon some provincial capitals, as well as disbanding their [[ANA Special Operations Command|air assault brigades]] a year prior.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Army of Afghanistan|url=https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-army-of-afghanistan/ |access-date=2024-04-11 |website=Hurst Publishers}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-11-30 |title="Пожарная команда" Кабула |website= Warspot.ru |url=https://warspot.ru/21620-pozharnaya-komanda-kabula |access-date=2024-04-11 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221130074403/https://warspot.ru/21620-pozharnaya-komanda-kabula |archive-date=30 November 2022 }}</ref> It was widely believed that they would not be able to resist the Mujahideen for long. However, in the spring of 1989, DRA forces inflicted a major defeat on the Mujahideen during the [[Battle of Jalalabad (1989)|Battle of Jalalabad]], as well launching successful assaults on fortified complexes in [[Paghman]] in 1990.<ref>{{Cite web |title=A Tale of Two Afghan Armies|url=https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/a-tale-of-two-afghan-armies |access-date=2024-04-11 |website=Small Wars Journal}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Fleiss |first=Alex |date=2022-04-05 |title=What happened in the battle of Jalalabad? |url=https://www.rebellionresearch.com/what-happened-in-the-battle-of-jalalabad |access-date=2024-04-11 |website=Rebellion Research}}</ref><ref>Marshall, p.7</ref> The United States, having achieved its goal of forcing the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan, gradually disengaged itself from the country.<ref name="cdlib" />

==== Causes of withdrawal ====
Some of the causes of the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan leading to the Afghanistan regime's eventual defeat include<ref name=Fremont-Barnes>{{cite book|last1=Fremont-Barnes|first1=Gregory|title=The Soviet–Afghan War 1979–89|date=2012|publisher=Osprey Publishing|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LH55BgAAQBAJ&pg=PT89|isbn=978-1-4728-1038-0}}{{Dead link|date=February 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>
* The Soviet Army of 1980 was trained and equipped for large scale, conventional warfare in Central Europe against a similar opponent, i.e., it used armored and motor-rifle formations. This was notably ineffective against small scale guerrilla groups using hit-and-run tactics in the rough terrain of Afghanistan. Also, the Soviet Army's large formations were not mobile enough to engage small groups of Mujahideen fighters that easily merged back into the terrain.<ref name=Fremont-Barnes /> The set strategy also meant that troops were discouraged from "tactical initiative", essential in counter insurgency, because it "tended to upset operational timing".<ref name=Grau-201 />
* The Soviets used large-scale offensives against Mujahideen strongholds, such as in the Panjshir Valley, which temporarily cleared those sectors and killed many civilians in addition to enemy combatants. The biggest shortcoming here, though, was the fact that once the Soviets engaged the enemy with force, they failed to hold the ground, as they withdrew once their operation was completed. The killing of civilians further alienated the population from the Soviets, with bad long-term effects.<ref name=Fremont-Barnes />
* The Soviets did not have enough men to fight a counter-insurgency war (COIN),<ref name=Grau-201>{{cite book|last1=Grau|first1=Lester W.|title=The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan|date=1996|publisher=DIANE Publishing. |pages=201–2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=yOtThPNqKP8C&pg=PA197|isbn=978-0-7881-4665-7}}</ref> and their troops had low morale. The peak number of Soviet troops during the war was 115,000, but the bulk of these troops were conscripts, which led to poor combat performance in their Motor-Rifle Formations. However, the Soviets did have their elite infantry units, such as the famed Spetsnaz, the VDV, and their recon infantry. The problem with their elite units was not combat effectiveness, but that there were not enough of them and that they were employed incorrectly.<ref name=Fremont-Barnes />
* Intelligence gathering, essential for successful COIN, was inadequate. The Soviets overly relied on less-than-accurate aerial recon and radio intercepts rather than their recon infantry and special forces. Although their special forces and recon infantry units performed very well in combat against the Mujahideen, they would have better served in intelligence gathering.<ref name=Fremont-Barnes />
* The concept of a "war of national liberation" against a Soviet-sponsored "revolutionary" regime was so alien to the Soviet dogma that the leadership could not "come to grips" with it. This led to, among other things, a suppression by the Soviet media for several years of the truth about how bad the war was going, which caused a backlash when it was unable to hide it further.<ref name=Grau-201 />