Editing Rationality (section)

==In various fields==
=== Ethics and morality ===
The problem of rationality is relevant to various issues in [[ethics]] and [[morality]].<ref name="Mele2004a"/> Many debates center around the question of whether rationality implies morality or is possible without it. Some examples based on common sense suggest that the two can come apart. For example, some immoral [[psychopath]]s are highly intelligent in the pursuit of their schemes and may, therefore, be seen as rational. However, there are also considerations suggesting that the two are closely related to each other. For example, according to the principle of universality, "one's reasons for acting are acceptable only if it is acceptable that everyone acts on such reasons".<ref name="Harman2013"/> A similar formulation is given in [[Immanuel Kant]]'s [[categorical imperative]]: "act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law".<ref>{{cite book |last1=Kant |first1=Immanuel |last2=Ellington |first2=James W. (James Wesley) |last3=Kant |first3=Immanuel |title=Grounding for the metaphysics of morals ; with, On a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns |date=1993 |publisher=Indianapolis : Hackett Pub. Co. |isbn=978-0-87220-166-8 |page=30 |url=https://archive.org/details/groundingformet000kant/page/30}}</ref> The principle of universality has been suggested as a basic principle both for morality and for rationality.<ref name="Harman2013"/> This is closely related to the question of whether agents have a duty to be rational. Another issue concerns the value of rationality. In this regard, it is often held that human lives are more important than animal lives because humans are rational.<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Rysiew2012"/>

===Psychology===
Many psychological theories have been proposed to describe how reasoning happens and what underlying psychological processes are responsible. One of their goals is to explain how the different types of irrationality happen and why some types are more prevalent than others. They include ''mental logic theories'', ''mental model theories'', and ''[[Dual process theory|dual process theories]]''.<ref name="Knauff2021a"/><ref name="Schechter2013"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Johnson-Laird |first1=Phil |title=Deductive reasoning |journal=WIREs Cognitive Science |date=30 December 2009 |volume=1 |issue=1 |pages=8–17 |doi=10.1002/wcs.20 |pmid=26272833 |url=https://wires.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/wcs.20 |issn=1939-5078 |access-date=19 August 2022 |archive-date=24 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230124120447/https://wires.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/wcs.20 |url-status=live }}</ref> An important psychological area of study focuses on [[cognitive biases]]. Cognitive biases are systematic tendencies to engage in erroneous or irrational forms of [[thinking]], [[judging]], and acting. Examples include the [[confirmation bias]], the [[self-serving bias]], the [[hindsight bias]], and the [[Dunning–Kruger effect]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Litvak |first1=P. |last2=Lerner |first2=J. S. |title=The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences |date=2009 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LITCB |chapter=Cognitive Bias |access-date=20 December 2021 |archive-date=2 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211102021835/https://philpapers.org/rec/LITCB |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Dunning-Kruger effect |url=https://www.britannica.com/science/Dunning-Kruger-effect |website=www.britannica.com |access-date=7 December 2021 |language=en |archive-date=30 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211130065643/https://www.britannica.com/science/Dunning-Kruger-effect |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gignac |first1=Gilles E. |last2=Zajenkowski |first2=Marcin |title=The Dunning-Kruger effect is (mostly) a statistical artefact: Valid approaches to testing the hypothesis with individual differences data |journal=Intelligence |date=1 May 2020 |volume=80 |pages=101449 |doi=10.1016/j.intell.2020.101449 |s2cid=216410901 |url=https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2020.101449 |language=en |issn=0160-2896 |access-date=20 December 2021 |archive-date=15 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220515000616/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160289620300271?via%3Dihub |url-status=live }}</ref> Some empirical findings suggest that metacognition is an important aspect of rationality. The idea behind this claim is that reasoning is carried out more efficiently and reliably if the responsible thought processes are properly controlled and monitored.<ref name="Knauff2021a"/>

The [[Wason selection task]] is an influential test for studying rationality and reasoning abilities. In it, four cards are placed before the participants. Each has a number on one side and a letter on the opposite side. In one case, the visible sides of the four cards are A, D, 4, and 7. The participant is then asked which cards need to be turned around in order to verify the conditional claim "if there is a vowel on one side of the card, then there is an even number on the other side of the card". The correct answer is A and 7. But this answer is only given by about 10%. Many choose card 4 instead even though there is no requirement on what letters may appear on its opposite side.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Schechter2013"/><ref name="Evans2005"/> An important insight from using these and similar tests is that the rational ability of the participants is usually significantly better for concrete and realistic cases than for abstract or implausible cases.<ref name="Schechter2013"/><ref name="Evans2005"/> Various contemporary studies in this field use [[Bayesian probability theory]] to study subjective degrees of belief, for example, how the believer's certainty in the premises is carried over to the conclusion through reasoning.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/>

In the [[psychology of reasoning]], psychologists and [[Cognitive science|cognitive scientists]] have defended different positions on human rationality. One prominent view, due to [[Philip Johnson-Laird]] and [[Ruth M.&nbsp;J. Byrne]] among others is that humans are rational in principle but they err in practice, that is, humans have the competence to be rational but their performance is limited by various factors.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Johnson-Laird |first1=Philip N. |last2=Byrne |first2=Ruth M. J. |title=Corrigendum: 'If' and the problems of conditional reasoning |journal=Trends in Cognitive Sciences |date=1 September 2009 |volume=13 |issue=9 |pages=282–287 |doi=10.1016/j.tics.2009.08.003 |s2cid=54389097 |doi-access=free }}</ref> However, it has been argued that many standard tests of reasoning, such as those on the [[conjunction fallacy]], on the [[Wason selection task]], or the [[base rate fallacy]] suffer from methodological and conceptual problems. This has led to disputes in psychology over whether researchers should (only) use standard rules of logic, probability theory and statistics, or rational choice theory as norms of good reasoning. Opponents of this view, such as [[Gerd Gigerenzer]], favor a conception of [[bounded rationality]], especially for tasks under high uncertainty.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Sturm |first1=Thomas |title=The 'Rationality Wars' in Psychology: Where They Are and Where They Could Go |journal=Inquiry |date=February 2012 |volume=55 |issue=1 |pages=66–81 |doi=10.1080/0020174X.2012.643628 |s2cid=144877200 }}</ref> The concept of rationality continues to be debated by psychologists, economists and cognitive scientists.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Chater|first1=Nick|last2=Felin|first2=Teppo|last3=Funder|first3=David C.|last4=Gigerenzer|first4=Gerd|last5=Koenderink|first5=Jan J.|last6=Krueger|first6=Joachim I.|last7=Noble|first7=Denis|last8=Nordli|first8=Samuel A.|last9=Oaksford|first9=Mike|last10=Schwartz|first10=Barry|last11=Stanovich|first11=Keith E.|date=2018-04-01|title=Mind, rationality, and cognition: An interdisciplinary debate|url=https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-017-1333-5|journal=Psychonomic Bulletin & Review|language=en|volume=25|issue=2|pages=793–826|doi=10.3758/s13423-017-1333-5|issn=1531-5320|pmc=5902517|pmid=28744767|access-date=2021-12-18|archive-date=2023-12-30|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231230142156/https://link.springer.com/article/10.3758/s13423-017-1333-5|url-status=live}}</ref>

The psychologist [[Jean Piaget]] gave an influential account of how the stages in human development from childhood to adulthood can be understood in terms of the increase of rational and logical abilities.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref>{{cite web |title=Philosophy of logic |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-logic |website=www.britannica.com |access-date=21 November 2021 |language=en |archive-date=28 April 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150428101732/http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/346240/philosophy-of-logic |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Inhelder |first1=Bärbel |last2=Piaget |first2=Jean |title=The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence: An Essay on the Construction of Formal Operational Structures |date=1958 |publisher=Psychology Press |isbn=978-0-415-21002-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=39cdDv2-PZkC |language=en |chapter=Part I: The development of propositional logic |access-date=2022-08-19 |archive-date=2023-12-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231230142129/https://books.google.com/books?id=39cdDv2-PZkC |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Parsons |first1=Charles |title=Inhelder and Piaget's the Growth of Logical Thinking† |journal=British Journal of Psychology |date=1960 |volume=51 |issue=1 |pages=75–84 |doi=10.1111/j.2044-8295.1960.tb00727.x |pmid=14430621 |url=https://bpspsychub.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.2044-8295.1960.tb00727.x |language=en |issn=2044-8295 |access-date=2022-08-19 |archive-date=2021-12-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211207184951/https://bpspsychub.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.2044-8295.1960.tb00727.x |url-status=live }}</ref> He identifies four stages associated with rough age groups: the sensorimotor stage below the age of two, the preoperational state until the age of seven, the concrete operational stage until the age of eleven, and the formal operational stage afterward. Rational or logical reasoning only takes place in the last stage and is related to abstract [[thinking]], [[concept formation]], reasoning, planning, and [[problem-solving]].<ref name="Knauff2021b"/>

====Emotions====
According to A. C. Grayling, rationality "must be independent of emotions, personal feelings or any kind of instincts".<ref>{{cite book |last1=Kumar |first1=Dr Binoy |title=Urban and Rural Sociology |date=22 January 2022 |publisher=K.K. Publications |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jn9aEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA114 |language=en |access-date=22 August 2022 |archive-date=30 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231230142126/https://books.google.com/books?id=jn9aEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA114#v=onepage&q&f=false |url-status=live }}</ref> Certain findings{{Which|date=August 2022}} in [[cognitive science]] and [[neuroscience]] show that no human has ever satisfied this criterion, except perhaps a person with no affective feelings, for example, an individual with a massively damaged [[amygdala]] or severe psychopathy. Thus, such an idealized form of rationality is best exemplified by computers, and not people. However, scholars may productively appeal to the idealization as a point of reference. {{Citation needed|date=August 2012}} In his book, ''The Edge of Reason: A Rational Skeptic in an Irrational World,'' British philosopher [[Julian Baggini]] sets out to debunk myths about reason (e.g., that it is "purely objective and requires no subjective judgment").<ref name="Radford and Frazier (2017)">{{cite journal |author1=[[Benjamin Radford|Radford, Benjamin]] |author2=[[Kendrick Frazier|Frazier, Kendrick]] |title=The Edge of Reason: A Rational Skeptic in an Irrational World |journal=Skeptical Inquirer |date=January 2017 |volume=41 |issue=1 |page=60}}</ref>

=== Cognitive and behavioral sciences ===
[[Cognitive science|Cognitive]] and [[behavioral sciences]] try to describe, explain, and predict how people think and act. Their models are often based on the assumption that people are rational. For example, [[classical economics]] is based on the assumption that people are rational agents that maximize expected utility. However, people often depart from the ideal standards of rationality in various ways. For example, they may only look for confirming [[evidence]] and ignore disconfirming evidence. Another factor studied in this regard are the limitations of human intellectual capacities. Many discrepancies from rationality are caused by limited time, memory, or attention. Often [[heuristics]] and rules of thumb are used to mitigate these limitations, but they may lead to new forms of irrationality.<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Moser2006"/><ref name="Bendor2009"/>

===Logic===
{{main|Logic and rationality}}
Theoretical rationality is closely related to [[logic]], but not identical to it.<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Knauff2021b"/> Logic is often defined as the study of correct [[argument]]s. This concerns the relation between the [[proposition]]s used in the argument: whether its [[premise]]s offer support to its conclusion. Theoretical rationality, on the other hand, is about what to believe or how to change one's beliefs. The laws of logic are relevant to rationality since the agent should change their beliefs if they violate these laws. But logic is not directly about what to believe. Additionally, there are also other factors and norms besides logic that determine whether it is rational to hold or change a belief.<ref name="Harman2013"/> The study of rationality in logic is more concerned with epistemic rationality, that is, attaining beliefs in a rational manner, than instrumental rationality.

=== Decision theory ===
An influential account of practical rationality is given by [[decision theory]].<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Knauff2021a"/><ref name="Knauff2021b"/> Decisions are situations where a number of possible courses of action are available to the agent, who has to choose one of them. Decision theory investigates the rules governing which action should be chosen. It assumes that each action may lead to a variety of outcomes. Each outcome is associated with a [[conditional probability]] and a [[utility]]. The ''expected gain'' of an outcome can be calculated by multiplying its conditional probability with its utility. The ''[[Subjective expected utility|expected utility]]'' of an act is equivalent to the sum of all expected gains of the outcomes associated with it. From these basic ingredients, it is possible to define the rationality of decisions: a decision is rational if it selects the act with the highest expected utility.<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Knauff2021b"/> While decision theory gives a very precise formal treatment of this issue, it leaves open the empirical problem of how to assign utilities and probabilities. So decision theory can still lead to bad empirical decisions if it is based on poor assignments.<ref name="Harman2013"/>

According to decision theorists, rationality is primarily a matter of internal consistency. This means that a person's [[mental state]]s like beliefs and preferences are consistent with each other or do not go against each other. One consequence of this position is that people with obviously false beliefs or perverse preferences may still count as rational if these mental states are consistent with their other mental states.<ref name="Mele2004a"/> Utility is often understood in terms of [[self-interest]] or personal [[preference]]s. However, this is not a necessary aspect of decisions theory and it can also be interpreted in terms of goodness or [[Value (ethics)|value in general]].<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Dreier2004"/>

=== Game theory ===
[[Game theory]] is closely related to decision theory and the problem of rational choice.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Knauff2021a"/> Rational choice is based on the idea that rational agents perform a [[cost-benefit analysis]] of all available options and choose the option that is most beneficial from their point of view. In the case of game theory, several agents are involved. This further complicates the situation since whether a given option is the best choice for one agent may depend on choices made by other agents. Game theory can be used to analyze various situations, like playing chess, firms competing for business, or animals fighting over prey. Rationality is a core assumption of game theory: it is assumed that each player chooses rationally based on what is most beneficial from their point of view. This way, the agent may be able to anticipate how others choose and what their best choice is relative to the behavior of the others.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Bicchieri2004"/><ref name="Ross2021"/><ref>{{cite web |title=game theory |url=https://www.britannica.com/science/game-theory |website=www.britannica.com |access-date=28 July 2022 |language=en |archive-date=26 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220726124646/https://www.britannica.com/science/game-theory |url-status=live }}</ref> This often results in a [[Nash equilibrium]], which constitutes a set of strategies, one for each player, where no player can improve their outcome by unilaterally changing their strategy.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Bicchieri2004"/><ref name="Ross2021"/>

=== Bayesianism ===
A popular contemporary approach to rationality is based on [[Bayesian epistemology]].<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Joyce2004"/> Bayesian epistemology sees belief as a continuous phenomenon that comes in degrees. For example, Daniel is relatively sure that the [[Boston Celtics]] will win their next match and absolutely certain that two plus two equals four. In this case, the degree of the first belief is weaker than the degree of the second belief. These degrees are usually referred to as ''credences'' and represented by numbers between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds to full disbelief, 1 corresponds to full belief and 0.5 corresponds to suspension of belief. Bayesians understand this in terms of [[probability]]: the higher the credence, the higher the [[subjective probability]] that the believed [[proposition]] is true. As probabilities, they are subject to the laws of [[probability theory]]. These laws act as norms of rationality: beliefs are rational if they comply with them and irrational if they violate them.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Hájek |first1=Alan |title=Interpretations of Probability: 3.3 The Subjective Interpretation |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/#SubPro |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=6 March 2021 |date=2019 |archive-date=17 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210217013520/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/#SubPro |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Olsson |first1=Erik J. |title=Introduction to Formal Philosophy |date=2018 |publisher=Springer |pages=431–442 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/OLSBE |chapter=Bayesian Epistemology |access-date=2022-08-19 |archive-date=2021-05-16 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210516095057/https://philpapers.org/rec/OLSBE |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Hartmann |first1=Stephan |last2=Sprenger |first2=Jan |title=The Routledge Companion to Epistemology |date=2010 |publisher=London: Routledge |pages=609–620 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BOVSIO |chapter=Bayesian Epistemology |access-date=2022-08-19 |archive-date=2021-05-16 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210516095047/https://philpapers.org/rec/BOVSIO |url-status=live }}</ref> For example, it would be irrational to have a credence of 0.9 that it will rain tomorrow together with another credence of 0.9 that it will not rain tomorrow. This account of rationality can also be extended to the practical domain by requiring that agents maximize their subjective expected utility. This way, Bayesianism can provide a unified account of both theoretical and practical rationality.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Joyce2004"/><ref name="Knauff2021b"/>

===Economics===
Rationality plays a key role in economics and there are several strands to this.<ref>{{cite book|title=Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk|publisher=Oxford University Press|author=Paul Anand|year=1993|isbn=0198233035}}{{page needed|date=July 2019}}</ref> Firstly, there is the concept of instrumentality—basically the idea that people and organisations are instrumentally rational—that is, adopt the best actions to achieve their goals. Secondly, there is an axiomatic concept that rationality is a matter of being logically consistent within your preferences and beliefs. Thirdly, people have focused on the accuracy of beliefs and full use of information—in this view, a person who is not rational has beliefs that do not fully use the information they have.

Debates within economic sociology also arise as to whether or not people or organizations are "really" rational, as well as whether it makes sense to model them as such in formal models. Some have argued that a kind of [[bounded rationality]] makes more sense for such models.

Others think that any kind of rationality along the lines of [[rational choice theory]] is a useless concept for understanding human behavior; the term ''[[homo economicus]]'' (economic man: the imaginary man being assumed in economic models who is [[logically consistent]] but amoral) was coined largely in honor of this view. [[Behavioral economics]] aims to account for economic actors as they actually are, allowing for psychological biases, rather than assuming idealized instrumental rationality.

===Artificial intelligence===
The field of [[artificial intelligence]] is concerned, among other things, with how problems of rationality can be implemented and solved by computers.<ref name="Knauff2021a"/> Within [[artificial intelligence]], a ''[[intelligent agent|rational agent]]'' is typically one that maximizes its expected utility, given its current knowledge. [[Utility]] is the usefulness of the consequences of its actions. The utility function is arbitrarily defined by the designer, but should be a function of "performance", which is the directly measurable consequences, such as winning or losing money. In order to make a safe agent that plays defensively, a nonlinear function of performance is often desired, so that the reward for winning is lower than the punishment for losing. An agent might be rational within its own problem area, but finding the rational decision for arbitrarily complex problems is not practically possible. The rationality of human thought is a key problem in the [[psychology of reasoning]].<ref>Johnson-Laird, P.N. & Byrne, R.M.J. (1991). ''Deduction''. Hillsdale: Erlbaum.</ref>

===International relations===
There is an ongoing debate over the merits of using "rationality" in the study of [[international relations]] (IR). Some scholars hold it indispensable.<ref>Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce (2010) Foreign Policy Analysis and Rational Choice Models. In The International Studies Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Allen Denemark. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.{{page needed|date=July 2019}}</ref> Others are more critical.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Walt |first1=Stephen M. |title=Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies |journal=International Security |date=April 1999 |volume=23 |issue=4 |pages=5–48 |doi=10.1162/isec.23.4.5 |s2cid=53513711 }}</ref> Still, the pervasive and persistent usage of "rationality" in political science and IR is beyond dispute. "Rationality" remains ubiquitous in this field. Abulof finds that Some 40% of all scholarly references to "foreign policy" allude to "rationality"—and this ratio goes up to more than half of pertinent academic publications in the 2000s. He further argues that when it comes to concrete security and foreign policies, IR employment of rationality borders on "malpractice": rationality-based descriptions are largely either false or unfalsifiable; many observers fail to explicate the meaning of "rationality" they employ; and the concept is frequently used politically to distinguish between "us and them."<ref name="Abulof">{{cite journal |last1=Abulof |first1=Uriel |title=The malpractice of 'rationality' in international relations |journal=Rationality and Society |date=16 July 2015 |volume=27 |issue=3 |pages=358–384 |doi=10.1177/1043463115593144 |s2cid=147058088 }}</ref>