Editing Precedent (section)

===Statutory interpretation in the United States===
In the United States, the courts have stated consistently that the text of the statute is read as it is written, using the ordinary meaning of the words of the statute.
* "[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn to one cardinal canon before all others. ... [C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." ''Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain'', [[Case citation|112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149]] (1992). Indeed, "[w]hen the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete.' "
* "A fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that every part of a statute be presumed to have some effect, and not be treated as meaningless unless absolutely necessary." ''Raven Coal Corp. v. Absher'', [[Case citation|153 Va. 332]], 149 S.E. 541 (1929).
* "In assessing statutory language, unless words have acquired a peculiar meaning, by virtue of statutory definition or judicial construction, they are to be construed in accordance with their common usage." ''Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc.'', [http://www.leagle.com/decision/19961706923P2d783_11695.xml/MULLER%20v.%20BP%20EXPLORATION%20(ALASKA)%20INC. 923 P.2d 783], 787–88 (Alaska 1996).

However, most legal texts have some lingering ambiguity—inevitably, situations arise in which the words chosen by the legislature do not address the precise facts in issue, or there is some tension among two or more statutes. In such cases, a court must analyze the various available sources, and reach a resolution of the ambiguity. The "Canons of statutory construction" are discussed in a [[Statutory interpretation|separate article]]. Once the ambiguity is resolved, that resolution has binding effect as described in the rest of this article.