Editing On the Origin of Species (section)

===Nature and structure of Darwin's argument===
Darwin's aims were twofold: to show that species had not been separately created, and to show that [[natural selection]] had been the chief agent of change.<ref>{{harvnb|Darwin|1871|p=[http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?viewtype=text&itemID=F937.1&pageseq=165 152]}}</ref> He knew that his readers were already familiar with the concept of transmutation of species from ''[[Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation|Vestiges]]'', and his introduction ridicules that work as failing to provide a viable mechanism.<ref name=sec/> Therefore, the first four chapters lay out his case that selection in nature, caused by the struggle for existence, is analogous to the selection of variations under domestication, and that the accumulation of adaptive variations provides a scientifically testable mechanism for evolutionary [[speciation]].<ref>{{harvnb|Quammen|2006|pp=183–188}}</ref><ref name=bowl180>{{harvnb|Bowler|2003|pp=180–181}}</ref>

Later chapters provide evidence that evolution has occurred, supporting the idea of branching, adaptive evolution without directly proving that selection is the mechanism. Darwin presents supporting facts drawn from many disciplines, showing that his theory could explain a myriad of observations from many fields of natural history that were inexplicable under the alternative concept that species had been individually created.<ref name=bowl180/><ref>{{Harvnb|Quammen|2006|pp=190, 200–201}}</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Larson|2004|pp=88–89}}</ref> The structure of Darwin's argument showed the influence of [[John Herschel]], whose philosophy of science maintained that a mechanism could be called a ''vera causa'' (true cause) if three things could be demonstrated: its existence in nature, its ability to produce the effects of interest, and its ability to explain a wide range of observations.<ref>{{harvnb|Darwin|Costa|2009|p=xvii}}</ref> This reflected the influence of [[William Whewell]]'s idea of a consilience of inductions, as explained in his work ''Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences'', where if you could argue that a proposed mechanism successfully explained various phenomena you could then use those arguments as evidence for that mechanism.<ref>{{harvnb|Ruse|2009|pp=22–23}}</ref>