Editing Mayaguez incident (section)

===Impact on U.S. military rescue planning===
{{quote|quote= The Mayaguez Rescue was the most classic example of assured failure with Joint Operations to that time. Unfortunately, the lesson was not learned and the same mistakes were repeated in the Iranian Hostage Rescue operation (1980).{{nbsp}}... In the final analysis... the lack of accurate intelligence resulted in faulty decisions. Decisions were driven by the desire to do something and to do it as quickly as possible.|source=— Brigadier-General [[Richard E. Carey]]<ref name=Dunham/>{{rp|265}}}}
The U.S. military received much criticism for its handling of the incident.<ref>{{cite report |url=http://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a293264.pdf |title=The Mayaguez incident : a failure in operational leadership |author=Major Glenn T Starnes |publisher=Naval War College |year=1995 |access-date=18 August 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140819125931/http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a293264.pdf |archive-date=19 August 2014 |url-status=live }}</ref> In addition to the failure of intelligence to determine the whereabouts of the crew of ''Mayaguez'' and the presence of a sizable hostile force on Koh Tang, the timing of the operation was questioned until it became clear that combat had been underway four hours before the crew was released. Within the services, the Marines in particular were critical of the ''ad hoc'' nature of the joint operation and the perceived pressure from the Administration for hasty action,<ref>{{cite report|url=http://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a529638.pdf|title=The Mayaguez Incident: Near Disaster at Koh Tang|author=Major Mark J. Toal|publisher=Marine Corps War College|year=1998|access-date=27 July 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150528215945/http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a529638.pdf|archive-date=28 May 2015|url-status=live}}</ref> although the success of Operation Frequent Wind had been the basis for many decisions made during the crisis.

[[Vice admiral (United States)|Vice Admiral]] [[George P. Steele]], the Seventh Fleet commander, later stated that: "The sad part of the ''Mayaguez'' is that we had sufficient force coming up with the Seventh Fleet, after it had been turned around from the evacuation of Vietnam stand down, to seize Southern Cambodia. I begged for another day or two, rather than commit forces piecemeal as we did .... The idea that we could use U.S. Air Force air police and Air Force helicopters as an assault force appears to me as ridiculous today as it did then."<ref name=Dunham/>{{rp|239}}

When many of the coordination and communications problems arose again during [[Operation Eagle Claw]], the hostage rescue mission in Iran in 1980, significant changes in joint and special operations were brought about.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|313}}