Editing Idealism (section)

==== American idealism ====
[[file:Charles Sanders Peirce.jpg|thumb|Charles Sanders Peirce]]
Idealism also became popular in the United States with thinkers like [[Charles Sanders Peirce]] (1839–1914), who defended an "objective idealism" in which, as he put it, "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws".<ref>Peirce (1891), "The Architecture of Theories",'' [[The Monist]]'' v. 1, pp. [https://archive.org/stream/monistquart01hegeuoft#page/161/mode/1up 161–176], see [https://archive.org/stream/monistquart01hegeuoft#page/170/mode/1up p. 170], via ''Internet Archive''. Reprinted (CP 6.7–34) and (''The Essential Peirce'', 1:285–297, see p. 293).</ref> Pierce initially defended a type of [[Direct and indirect realism|representationalism]] alongside his form of [[Pragmatism]] which was metaphysically neutral since it is "no doctrine of metaphysics".<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 143–145</ref> However, in later years (after c.1905), Pierce defended an objective idealism which held that the universe evolved from a state of maximum spontaneous freedom (which he associated with mind) into its present state where matter were merely "congealed" mind.<ref>Burch, Robert, "[https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/peirce/ Charles Sanders Peirce]", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Spring 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).</ref> In arguing for this view, he followed the classic idealist premise that states there must be a metaphysical equality (an [[Isomorphism of categories|isomorphism]]) between thought and being, and as such, "the root of all being is One".<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 147</ref> A key feature of Pierce's idealism is "[[Tychism]]", which he defined as "the doctrine that absolute chance is a factor of the universe."<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 148</ref> This allows for an element of chance or [[indeterminism]] in the universe which allows for cosmological evolution.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 148–149</ref>

Under the influence of Pierce, it was [[Josiah Royce]] (1855–1916) who became the leading American idealist at the turn of the century.<ref name="Guyer at al. 2023, p. 138">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 138</ref> Royce's idealism incorporated aspects of Pierce's Pragmatism and is defended in his ''The Spirit of Modern Philosophy'' (1892).<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 139–140</ref> One of Royce's arguments for idealism is his argument from meaning, which states the possibility of there being [[Meaning (philosophy)|meaning]] at all requires an identity between what is meant (ordinary objects) and what makes meaning (ordinary subjects).<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 140</ref>

In his ''The World and the Individual'' (2 vols, 1899 and 1901), Royce also links meaning with purpose, seeing the meaning of a term as its intended purpose.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 141</ref> Royce was an absolute idealist who held that ultimately reality was a super-self, an absolute mind.<ref name=":24">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 142</ref> Royce argues that for a mind to be able represent itself and its representations (and not lead to a vicious infinite regress), it must be complex and capacious enough, and only an absolute mind has this capacity.<ref name=":24" />

The American philosopher [[Brand Blanshard]] (1892–1987) was also a proponent of idealism who accepted a "necessary isomorphism between knowledge and its object".<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 178</ref> His idealism is most obvious in ''The Nature of Thought'' (1939), where he discusses how all [[perception]] is infused with concepts.<ref name=":28">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 179.</ref> He then argues from a coherence theory of truth that the "character of reality" must also include coherence itself, and thus, knowledge must be similar to what it knows.<ref name=":28" /> Not only that, but knowledge must be part of a single system with the world it knows, and causal relations must be also involve logical relations. These considerations lead to an idealism which sees the world as system of relations that cannot be merely physical.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 180</ref>