Editing Hirohito (section)

===Accountability for Japanese war crimes===
The issue of Emperor Hirohito's war responsibility is contested.<ref name="matsuno2729">{{cite book |last1=Yoshimi |first1=Yoshiaki |title={{Nihongo||毒ガス戦関係資料. II|Dokugasusen Kankei Shiryō II}}, Kaisetsu |last2=Matsuno |first2=Seiya |publisher=Fuji Shuppan |year=1997 |series={{Nihongo||十五年戦争極秘資料集|Jugonen Sensō Gokuhi Shiryoshu}} |location=Tōkyō |pages=27–29 |author-link1=Yoshiaki Yoshimi}}</ref> During the war, the [[Allies of World War II|Allies]] frequently depicted Hirohito to equate with [[Adolf Hitler]] and [[Benito Mussolini]] as the three [[Axis powers|Axis]] dictators.<ref name="Warriors-Scholars">{{cite book |last=Divine |first=Dr. Robert A. |title=Warriors and Scholars: A Modern War reader |year=2005}}, edited by Peter B. Lane and Ronald E. Marcello, pp. 94–96</ref> After the war, since the U.S. thought that the retention of the emperor would help establish a peaceful allied occupation regime in Japan, and help the U.S. achieve their postwar objectives, they depicted Hirohito as a "powerless figurehead" without any implication in wartime policies.{{sfn|Bix|2000|p=545}} Starting with the publication of specific archival records in the 1960s and continuing after Hirohito's death in 1989, a growing body of evidence and historical studies started to dispute the theory that he was a powerless figurehead.<ref name="Warriors-Scholars" /><ref name="Atomic-Heritage">{{cite web |title=Emperor Hirohito |url=https://www.atomicheritage.org/profile/emperor-hirohito |website=Atomic Heritage Foundation}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Laquerre |first=Paul-Yanic |title=Showa: Chronicles of a Fallen God |year=2013}}, Preface</ref> In recent years, the debate over the Emperor's role in the war has focused on the exact extent of his involvement in political and military affairs (as it is now widely accepted that he had at least some degree of involvement).<ref name="Wetzler 2020">{{cite book |last=Wetzler |first=Peter |year=2020 |title=Imperial Japan and Defeat in the Second World War: The Collapse of an Empire |location=London |publisher=Bloomsbury |page=175 |isbn=978-1350246799}}</ref>{{sfn|Rich|2018}}

Historian Peter Wetzler said that: <blockquote>"The debate, however, about Hirohito's participation in political and military affairs during the Second World War -whether or not (at first) and to what extent (later)- still continues. It will animate authors for years to come. Now most historians acknowledge that the Emperor was deeply involved, like all nation-state leaders at that time."<ref name="Wetzler 2020" /></blockquote>

Jennifer Lind, associate professor of government at [[Dartmouth College]] and a specialist in Japanese war memory, states that: <blockquote>"Over the years, these different pieces of evidence have trickled out and historians have amassed this picture of culpability and how he was reflecting on that. This is another piece of the puzzle that very much confirms that the picture that was taking place before, which is that he was extremely culpable, and after the war he was devastated about this."{{sfn|Rich|2018}}</blockquote> As new evidence surfaced over the years, historians concluded that he bore at least some amount of culpability for the war's outbreak and the crimes perpetrated by Japan's military during that period.<ref name="Wetzler 2020" />{{sfn|Rich|2018}}<ref>{{cite book |last=Ruoff |first=Kenneth J. |year=2020 |title=Japan's Imperial House in the Postwar Era, 1945-2019 |location=Cambridge, MA |publisher=Harvard University Asia Center |pages=95–98 |isbn=978-0674244481}}</ref>

====Evidence for wartime culpability====
{{see also|Chrysanthemum taboo}}
Historians who point to a higher degree of the Emperor's involvement in the war have stated that Hirohito was directly responsible for the [[Japanese war crimes|atrocities committed by the imperial forces]] in the Second Sino-Japanese War and in World War II. They have said that he and some members of the imperial family, such as his brother [[Prince Chichibu]], his cousins the princes [[Prince Takeda Tsuneyoshi|Takeda]] and [[Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu|Fushimi]], and his uncles the princes [[Prince Kan'in Kotohito|Kan'in]], [[Prince Asaka|Asaka]], and [[Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko|Higashikuni]], should have been tried for [[war crime]]s.{{sfn|Dower|1999}}{{page needed|date=October 2023}}<ref name="ReferenceA">Bix.</ref>{{incomplete short citation|date=October 2023}} In a study published in 1996, historian Mitsuyoshi Himeta said that the [[Three Alls policy]] (''Sankō Sakusen''), a Japanese [[scorched earth]] policy adopted in [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|China]] and sanctioned by Emperor Hirohito himself, was both directly and indirectly responsible for the deaths of "more than 2.7 million" Chinese civilians. In ''[[Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan]]'', [[Herbert P. Bix]] said the ''Sankō Sakusen'' far surpassed [[Nanking Massacre]] not only in terms of numbers, but in brutality. According to Bix, "[t]hese military operations caused death and suffering on a scale incomparably greater than the totally unplanned orgy of killing in Nanking, which later came to symbolize the war".{{Sfn|Bix|2001|p=365}} While the Nanking Massacre was unplanned, Bix said "Hirohito knew of and approved annihilation campaigns in China that included burning villages thought to harbor guerrillas."<ref name="Tajima-notes"/> Likewise,  in August 2000, the [[Los Angeles Times]] reported that top U.S. government officials were fully aware of the emperor's intimate role during the war.<ref>{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=14 August 2000 |title=Detail All of Hirohito's Role |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-aug-14-me-4022-story.html |access-date=24 November 2023 |website=Los Angeles Times |language=en-US}}</ref>

According to [[Yuki Tanaka (historian)|Yuki Tanaka]], [[Emeritus]] Research Professor of History at [[Hiroshima City University]], the war records at the Defense Agency National Institute provide evidence that Hirohito was heavily involved in creating war policies.<ref name="Tanaka 2023">{{cite book |last=Tanaka |first=Yuki |title=Entwined Atrocities. New Insights into the U.S.-Japan Alliance |location=New York |publisher=Peter Lang Inc., International Academic Publishers |pages=xxxvi-xxxvii |year=2023 |isbn=978-1433199530}}</ref> He further stated that Japanese statesmen [[Kido Kōichi]]'s wartime journal undeniably proves that Hirohito had a crucial role in the final decision to wage a war against the Allied nations in December 1941.<ref name="Tanaka 2023"/>

According to Francis Pike, Hirohito was deeply engaged in military operations and commissioned a war room beneath the [[Tokyo Imperial Palace]] to closely monitor Japan's military activities.<ref name="Pike">{{cite web |url=https://www.historynewsnetwork.org/article/five-myths-about-emperor-hirohito |title=Five Myths About Emperor Hirohito |work=History News Network |first=Francis |last=Pike |date=26 July 2015 |access-date=11 July 2024}}</ref> Pike further noted that the extensive resources required for regular updates to the Emperor often drew complaints from military officials.<ref name="Pike"/> To celebrate significant military victories, he rode his white horse in parades in front of the Imperial Palace.<ref name="Pike"/>

According to Peter Wetzler, he was actively involved in the decision to launch the war as well as in other political and military decisions.{{sfn|Wetzler|1998|p=3}}

Poison gas weapons, such as [[phosgene]], were produced by [[Unit 731]] and authorized by specific orders given by Hirohito himself, transmitted by the chief of staff of the army. Hirohito authorized the use of toxic gas 375 times during the [[Battle of Wuhan]] from August to October 1938.<ref name="matsuno2729"/> He rewarded [[Shirō Ishii]], who was the head of the medical experimentation unit and Unit 731, with a special service medal.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/hirohito-the-war-criminal-who-got-away/#:~:text=Belying%20the%20post%2Dwar%20myth,the%20Germans'%20Josef%20Mengele)%2C |title=Hirohito, the war criminal who got away |work=The Spectator |first=Francis |last=Pike |date=22 August 2020 |access-date=11 July 2024}}</ref>

[[Prince Mikasa]], the younger brother of Hirohito, informed the [[Yomiuri Shimbun]] that during 1944, he compiled a thorough report detailing the wartime atrocities perpetrated by Japanese soldiers in China.<ref name="tribune">{{cite news |url=https://www.chicagotribune.com/1994/07/07/new-hirohito-revelations-startle-japan/ |title=New Hirohito Revelations Startle Japan |work=[[Chicago Tribune]] |date=7 July 1994 |access-date=11 July 2024}}</ref> He clarified that he didn't directly discuss the report with Hirohito; however, he added that "when I met with him, I did report on the China situation in bits and pieces."<ref name="tribune"/>  Additionally, he recalled showing Hirohito a Chinese-produced film depicting Japanese atrocities.<ref name="tribune"/>

Officially, the imperial constitution, adopted under [[Emperor Meiji]], gave full power to the Emperor. Article 4 prescribed that, "The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitution." Likewise, according to article 6, "The Emperor gives sanction to laws and orders them to be promulgated and executed," and article 11, "The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and the Navy." The Emperor was thus the leader of the [[Imperial General Headquarters]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=1889 Japanese Constitution |url=https://history.hanover.edu/texts/1889con.html |website=history.hanover.edu}}</ref>

According to Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi of [[York University]], Hirohito's authority up to 1945 depended on three elements:

<blockquote> First, he was a constitutional monarch subject to legal restrictions and binding conventions, as he has so often stressed. Second, he was supreme commander of Japanese armed forces, though his orders were often ignored and sometimes defied. Third, he wielded absolute moral authority in Japan by granting imperial honors that conveyed incontestable prestige and by issuing imperial rescripts that had coercive power greater than law. [¶] In the postwar era, the Japanese Government, some Japanese historians, and Hirohito himself have downplayed or ignored these second and third elements, where were strongest up to 1945; and they have overemphasized the first, which was weakest. Hirohito was no despot. But he did retain 'absolute' power in the sense of ultimate and final authority to sanction a particular policy decision by agreeing with it, or to force its reformulation or abandonment by disagreeing with it. When he really wanted to put his foot down, he did –– even to the army."{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=19-20}}</blockquote>

Wakabayashi further adds:
<blockquote>...as a matter of course, [Hirohito] wanted to keep what his generals conquered -- though he was less greedy than some of them. None of this should surprise us. Hirohito would no more have granted Korea independence or returned Manchuria to China than Roosevelt would have granted Hawaii independence or returned Texas to Mexico.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17}}</blockquote>

Historians such as [[Herbert Bix]], [[Akira Fujiwara]], Peter Wetzler, and [[Akira Yamada]] assert that post-war arguments favoring the view that Hirohito was a mere figurehead overlook the importance of numerous "behind the chrysanthemum curtain" meetings where the real decisions were made between the Emperor, his chiefs of staff, and the cabinet. Using primary sources and the monumental work of Shirō Hara as a basis,{{efn|Former member of section 20 of War operations of the Army high command, Hara has made a detailed study of the way military decisions were made, including the Emperor's involvement published in five volumes in 1973–74 under the title ''Daihon'ei senshi; Daitōa Sensō kaisen gaishi; Kaisen ni itaru seisentyaku shidō'' (Imperial Headquarters war history; General history of beginning hostilities in the Greater East Asia War; Leadership and political strategy with respect to the beginning of hostilities).}} Fujiwara<ref>{{cite book |last=Fujiwara |first=Akira |title=Shōwa Tennō no Jū-go Nen Sensō (The Shōwa Emperor fifteen years war) |year=1991}}</ref> and Wetzler{{sfn|Wetzler|1998}} have produced evidence suggesting that the Emperor actively participated in making political and military decisions and was neither bellicose nor a pacifist but an opportunist who governed in a pluralistic decision-making process. Historian Peter Wetzler states that the emperor was thoroughly informed of military matters, and comensurate with his position and Japanese methods of forming policies, he participated in making political and military decisions as the constitutional emperor of Imperial Japan and head of the imperial house.{{sfn|Wetzler|1998|p=32}} For his part, American historian [[Herbert P. Bix]] maintains that Emperor Hirohito worked through intermediaries to exercise a great deal of control over the military and might have been the prime mover behind most of Japan's military aggression during the Shōwa era.<ref name="ReferenceA" />{{page needed|date=June 2022}}

The view promoted by the Imperial Palace and American occupation forces immediately after World War II portrayed Emperor Hirohito as a purely ceremonial figure who behaved strictly according to protocol while remaining at a distance from the decision-making processes. This view was endorsed by Prime Minister [[Noboru Takeshita]] in a speech on the day of Hirohito's death in which Takeshita asserted that the war "had broken out against [Hirohito's] wishes." Takeshita's statement provoked outrage in nations in East Asia and Commonwealth nations such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.<ref name="Chira1989">{{cite news |last=Chira |first=Susan |author-link=Susan Chira |date=22 January 1989 |title=Post-Hirohito, Japan Debates His War Role |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/22/world/post-hirohito-japan-debates-his-war-role.html |access-date=10 April 2009 |newspaper=The New York Times}}</ref> According to historian Fujiwara, "The thesis that the Emperor, as an organ of responsibility, could not reverse cabinet decision is a [[myth]] fabricated after the war."<ref>''Shōwa tennō no Jū-go nen sensō'', Aoki Shoten, 1991, p. 122.</ref>

According to Yinan He, associate professor of international relations at [[Lehigh University]],<ref>{{cite web |title=Yinan He &#124; International Relations |url=https://ir.cas.lehigh.edu/content/yinan-he |access-date=21 June 2022 |archive-date=5 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220705023707/https://ir.cas.lehigh.edu/content/yinan-he |url-status=dead }}</ref> [[Allies of World War II|allied countries]] and Japanese leftists demanded the emperor to abdicate and be tried as a war criminal.<ref name="Yinan-He" /> However, conservative Japanese elites concocted [[jingoism|jingoistic]] myths that exonerated the nation's ruling class and downplayed Japan's wartime culpability.<ref name="Yinan-He" /> Such revisionist campaigns depicted the Emperor as a peace-seeking diplomat, while blaming the militarists for hijacking the government and leading the country into a disastrous war.<ref name="Yinan-He" /> This narrative sought to exonerate the Emperor by shifting responsibility onto a small group of military leaders.<ref name="Yinan-He" /> Furthermore, numerous Japanese conservative elites lobbied the United States to spare the emperor from war crimes investigations and advocated instead for the prosecution of General Hideki Tojo, who held office as prime minister for most of the Pacific War.<ref name="Yinan-He" /> This narrative also narrowly focuses on the U.S.–Japan conflict, completely ignores the wars Japan waged in Asia, and disregards the atrocities committed by Japanese troops during the war.<ref name="Yinan-He" /> Japanese elites created the narrative in an attempt to avoid tarnishing the national image and regain the international acceptance of the country.<ref name="Yinan-He" />

{{Wikidata fallback link|Q11604570}} said that post-war Japanese public opinion supporting protection of the Emperor was influenced by United States propaganda promoting the view that the Emperor together with the Japanese people had been fooled by the military.<ref>{{cite web |last=Awaya |first=Kentarō |others=Timothy Amos trans. |title=The Tokyo Tribunal, War Responsibility and the Japanese People |url=http://www.japanfocus.org/-Awaya-Kentaro/2061 |access-date=10 April 2009 |work=Japan Focus |date=16 February 2006 |publisher=The Asia-Pacific Journal}}</ref>

In the years immediately after Hirohito's death, scholars who spoke out against the emperor were threatened and attacked by right-wing extremists. [[Susan Chira]] reported, "Scholars who have spoken out against the late Emperor have received threatening phone calls from Japan's extremist right wing."<ref name="Chira1989" /> One example of actual violence occurred in 1990 when the mayor of Nagasaki, [[Hitoshi Motoshima]], was shot and critically wounded by a member of the ultranationalist group, [[Seikijuku]]. A year before, in 1989, Motoshima had broken what was characterized as "one of [Japan's] most sensitive taboos" by asserting that Emperor Hirohito bore responsibility for World War II.<ref>{{cite news |last=Sanger |first=David |date=19 January 1990 |title=Mayor Who Faulted Hirohito Is Shot |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/19/world/mayor-who-faulted-hirohito-is-shot.html?sec=&spon= |access-date=10 April 2009 |newspaper=The New York Times}}</ref>

Regarding Hirohito's exemption from trial before the [[International Military Tribunal of the Far East]], opinions were not unanimous. Sir [[William Webb (judge)|William Webb]], the president of the tribunal, declared: "This immunity of the Emperor is contrasted with the part he played in launching the war in the Pacific, is, I think, a matter which the tribunal should take into consideration in imposing the sentences."<ref>{{cite book |last=Fleury |first=Jean Sénat |title=Hirohito: Guilty or Innocent |year=2019}} Prologue, p. xxvi.</ref> Likewise, the French judge, [[Henri Bernard (magistrate)|Henri Bernard]], wrote about Hirohito's accountability that the declaration of war by Japan "had a principal author who escaped all prosecution and of whom in any case the present defendants could only be considered accomplices."<ref>{{cite book |last=Pike |first=Francis |title=Hirohito's War: The Pacific War, 1941–1945 |year=2015}}, p. 120.</ref>

An account from the Vice Interior Minister in 1941, Michio Yuzawa, asserts that Hirohito was "at ease" with the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]] "once he had made a decision."<ref name="Yuzawa-memo">{{cite journal |last=Yamaguchi |first=Mari |date=27 July 2018 |title=Newly released 1941 memo says Emperor Hirohito 'at ease' with attack on Pearl Harbor |url=https://www.staradvertiser.com/2018/07/27/breaking-news/newly-released-1941-memo-says-emperor-hirohito-at-ease-with-attack-on-pearl-harbor/ |journal=Honolulu Star-Advertiser |access-date=26 February 2020}}</ref>

Since his death in 1989, historians have discovered evidence that prove Hirohito's culpability for the war, and that he was not a passive figurehead manipulated by those around him.<ref name="Yinan-He" />

====Showa Tenno Dokuhaku Roku====
In December 1990, the [[Bungeishunjū]] published the Showa tenno dokuhaku roku (Dokuhaku roku), which recorded conversations Hirohito held with five Imperial Household Ministry officials between March and April 1946, containing twenty-four sections.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=5}} The Dokuhaku roku recorded Hirohito speaking retroactively on topics arranged chronologically from 1919 to 1946, right before the [[Tokyo War Crimes Trials]].{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=5}}

In Hirohito's monologue: <blockquote>It doesn't matter much if an incident occurs in Manchuria, as it is rural; however, if something were to happen in the Tientsin-Peking area, Anglo-American intervention would likely worsen and could lead to a clash.<ref name="Bix 1992 343–344">{{cite journal |last=Bix |first=Herbert |title=The Showa Emperor's "Monologue" and the Problem of War Responsibility |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/132824 |date=1992 |issue=2 |journal=The Journal of Japanese Studies |volume=18 |pages=343–344|doi=10.2307/132824 |jstor=132824 }}</ref></blockquote>

While he could justify the aggression of his military in China's northeastern provinces, he lacked confidence in Japan's capacity to win a war against the United States and Britain. He was also more aware than his military commanders of Japan's vulnerability to an economic blockade by Western powers.<ref name="Bix 1992 343–344"/>

Japan signed the [[Tripartite Pact]] in 1940 and another agreement in December 1941 that forbade Japan from signing a separate peace treaty with the United States.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}} In the Dokuhaku roku, Hirohito said:

<blockquote>(In 1941,) we thought we could achieve a draw with the US, or at best win by a six to four margin; but total victory was nearly impossible ... When the war actually began, however, we gained a miraculous victory at Pearl Harbor and our invasions of Malaya and Burma succeeded far quicker than expected. So, if not for this (agreement), we might have achieved peace when we were in an advantageous position.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}}</blockquote>

The passage in the Dokuhaku roku refutes the theory that Hirohito wanted an early conclusion to the war owing to his value for peace. Instead, it provides evidence that he desired its end because of Japan's early military victories in Pearl Harbor and Southeast Asia.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}}

In September 1944, Prime Minister [[Kuniaki Koiso]] proposed that a settlement and concessions, such as the return of Hong Kong, should be given to [[Chiang Kai-shek]], so that Japanese troops in China could be diverted to the [[Pacific War]].{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=15-16}} Hirohito rejected the proposal and did not want to give concessions to China because he feared it would signal Japanese weakness, create defeatism at home, and trigger independence movements in occupied countries.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=16}}

As the war shifted unfavorably for Japan, his sentiments were recorded in the Dokuhaku roku as follows:
<blockquote> I hoped to give the enemy one good bashing somewhere, and then seize a chance for peace. Yet I didn't want to ask for peace before Germany did because then we would lose trust in the international community for having violated that corollary agreement.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=18}}</blockquote>

As the war front progressed northward, Hirohito persistently hoped for the Japanese military to deliver a "good bashing" at some point during the war, which meant securing a decisive victory and then leveraging that success to negotiate the most favorable terms possible for Japan.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-19}} In the autumn of 1944, he hoped for a victory at [[Battle of Leyte Gulf]], but Japan suffered defeat.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}} On 14 February 1945, [[Fumimaro Konoe]] wrote a proposal to Hirohito, urging him to quell extremist elements within the military and end the war.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}} Konoe argued that although surrendering to America might preserve imperial rule, it would not survive a communist revolution he believed was imminent.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}} Hirohito was troubled by the ambiguity surrounding America's commitment to upholding imperial rule.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}} He considered the advice of Army Chief of Staff [[Yoshijirō Umezu]], who advocated for continuing the fight to the bitter end, believing that the Americans could be lured into a trap on Taiwan, where they could be defeated.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}} However, the Americans avoided Taiwan.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}} Despite the defeat at the [[Battle of Okinawa]] and acknowledging Japan's imminent unconditional surrender following this defeat, Hirohito persisted in seeking another battlefield where a "good bashing" could be achieved, considering locations such as [[Yunnan]] or [[British rule in Burma|Burma]].{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=17-18}}

In August 1945, Hirohito agreed to the [[Potsdam Declaration]] because he thought that the American occupation of Japan would uphold imperial rule in Japan.{{sfn|Wakabayashi|1991|pp=5}}

====Shinobu Kobayashi's diary====
Shinobu Kobayashi was the Emperor's chamberlain from April 1974 until June 2000. Kobayashi kept a diary with near-daily remarks of Hirohito for 26 years. It was made public on Wednesday 22 August 2018.<ref name="Kobayashi-diary">{{cite web |date=23 August 2018 |title=Diary tells of Emperor Hirohito's anguish in final years over blame for war |url=https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/08/23/national/history/diary-tells-emperor-hirohitos-anguish-final-years-blame-war/#.XV35d9LLfK4}}</ref> According to Takahisa Furukawa, a professor of modern Japanese history at Nihon University, the diary reveals that the emperor "gravely took responsibility for the war for a long time, and as he got older, that feeling became stronger."{{sfn|Rich|2018}}

Jennifer Lind, associate professor of government at [[Dartmouth College]] and a specialist in Japanese war memory said:

{{blockquote|"Over the years, these different pieces of evidence have trickled out and historians have amassed this picture of culpability and how he was reflecting on that. This is another piece of the puzzle that very much confirms that the picture that was taking place before, which is that he was extremely culpable, and after the war he was devastated about this."{{sfn|Rich|2018}}}}

An entry dated 27 May 1980 said the Emperor wanted to express his regret about the [[Second Sino-Japanese War|Sino-Japanese war]] to former Chinese Premier [[Hua Guofeng]] who visited at the time, but was stopped by senior members of the [[Imperial Household Agency]] owing to fear of backlash from far right groups.<ref name="Kobayashi-diary" />

An entry dated 7 April 1987 said the Emperor was haunted by discussions of his wartime responsibility and, as a result, was losing his will to live.<ref name="Kobayashi-diary" />

====Michiji Tajima's notes in 1952====
According to notebooks by Michiji Tajima, a top Imperial Household Agency official who took office after the war, Emperor Hirohito privately expressed regret about the atrocities that were committed by Japanese troops during the [[Nanjing Massacre]].<ref name="Tajima-notes">{{cite journal |last=Landers |first=Peter |date=19 August 2019 |title=Japan's Wartime Emperor Showed Remorse Over Nanjing Massacre |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/japans-wartime-emperor-showed-remorse-over-nanjing-massacre-11566210385 |newspaper=The Wall Street Journal}}</ref> In addition to feeling remorseful about his own role in the war, he "fell short by allowing radical elements of the military to drive the conduct of the war."<ref name="Tajima-notes" />

====Vice Interior Minister Yuzawa's account on Hirohito's role in Pearl Harbor raid====
In late July 2018, the bookseller Takeo Hatano, an acquaintance of the descendants of [[Michio Yuzawa]] (Japanese Vice Interior Minister in 1941), released to Japan's ''[[Yomiuri Shimbun]]'' newspaper a memo by Yuzawa that Hatano had kept for nine years since he received it from Yuzawa's family. The bookseller said: "It took me nine years to come forward, as I was afraid of a backlash. But now I hope the memo would help us figure out what really happened during the war, in which 3.1 million people were killed."<ref name="Yuzawa-memo" />

Takahisa Furukawa, expert on wartime history from Nihon University, confirmed the authenticity of the memo, calling it "the first look at the thinking of Emperor Hirohito and Prime Minister [[Hideki Tojo]] on the eve of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor."<ref name="Yuzawa-memo" />

In this document, Yuzawa details a conversation he had with Tojo a few hours before the attack. The Vice Minister quotes Tojo saying:

{{blockquote|"The Emperor seemed at ease and unshakable once he had made a decision."<ref name= "Yuzawa-memo"/>}}
{{blockquote|"If His Majesty had any regret over negotiations with Britain and the U.S., he would have looked somewhat grim. There was no such indication, which must be a result of his determination. I'm completely relieved. Given the current conditions, I could say we have practically won already."<ref name= "Yuzawa-memo"/>}}

Historian Furukawa concluded from Yuzawa's memo:

{{blockquote|"Tojo is a bureaucrat who was incapable of making own decisions, so he turned to the Emperor as his supervisor. That's why he had to report everything for the Emperor to decide. If the Emperor didn't say no, then he would proceed."<ref name= "Yuzawa-memo"/>}}

====Diary of Chief Military Aide-de-Camp Takeji Nara====

The diary of Japanese general [[Takeji Nara]] documented Nara's interactions with the emperor and described Hirohito's reactions to Japan's role in instigating the [[Mukden Incident]].<ref name="Bix 1992 342–344">{{cite journal |last=Bix |first=Herbert P. |title=The Showa Emperor's |journal=The Journal of Japanese Studies |publisher=The Society for Japanese Studies |volume=18 |issue=2 |year=1992 |issn=0095-6848 |jstor=132824 |pages=342–344}}</ref> Nara's diary entries show that Hirohito was well aware of the Mukden Incident and acknowledged that Japanese General [[Kanji Ishiwara]] was its instigator. However, once the emperor justified that the army's actions in Manchuria as necessary, he gradually adapted to the new circumstances and showed little desire to punish those responsible.<ref name="Bix 1992 342–344"/>

====Hirohito's preparations for war described in Saburō Hyakutake's diary====
In September 2021, 25 diaries, pocket notebooks and memos by [[Saburō Hyakutake]] (Emperor Hirohito's Grand Chamberlain from 1936 to 1944) deposited by his relatives to the library of the University of Tokyo's graduate schools for law and politics became available to the public.<ref name="Hyakutake-diary">{{cite news |last=Kitano |first=Ryuichi |date=6 December 2021 |title=Diary: Hirohito prepared for U.S. war before Pearl Harbor attack |url=https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14496398 |work=The Asahi Shimbun |access-date=30 January 2022}}</ref>

Hyakutake's diary quotes some of Hirohito's ministers and advisers as being worried that the Emperor was getting ahead of them in terms of battle preparations.

Thus, Hyakutake quotes Tsuneo Matsudaira, the Imperial Household Minister, saying:

{{blockquote|"The Emperor appears to have been prepared for war in the face of the tense times." (13 October 1941)<ref name="Hyakutake-diary"/>}}

Likewise, Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, is quoted as saying:

{{blockquote|"I occasionally have to try to stop him from going too far." (13 October 1941)<ref name="Hyakutake-diary"/>}}
{{blockquote|"The Emperor's resolve appears to be going too far." (20 November 1941)<ref name="Hyakutake-diary"/>}}
{{blockquote|"I requested the Emperor to say things to give the impression that Japan will exhaust all measures to pursue peace when the Foreign Minister is present." (20 November 1941)<ref name="Hyakutake-diary"/>}}

Seiichi Chadani, professor of modern Japanese history with Shigakukan University who has studied Hirohito's actions before and during the war said on the discovery of Hyakutake's diary:

{{blockquote|"The archives available so far, including his biography compiled by the Imperial Household Agency, contained no detailed descriptions that his aides expressed concerns about Hirohito leaning toward Japan's entry into the war."<ref name="Hyakutake-diary"/>}}
{{blockquote|"(Hyakutake's diary) is a significant record penned by one of the close aides to the Emperor documenting the process of how Japan's leaders led to the war."<ref name="Hyakutake-diary"/>}}

==== Documents that suggest limited wartime responsibility ====
The declassified January 1989 British government assessment of Hirohito describes him as "too weak to alter the course of events" and Hirohito was "powerless" and comparisons with Hitler are "ridiculously wide off the mark." Hirohito's power was limited by ministers and the military and if he asserted his views too much he would have been replaced by another member of the royal family.<ref name="whitehead-assessment" />

[[British Raj|Indian]] [[jurist]] [[Radhabinod Pal]] opposed the International Military Tribunal and made a 1,235-page judgment.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |title=SDHF Newsletter No. 18: "Dissentient Judgment of Justice Pal" |publisher=Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact |url=http://www.sdh-fact.com/mail-magazine/452/ |access-date=17 June 2018}}</ref> He found the entire prosecution case to be weak regarding the conspiracy to commit an act of aggressive war with brutalization and subjugation of conquered nations. Pal said there is "no evidence, testimonial or circumstantial, concomitant, prospectant, restrospectant, that would in any way lead to the inference that the government in any way permitted the commission of such offenses".<ref name="brook">"The Tokyo Judgment and the Rape of Nanking", by [[Timothy Brook]], ''The Journal of Asian Studies'', August 2001.</ref> He added that conspiracy to wage aggressive war was not illegal in 1937, or at any point since.<ref name="brook" /> Pal supported the acquittal of all of the defendants. He considered the Japanese military operations as justified, because [[Chiang Kai-shek]] supported the boycott of trade operations by the Western Powers, particularly the United States boycott of oil exports to Japan. Pal argued the attacks on neighboring territories were justified to protect the Japanese Empire from an aggressive environment, especially the [[Soviet Union]]. He considered that to be self-defense operations which are not criminal. Pal said "the real culprits are not before us" and concluded that "only a lost war is an international crime".

=====The Emperor's own statements=====
;8 September 1975 TV interview with [[NBC]], USA<ref>[[#陛下、お尋ね申し上げます 1988|陛下、お尋ね申し上げます 1988]]{{Broken anchor|date=16 June 2024|bot=User:Cewbot/log/20201008/configuration|target_link=Hirohito#陛下、お尋ね申し上げます 1988|reason= }} p. 209</ref>
: '''Reporter:''' "How far has your Majesty been involved in Japan's decision to end the war in 1945? What was the motivation for your launch?"
: '''Emperor:''' "Originally, this should be done by the Cabinet. I heard the results, but at the last [[Gozen Kaigi|meeting]] I asked for a decision. I decided to end the war on my own. (...) I thought that the continuation of the war would only bring more misery to the people."
;Interview with ''[[Newsweek]]'', USA, 20 September 1975<ref>[[#陛下、お尋ね申し上げます 1988|陛下、お尋ね申し上げます 1988]]{{Broken anchor|date=16 June 2024|bot=User:Cewbot/log/20201008/configuration|target_link=Hirohito#陛下、お尋ね申し上げます 1988|reason= }} p. 212</ref>
: '''Reporter:''' "(Abbreviation) How do you answer those who claim that your Majesty was also involved in the decision-making process that led Japan to start the war?"
: '''Emperor:''' "(Omission) At the start of the war, a cabinet decision was made, and I could not reverse that decision. We believe this is consistent with the provisions of the Imperial Constitution."
;22 September 1975 – Press conference with Foreign Correspondents<ref>[[#陛下、お尋ね申し上げます 1988|陛下、お尋ね申し上げます 1988]]{{Broken anchor|date=16 June 2024|bot=User:Cewbot/log/20201008/configuration|target_link=Hirohito#陛下、お尋ね申し上げます 1988|reason= }} p. 216</ref>
: '''Reporter:''' "How long before the attack on Pearl Harbor did your Majesty know about the attack plan? And did you approve the plan?"
: '''Emperor:''' "It is true that I had received information on military operations in advance. However, I only received those reports after the military commanders made detailed decisions. Regarding issues of political character and military command, I believe that I acted in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution."
;On 31 October 1975, a press conference was held immediately after returning to Japan after visiting the United States.<ref>[[#陛下、お尋ね申し上げます 1988|陛下、お尋ね申し上げます 1988]]{{Broken anchor|date=16 June 2024|bot=User:Cewbot/log/20201008/configuration|target_link=Hirohito#陛下、お尋ね申し上げます 1988|reason= }} pp. 226–227</ref><ref>[[#昭和天皇語録 2004|昭和天皇語録 2004]]{{Broken anchor|date=16 June 2024|bot=User:Cewbot/log/20201008/configuration|target_link=Hirohito#昭和天皇語録 2004|reason= }} p. 332</ref>
: '''Question:''' "Your majesty, at your [[White House]] banquet you said, 'I deeply deplore that unfortunate war.' (See also {{ill|Emperor Shōwa's Theory of War Responsibility|ja|昭和天皇の戦争責任論|vertical-align=sup}}.) Does your majesty feel responsibility for the war itself, including the opening of hostilities? Also, what does your majesty think about so-called war responsibility?" ([[The Times]] reporter)
: '''Emperor:'''  "I can't answer that kind of question because I haven't thoroughly studied the literature in this field, and so don't really appreciate the nuances of your words."
: '''Question:''' "How did you understand that the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima at the end of the war?" ([[RCC Broadcasting]] Reporter)
: '''Emperor:''' "I am sorry that the atomic bomb was dropped, but because of this war, I feel sorry for the citizens of Hiroshima, but I think it is unavoidable."
;17 April 1981 Press conference with the presidents of the press<ref>[[#陛下、お尋ね申し上げます 1988|陛下、お尋ね申し上げます 1988]]{{Broken anchor|date=16 June 2024|bot=User:Cewbot/log/20201008/configuration|target_link=Hirohito#陛下、お尋ね申し上げます 1988|reason= }} p. 313</ref>
: '''Reporter:''' "What was the most enjoyable of your memories of eighty years?"
: '''Emperor:''' "Since I saw the constitutional politics of Britain as the {{ill|Crown Prince|ja|皇太子裕仁親王の欧州訪問|vertical-align=sup}}, I felt strongly that I must adhere to the constitutional politics. But I was too particular about it to prevent the war. I made my own decisions twice ([[February 26 Incident]] and the end of World War II)."

====British government assessment of Hirohito====
A January 1989 declassified British government assessment of Hirohito said the Emperor was "uneasy with Japan's drift to war in the 1930s and 1940s but was too weak to alter the course of events." The dispatch by John Whitehead, former ambassador of the United Kingdom to Japan, to Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe was declassified on Thursday 20 July 2017 at the [[The National Archives (United Kingdom)|National Archives]] in London. The letter was written shortly after Hirohito's death.
Britain's ambassador to Japan John Whitehead stated in 1989:<ref name="whitehead-assessment" />

{{blockquote|"By personality and temperament, Hirohito was ill-suited to the role assigned to him by destiny. The successors of the men who had led the Meiji Restoration yearned for a charismatic warrior king. Instead, they were given an introspective prince who grew up to be more at home in the science laboratory than on the military parade ground. But in his early years, every effort was made to cast him in a different mould."<ref name="whitehead-assessment"/>}}
{{blockquote|"A man of stronger personality than Hirohito might have tried more strenuously to check the growing influence of the military in Japanese politics and the drift of Japan toward war with the western powers." "The contemporary diary evidence suggests that Hirohito was uncomfortable with the direction of Japanese policy." "The consensus of those who have studied the documents of the period is that Hirohito was consistent in attempting to use his personal influence to induce caution and to moderate and even obstruct the growing impetus toward war."<ref name="whitehead-assessment">{{cite web |publisher=Kyodo News |date=20 July 2017 |title=Hirohito "uncomfortable" with war but powerless to stop |url=https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2017/07/758307910564-hirohito-uncomfortable-with-military-aggression-but-powerless-to-change.html |format=website |access-date=23 February 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181214173058/https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2017/07/758307910564-hirohito-uncomfortable-with-military-aggression-but-powerless-to-change.html |archive-date=14 December 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref>}}

Whitehead concludes that ultimately Hirohito was "powerless" and comparisons with Hitler are "ridiculously wide off the mark." If Hirohito acted too insistently with his views he could have been isolated or replaced with a more pliant member of the royal family. The pre-war [[Meiji Constitution]] defined Hirohito as "sacred" and all-powerful, but according to Whitehead, Hirohito's power was limited by ministers and the military. Whitehead explained after World War II that Hirohito's humility was fundamental for the Japanese people to accept the new 1947 constitution and allied occupation.<ref name="whitehead-assessment" />