Editing Hamas (section)

===Finances and funding===
{{see also|Blockade of the Gaza Strip|Zaher Jabarin|Israeli support for Hamas|Taxation in the State of Palestine|Fatah–Hamas reconciliation process}}
Hamas, like its predecessor the Muslim Brotherhood, assumed the administration of Gaza's {{transliteration|ar|[[waqf]]}} properties, endowments which extend over 10% of all real estate in the Gaza Strip, with 2,000 acres of agricultural land held in religious trusts, together with numerous shops, rentable apartments and public buildings.{{sfn|Abu-Amr|1993|p=8}}

In the first five years of the 1st Intifada, the Gaza economy, 50% of which depended on external sources of income, plummeted by 30–50% as Israel closed its labour market and remittances from the [[Palestinian diaspora|Palestinian expatriates]] in the Gulf countries dried up following the 1991–1992 [[Gulf War]].{{sfn|Roy|1993|p=21}} At the 1993 Philadelphia conference, Hamas leaders' statements indicated that they read [[George H. W. Bush]]'s outline of a [[New world order (politics)|New World Order]] as embodying a [[New World Order (conspiracy theory)|tacit aim]] to destroy Islam, and that therefore funding should focus on enhancing the Islamic roots of Palestinian society and promoting jihad, which also means zeal for social justice, in the occupied territories.{{sfn|Levitt|2006|p=148}} Hamas became particularly fastidious about maintaining separate resourcing for its respective branches of activity—military, political and social services.{{sfn|Vittori|2011|p=72}} It has had a holding company in East Jerusalem (''Beit al-Mal''), a 20% stake in Al Aqsa International Bank which served as its financial arm, the Sunuqrut Global Group and al-Ajouli money-changing firm.{{sfn|Vittori|2011|p=73}}

By 2011, Hamas's budget, calculated to be roughly US$70&nbsp;million, derived even more substantially (85%) from foreign, rather than internal Palestinian, sources.{{sfn|Vittori|2011|p=73}} Only two Israeli-Palestinian sources figure in a list seized in 2004, while the other contributors were donor bodies located in Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Britain, Germany, the United States, United Arab Emirates, Italy and France. Much of the money raised comes from sources that direct their assistance to what Hamas describes as its charitable work for Palestinians, but investments in support of its ideological position are also relevant, with Persian Gulf States and Saudi Arabia prominent in the latter. Matthew Levitt claims that Hamas also taps money from corporations, criminal organizations and financial networks that support terror.{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=143–44}} It is also alleged that it engages in cigarette and drug smuggling, multimedia copyright infringement and credit card fraud.{{sfn|Vittori|2011|p=73}} The United States, Israel and the EU have shut down many charities and organs that channel money to Hamas, such as the [[Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development|Holy Land Foundation for Relief]].{{sfn|Clarke|2015|p=97}} Between 1992 and 2001, this group is said to have provided $6.8&nbsp;million to Palestinian charities of the $57&nbsp;million collected. By 2001, it was alleged to have given Hamas $13&nbsp;million, and was shut down shortly afterwards.<ref>Interpal and Development and the Al-Aqsa Charitable Foundation Fund. pp.&nbsp;146, 154–59.</ref>

About half of Hamas's funding came from states in the Persian Gulf down to the mid-2000s. Saudi Arabia supplied half of the Hamas budget of $50&nbsp;million in the early 2000s,<ref name="Burfeindt">Marsh E. Burfeindt, 'Rapprochement with Iran', in Thomas A. Johnson (ed.), [https://books.google.com/books?id=tu5m8_0iUSoC&pg=PA198 ''Power, National Security, and Transformational Global Events: Challenges Confronting America, China, and Iran''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320155024/https://books.google.com/books?id=tu5m8_0iUSoC&pg=PA198#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}. CRC Press. 2012. pp. 185–235 [198].</ref> but, under US pressure, began to cut its funding by cracking down on Islamic charities and private donor transfers to Hamas in 2004,<ref name="Vittori">Jodi Vittori, [https://books.google.com/books?id=ra_GAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA193 ''Terrorist Financing and Resourcing''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320155054/https://books.google.com/books?id=ra_GAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA193#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 pp. 72–74, 193 notes 50, 51.</ref> which by 2006 drastically reduced the flow of money from that area. Iran and Syria, in the aftermath of Hamas's 2006 electoral victory, stepped in to fill the shortfall.{{sfn|Levitt|2006|p=173}}{{sfn|Gleis|Berti|2012|p=156}} Saudi funding, negotiated with third parties including Egypt, remained supportive of Hamas as a Sunni group but chose to provide more assistance to the PNA, the electoral loser, when the EU responded to the outcome by suspending its monetary aid.<ref>Robert Mason, [https://books.google.com/books?id=ZaIcBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA48 ''Foreign Policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia: Economics and Diplomacy in the Middle East''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320155031/https://books.google.com/books?id=ZaIcBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA48 |date=20 March 2024 }}, [[I.B. Tauris]], 2015 pp. 48–49</ref> During the 1980s, Iran began to provide 10% of Hamas's funding, which it increased annually until by the 1990s it supplied $30&nbsp;million.<ref name =Burfeindt/> It accounted for $22&nbsp;million, over a quarter of Hamas's budget, by the late 2000s.<ref name="Vittori"/> According to Matthew Levitt, Iran preferred direct financing to operative groups rather than charities, requiring video proof of attacks.<ref name =Vittori/>{{sfn|Levitt|2006|pp=172–74}} Much of the Iran funding is said to be channeled through [[Hezbollah]].<ref name="Vittori"/> After 2006, Iran's willingness to take over the burden of the shortfall created by the drying up of Saudi funding also reflected the geopolitical tensions between the two, since, though Shiite, Iran was supporting a Sunni group traditionally closely linked with the Saudi kingdom.<ref>Lawrence Rubin, [https://books.google.com/books?id=TzeOAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA104 ''Islam in the Balance: Ideational Threats in Arab Politics''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320155102/https://books.google.com/books?id=TzeOAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA104#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}. Stanford University Press, 2014 p. 104</ref> The US imposed sanctions on Iran's Bank Saderat, alleging it had funneled hundreds of millions to Hamas.<ref>Jalil Roshandel, Alethia H. Cook, [https://books.google.com/books?id=0c_IAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA104 ''The United States and Iran: Policy Challenges and Opportunities''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320155043/https://books.google.com/books?id=0c_IAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA104#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. p. 104.</ref> The US has expressed concerns that Hamas obtains funds through Palestinian and Lebanese sympathizers of Arab descent in the [[Foz do Iguaçu]] area of the tri-border region of Latin America, an area long associated with arms trading, drug trafficking, contraband, the manufacture of counterfeit goods, money-laundering and currency fraud. The State Department adds that confirmatory information of a Hamas operational presence there is lacking.<ref>Mark P. Sullivan, [https://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128377.pdf 'Latin America: Terrorism Issues'] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181121061624/https://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128377.pdf |date=21 November 2018 }}. Congressional Research Service. 14 July 2009. p. 4.</ref>

After 2009, [[sanctions on Iran]] made funding difficult, forcing Hamas to rely on religious donations by individuals in the West Bank, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Funds amounting to tens of millions of dollars raised in the Gulf states were transferred through the [[Rafah Border Crossing]]. These were not sufficient to cover the costs of governing the Strip and running the al Qassam Brigades, and when tensions arose with Iran over support of President Assad in Syria, Iran dropped its financial assistance to the government, restricting its funding to the military wing, which meant a drop from $150&nbsp;million in 2012 to $60&nbsp;million the following year. A further drop occurred in 2015 when Hamas expressed its criticisms of Iran's role in the [[Yemeni Civil War (2015–present)|Yemeni Civil War]].<ref>Davis, [https://books.google.com/books?id=kGWFCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA173 p. 173] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240320155043/https://books.google.com/books?id=kGWFCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA173#v=onepage&q&f=false |date=20 March 2024 }}.</ref>

In 2017, the PA government imposed its own sanctions against Gaza, including, among other things, cutting off salaries to thousands of PA employees, as well as financial assistance to hundreds of families in the Gaza Strip. The PA initially said it would stop paying for the electricity and fuel that Israel supplies to the Gaza Strip, but after a year partially backtracked.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/palestinian-authority-rejects-israeli-us-ideas-to-help-gaza-560921|title=Palestinian Authority rejects Israeli, U.S. ideas to help Gaza|website=The Jerusalem Post|access-date=20 March 2024|archive-date=20 October 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231020135417/https://www.jpost.com//arab-israeli-conflict/palestinian-authority-rejects-israeli-us-ideas-to-help-gaza-560921|url-status=live}}</ref> The Israeli government has allowed millions of dollars from Qatar to be funneled on a regular basis through Israel to Hamas, to replace the millions of dollars the PA had stopped transferring to Hamas. Israeli Prime Minister [[Benjamin Netanyahu]] explained that letting the money go through Israel meant that it could not be used for terrorism, saying: "Now that we are supervising, we know it's going to humanitarian causes."<ref>[[The Jerusalem Post]], 12 March 2019, [https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Netanyahu-Money-to-Hamas-part-of-strategy-to-keep-Palestinians-divided-583082 "Netanyahu: Money to Hamas Part of Strategy to Keep Palestinians Divided"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231030230739/https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Netanyahu-Money-to-Hamas-part-of-strategy-to-keep-Palestinians-divided-583082 |date=30 October 2023 }}</ref>

According to U.S. officials, as of 2023 Hamas has an investment portfolio that is worth anywhere from 500 million to US$1 billion, including assets in Sudan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and the United Arab Emirates.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Stein |first=Jeff |date=4 November 2023 |title=Far from war in Gaza, Hamas chief oversees vast financial network |language=en-US |newspaper=Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/11/02/hamas-funding-ismail-haniyeh-us-sanctions/ |access-date=15 December 2023 |issn=0190-8286 |archive-date=17 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231217194737/http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/11/02/hamas-funding-ismail-haniyeh-us-sanctions/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Hamas has denied such allegations.<ref>{{cite news|title=US sanctions Hamas official, finance network|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/5/24/us-sanctions-hamas-official-finance-network|publisher=[[Al-Jazeera English]]|access-date=15 December 2023|archive-date=15 December 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231215173652/https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/5/24/us-sanctions-hamas-official-finance-network|url-status=live}}</ref>

In 2024, financial activity in Gaza is mainly carried out via money changers in order to bypass the international financial authorities.<ref>[https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-11-14/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/by-allowing-suitcases-of-cash-into-gaza-israel-harmed-the-global-fight-against-hamas/00000193-2b39-d0a3-a5d3-bfb998bd0000 Targeting a shadow economy], [[Haaretz]]</ref> Also in 2024, the [[European Council]] added six people to its sanctions list for helping fund Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, including a senior official from the [[Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps]]. Three businesses were also added, including companies in Spain and Sudan that functioned as front companies.<ref>[https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20240628-new-eu-sanctions-list-for-hamas-financiers-includes-front-companies-based-in-spain-sudan New EU sanctions list for Hamas financiers includes front companies based in Spain, Sudan], [[France 24]]</ref><ref>[https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-sanctions-6-people-3-firms-hamas-finance-crackdown-2024-06-28/ EU sanctions 6 people and 3 firms in Hamas finance crackdown], [[Reuters]]</ref>