Editing German Empire (section)

=====Pre-war Europe=====
{{Main|Causes of World War I|Diplomatic history of World War I}}
Berlin was deeply suspicious of a supposed conspiracy of its enemies: that year-by-year in the early 20th century it was systematically encircled by enemies.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Carroll |first=E. Malcolm |title=Germany and the great powers, 1866–1914: A study in public opinion and foreign policy |date=1938 |pages=485–487, 830} |ol=7014761W}}</ref> There was a growing fear that the supposed enemy coalition of Russia, France and Britain was getting stronger militarily every year, especially Russia. The longer Berlin waited the less likely it would prevail in a war.{{Sfnp|Seligmann|2002|pp=333–355}} According to American historian [[Gordon A. Craig]], it was after the set-back in Morocco in 1905 that the fear of encirclement began to be a potent factor in German politics."{{Sfnp|Craig|1978|p=321}} Few outside observers agreed with the notion of Germany as a victim of deliberate encirclement.{{Sfnp|Geise|1976|pp=121–138}}<ref>{{Harvp|Kantorowicz|1931}}.{{page needed|date=May 2025}}</ref> English historian [[G. M. Trevelyan]] expressed the British viewpoint:

{{Blockquote|The encirclement, such as it was, was of Germany's own making. She had encircled herself by alienating France over Alsace-Lorraine, Russia by her support of Austria-Hungary's anti—Slav policy in the Balkans, England by building her rival fleet. She had created with Austria-Hungary a military bloc in the heart of Europe so powerful and yet so restless that her neighbors on each side had no choice but either to become her vassals or to stand together for protection....They used their central position to create fear in all sides, in order to gain their diplomatic ends. And then they complained that on all sides they had been encircled.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Trevelyan |first=G. M. |author-link=G. M. Trevelyan |title=British history in the 19th century and after 1782–1919 |date=1937 |page=463 |ol=10439924W |orig-date=1922}}</ref>}}

Wilhelm II, under pressure from his new advisors after Bismarck left, committed a fatal error when he decided to allow the "[[Reinsurance Treaty]]" that Bismarck had negotiated with Tsarist Russia to lapse. It allowed Russia to make a new alliance with France. Germany was left with no firm ally but [[Austria-Hungary]], and her support for action in annexing [[Bosnia and Herzegovina]] in 1908 further soured relations with Russia. Berlin missed the opportunity to secure an alliance with Britain in the 1890s when it was involved in colonial rivalries with France, and he alienated British statesmen further by openly supporting the Boers in the [[South African War]] and building a navy to rival Britain's. By 1911, Wilhelm had completely picked apart the careful power balance established by Bismarck and Britain turned to France in the [[Entente Cordiale]]. Germany's only other ally besides Austria was the [[Kingdom of Italy]], but it remained an ally only ''pro forma''. When war came, Italy saw more benefit in an alliance with Britain, France, and Russia, which, in the secret [[Treaty of London (1915)|Treaty of London]] in 1915 promised it the frontier districts of Austria and also colonial concessions. Germany did acquire a second ally in 1914 when the Ottoman Empire entered the war on its side, but in the long run, supporting the Ottoman war effort only drained away German resources from the main fronts.{{Sfnp|Craig|1978|pp=302–338, 350}}