Editing Game theory (section)

===Description and modeling===
[[File:Centipede game.svg|thumb|upright=1.25|right|A four-stage [[centipede game]]]]
The primary use of game theory is to describe and [[Conceptual model#Economic models|model]] how human populations behave.{{Citation needed|date=November 2019}} Some{{Who|date=July 2012}} scholars believe that by finding the equilibria of games they can predict how actual human populations will behave when confronted with situations analogous to the game being studied. This particular view of game theory has been criticized. It is argued that the assumptions made by game theorists are often violated when applied to real-world situations. Game theorists usually assume players act rationally, but in practice, human rationality and/or behavior often deviates from the model of rationality as used in game theory. Game theorists respond by comparing their assumptions to those used in [[physics]]. Thus while their assumptions do not always hold, they can treat game theory as a reasonable scientific [[Idealization (science philosophy)|ideal]] akin to the models used by [[physicist]]s. However, empirical work has shown that in some classic games, such as the [[centipede game]], [[guess 2/3 of the average]] game, and the [[dictator game]], people regularly do not play Nash equilibria. There is an ongoing debate regarding the importance of these experiments and whether the analysis of the experiments fully captures all aspects of the relevant situation.{{efn|Experimental work in game theory goes by many names, [[experimental economics]], [[behavioral economics]], and [[behavioural game theory]] are several.<ref>{{cite book |first=Colin F. |last=Camerer |date=2003 |title=Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction |url=http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i7517.html |chapter=Introduction |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110514201411/http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i7517.html |archive-date=14 May 2011 |pages=1–25 }}</ref>}}

Some game theorists, following the work of John Maynard Smith and [[George R. Price]], have turned to evolutionary game theory in order to resolve these issues. These models presume either no rationality or [[bounded rationality]] on the part of players. Despite the name, evolutionary game theory does not necessarily presume [[natural selection]] in the biological sense. Evolutionary game theory includes both biological as well as cultural evolution and also models of individual learning (for example, [[fictitious play]] dynamics).