Editing Dwight D. Eisenhower (section)

==== Korean War, Free China and Red China ====
In late 1952, Eisenhower went to Korea and discovered a military and political stalemate. Once in office, when the Chinese [[People's Volunteer Army]] began a buildup in the [[Kaesong]] sanctuary, he considered using nuclear weapons if an armistice was not reached. Whether China was informed of the potential for nuclear force is unknown.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Jackson|first=Michael Gordon|date=2005|title=Beyond Brinkmanship: Eisenhower, Nuclear War Fighting, and Korea, 1953–1968|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552659|journal=Presidential Studies Quarterly|volume=35|issue=1|pages=52–75|doi=10.1111/j.1741-5705.2004.00235.x|jstor=27552659|issn=0360-4918}}</ref> His earlier military reputation in Europe was effective with the Chinese communists.<ref>{{harvnb|Ambrose|1984|p=51}}</ref> The National Security Council, the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], and the [[Strategic Air Command]] (SAC) devised detailed plans for [[nuclear war]] against Red China.<ref>{{cite journal|first=Matthew|last=Jones|title=Targeting China: U.S. Nuclear Planning and 'Massive Retaliation' in East Asia, 1953–1955|journal=Journal of Cold War Studies|year=2008|volume=10|issue=4|pages=37–65 |doi=10.1162/jcws.2008.10.4.37|s2cid=57564482 |issn = 1520-3972 }}</ref> With the death of Stalin in March 1953, Russian support for a Chinese communist hard-line weakened and China decided to compromise on the prisoner issue.<ref name="Ambrose 1984, p. 106–7">{{harvnb|Ambrose|1984|pp=106–107}}</ref>

[[File:1951 Chung Baik Eisenhower.jpg|thumb|Eisenhower in Korea with General [[Chung Il-kwon]], and [[Baik Seon-yup]], 1952]]

In July 1953, an armistice took effect with Korea divided along [[Military Demarcation Line|approximately the same boundary as in 1950]]. The armistice and boundary remain in effect today. The armistice, which concluded despite opposition from Secretary Dulles, South Korean President [[Syngman Rhee]], and also within Eisenhower's party, has been described by biographer [[Stephen E. Ambrose]] as the greatest achievement of the administration. Eisenhower had the insight to realize that unlimited war in the nuclear age was unthinkable, and limited war unwinnable.<ref name="Ambrose 1984, p. 106–7" />

A point of emphasis in Eisenhower's campaign had been his endorsement of a policy of liberation from communism as opposed to a policy of containment. This remained his preference despite the armistice with Korea.<ref>{{harvnb|Ambrose|1984|p=173}}</ref> Throughout his terms Eisenhower took a hard-line attitude toward China, as demanded by conservative Republicans, with the goal of driving a wedge between China and the Soviet Union.<ref>{{cite journal|first=Qiang|last=Zhai|title=Crisis and Confrontations: Chinese-American Relations during the Eisenhower Administration|journal=Journal of American-East Asian Relations|year=2000|volume=9|issue=3/4|pages=221–249|doi=10.1163/187656100793645921|doi-access=free}}</ref>
Eisenhower continued Truman's policy of recognizing the [[Republic of China (Taiwan)]] as the legitimate government of China, not the Peking (Beijing) regime. There were localized flare-ups when the People's Liberation Army began shelling the islands of [[Quemoy]] and [[Matsu Islands|Matsu]] in September 1954. Eisenhower received recommendations embracing every variation of response; he thought it essential to have every possible option available to him as the crisis unfolded.<ref name="Ambrose 1984, p. 231">{{harvnb|Ambrose|1984|p=231}}</ref>

The [[Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty]] with the Republic of China was signed in December 1954. He requested and secured from Congress their "Free China Resolution" in January 1955, which gave Eisenhower unprecedented power in advance to use military force at any level in defense of Free China and the Pescadores. The Resolution bolstered the morale of the Chinese nationalists and signaled to Beijing that the US was committed to holding the line.<ref name="Ambrose 1984, p. 231" />

During the [[First Taiwan Strait Crisis|First Taiwan Strait crisis]], Eisenhower threatened to use nuclear weapons against PRC military targets in [[Fujian]].<ref name=":17">{{Cite book |last=Crean |first=Jeffrey |title=The Fear of Chinese Power: an International History |date=2024 |publisher=[[Bloomsbury Academic]] |isbn=978-1-350-23394-2 |edition= |series=New Approaches to International History series |location=London, UK}}</ref>{{Rp|page=89}} These threats prompted Mao Zedong to launch [[China and weapons of mass destruction|China's nuclear weapons program]].<ref name=":17" />{{Rp|pages=89–90}} He authorized a series of bomb tests labeled [[Operation Teapot]]. Nevertheless, he left the Chinese communists guessing as to the exact nature of his nuclear response. This allowed Eisenhower to accomplish all of his objectives—the end of this communist encroachment, the retention of the Islands by the Chinese nationalists and continued peace.<ref>{{harvnb|Ambrose|1984|pp=245, 246}}</ref> Defense of the Republic of China from an invasion remains a core American policy.<ref>{{cite journal|first=Robert|last=Accinelli|title=Eisenhower, Congress, and the 1954–55 offshore island crisis|journal=Presidential Studies Quarterly|year=1990|volume=20|issue=2|pages=329–348|jstor=27550618}}</ref>

China invited some American reporters to China in 1956, having previously ousted American reporters after the PRC's founding.<ref name=":Minami2">{{Cite book |last=Minami |first=Kazushi |title=People's Diplomacy: How Americans and Chinese Transformed US-China Relations during the Cold War |date=2024 |publisher=[[Cornell University Press]] |isbn=9781501774157 |location=Ithaca, NY}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=115–116}} Eisenhower upheld the US ban on travel to China.<ref name=":Minami2" />{{Rp|page=116}} US newspapers, including [[The New York Times|''The'' ''New York Times'']] and [[The Washington Post|''The'' ''Washington Post'']] criticized the Eisenhower's administration decision as antithetical to the free press.<ref name=":Minami2" />{{Rp|page=116}}