Editing David Lloyd George (section)

==== Nivelle affair ====
Lloyd George engaged almost constantly in intrigues calculated to reduce the power of the generals, including trying to subordinate British forces in France to the French [[General Nivelle]]. He backed Nivelle because he thought he had "proved himself to be a Man" by his successful counterattacks at [[Battle of Verdun|Verdun]], and because of his promises that he could break the German lines in 48 hours. Nivelle increasingly complained of Haig's dragging his feet rather than cooperating with their plans for the offensive.{{sfn|Woodward|1998|pp=88–90}}

The plan was to put British forces under Nivelle's direct command for the great 1917 offensive. The British would attack first, thereby tying down the German reserves. Then the French would strike and score an overwhelming victory in two days. It was announced at a War Cabinet meeting on 24 February, to which neither Robertson nor [[Edward Stanley, 17th Earl of Derby|Lord Derby]] (Secretary of State for War) had been invited. Ministers felt that the French generals and staff had shown themselves more skilful than the British in 1916, whilst politically Britain had to give wholehearted support to what would probably be the last major French effort of the war. The Nivelle proposal was then given to Robertson and Haig without warning on 26–27 February at the [[Calais Conference (1917)|Calais Conference]] (minutes from the War Cabinet meeting were not sent to [[George V|the King]] until 28 February, so that he did not have a prior chance to object). Robertson in particular protested vehemently. Finally, a compromise was reached whereby Haig would be under Nivelle's orders but would retain operational control of British forces and keep a right of appeal to London "if he saw good reason". After further argument the ''status quo'', that Haig was an ally of the French but was expected to defer to their wishes, was largely restored in mid-March.{{sfn|Woodward|1998|pp=90–93}}{{sfn|Hattersley|2010|loc=ch. "Frontal Assaults", pp. [https://archive.org/details/isbn_9781408700976/page/426 426]–433}}{{sfn|Grigg|2003|loc=ch. "Conference at Calais", pp. 35–44}}{{sfn|Grigg|2003|loc=ch. "Nivelle's Nemesis", pp. 82–98}}

The British attack at the [[Battle of Arras (1917)|Battle of Arras]] (9–14 April 1917) was partly successful but with much higher casualties than the Germans suffered. There had been many delays and the Germans, suspecting an attack, had shortened their lines to the strong [[Hindenburg Line]]. The [[Nivelle Offensive|French attack on the Aisne River in mid-April]] gained some tactically important high ground but failed to achieve the promised decisive breakthrough, pushing the French Army to the point of [[French Army Mutinies|mutiny]]. While Haig gained prestige, Lloyd George lost credibility, and the affair further poisoned relations between himself and the "Brasshats".{{sfn|Taylor|1976|pp=80–81, 86}}