Editing Battle of Kursk (section)

== Results ==
[[File:Prokhorovka. Cathedral of Saint Peter and Saint Paul P5070168 2200.jpg|thumb|upright|Prokhorovka Cathedral, in [[Prokhorovka, Belgorod Oblast|Prokhorovka]] on the former battlefield, commemorates the Red Army losses and victory.]]
Soviet journalist and writer [[Ilya Ehrenburg]] noted the devastation of the battle;{{sfn|Ferguson|2006|p=534}}{{blockquote|Villages destroyed by fire, shattered towns, stumps of trees, cars bogged down in green slime, field hospitals, hastily dug graves – it all merges into one.}}The campaign was a strategic Soviet success. For the first time, a major German offensive had been stopped before achieving a breakthrough;<ref name="THE BATTLE OF KURSK: 75 YEARS ON">{{Cite web |url=https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/the-battle-of-kursk-75-years-on |title=The Battle of Kursk: 75 Years On – The human and material toll of the world's largest tank battle was horrendous as the Wehrmacht's tactical edge was overwhelmed by superior means of destruction |last=Edele |first=Mark |date=18 July 2018 |website=Pursuit |access-date=2019-05-05 |archive-date=5 May 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190505225046/https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/the-battle-of-kursk-75-years-on |url-status=live }}</ref> the maximum depth of the German advance was {{convert|8|–|12|km|mi}} in the north and {{convert|35|km|mi}} in the south.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=166}} The Germans, despite using more technologically advanced armour than in previous years, were unable to break through the deep Soviet defences and were caught off guard by the significant operational reserves of the Red Army. This result changed the pattern of operations on the Eastern Front, with the Soviet Union gaining the operational initiative. The Soviet victory was costly, with the Red Army losing considerably more men and materiel than the German Army. The Soviet Union's larger industrial potential and pool of manpower allowed them to absorb and replace its losses.<ref name="THE BATTLE OF KURSK: 75 YEARS ON"/> Guderian wrote:
{{blockquote|With the failure of ''Zitadelle'' we have suffered a decisive defeat. The armoured formations, reformed and re-equipped with so much effort, had lost heavily in both men and equipment and would now be unemployable for a long time to come. It was problematical whether they could be rehabilitated in time to defend the Eastern Front ... Needless to say the [Soviets] exploited their victory to the full. There were to be no more periods of quiet on the Eastern Front. From now on, the enemy was in undisputed possession of the initiative.{{sfn|Bergström|2007|p=121}}}}

With victory, the initiative firmly passed to the Red Army. For the remainder of the war the Germans were limited to reacting to Soviet advances, and were never able to regain the initiative or launch a major offensive on the Eastern Front.{{sfn|Jacobsen|Rohwer|1965|p=251}} British historian Robin Cross stated that "the Red Army had turned the tide at [[Battle of Stalingrad|Stalingrad]]; it had seized the psychological advantage for the first time. But it was in the terrible killing grounds near Kursk that Hitler's panzers, and his ambitions, were dealt a blow from which they never recovered" and that "Failure at Kursk had dealt the Ostheer heavier psychological and material blows than it had suffered at Stalingrad".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Cross |first=Robin |url=https://archive.org/details/battleofkurskope0000cros/page/n5/mode/1up |title=The Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel 1943 |publisher=Penguin Publishing |year=2002 |isbn=9780141391090 |pages=251}}</ref> Further, the Western Allied landings in Italy opened a new [[Italian Campaign (World War II)|front]], further diverting German resources and attention.{{sfn|Taylor|Kulish|1974|p=171}}

Soviet air forces dropped about 20,000 tons of bombs during the battle, 4 times more than in the [[Battle of Moscow]], and 2.5 times more than in the Battle of Stalingrad.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=П.в |first=Казьмин |last2=Д.а |first2=Кузнецов |date=2010 |title=Боевая авиация в битве на Курской дуге |url=https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/boevaya-aviatsiya-v-bitve-na-kurskoy-duge |journal=Современные технологии обеспечения гражданской обороны и ликвидации последствий чрезвычайных ситуаций |issue=1 (1) |pages=112–114}}</ref>

Though the location, plan of attack and timing were determined by Hitler, he blamed the defeat on his General Staff. Unlike Stalin, who gave his commanding generals the liberty to make important command decisions, Hitler's interference in German military matters progressively increased while his attention to the political aspects of the war decreased.{{sfn|Liddell Hart|1948|p=216}} The opposite was true for Stalin; throughout the Kursk campaign, he trusted the judgment of his commanders, and as their decisions led to battlefield success, it increased his trust in their military judgment. Stalin stepped back from operational planning, only rarely overruling military decisions, resulting in the Red Army being entrusted with higher levels of autonomy during the war.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=9}}

However, while it is accurate that Hitler interfered in military operational planning and that Stalin generally provided his generals with greater autonomy, this characterization oversimplifies the strategic context surrounding the Battle of Kursk. Hitler's decisions to delay the offensive were not merely capricious but were based on substantial logistical concerns, notably the preparation of new Panther and Tiger tanks, which he believed were essential for a successful summer campaign. Recent examinations of wartime documents reveal that Stalin's trust in his generals was underpinned by a well-coordinated defense strategy that had been meticulously planned and robustly fortified by early June 1943. The Soviet forces, contrary to the implications of passive or reactive strategies, were proactively prepared and strategically positioned, with manpower and artillery strengths reaching over 80 percent of their July capacity by mid-May, effectively nullifying the advantage a swifter German offensive might have achieved. This suggests that Soviet readiness and strategic placement, rather than mere autonomy, were crucial in determining the outcome at Kursk. Moreover, the detailed preparation and anticipation of the German offensive's axis highlight a sophisticated level of strategic defense that goes beyond the simple dichotomy of command autonomy versus interference, reflecting a deep integration of military readiness and strategic foresight.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Zamulin |first=Valeriy N. |title=Could Germany Have Won the Battle of Kursk if It Had Started in Late May or the Beginning of June 1943? |journal=The Journal of Slavic Military Studies |volume=27 |issue=4 |pages=606–617 |year=2014 |doi=10.1080/13518046.2014.963418 |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2014.963418}}</ref>

All told, 239 Red Army personnel were awarded the USSR's highest degree of distinction, the title Hero of the Soviet Union (HSU), for their valour in the Battle of Kursk. Two women, Guards Senior Sergeants [[Mariya Borovichenko]] and [[Zinaida Mareseva]], were awarded the HSU title posthumously for their valour under fire while serving as combat medics. Borovichenko was assigned to the 32nd Guards Artillery Regiment, [[13th Guards Rifle Division]], 5th Guards Army and Mareseva served in a medical platoon in the 214th Guards Rifle Regiment, [[73rd Guards Rifle Division]], 7th Guards Army.{{sfn|Empric|2020|p=6}}

The Battle of Kursk is cited by some as being the true turning point of the [[European theatre of World War II]],{{sfn|Barbier|2002|pp=170–171}}{{sfn|Ferguson|2006|pp=533–535}}<ref name=":2" /> however, this has been thoroughly criticized.{{sfn|Frieser|2017|pp=83, 138, 154, 156, 170, 1214 }}