Editing Battle of Jutland (section)

====Battlecruiser losses====
British battlecruisers were designed to chase and destroy enemy cruisers from out of the range of those ships. They were not designed to be [[ship of the line|ships of the line]] and exchange [[Broadside (naval)|broadside]]s with the enemy. One German and three British battlecruisers were sunk—but none were destroyed by enemy shells penetrating the belt armour and detonating the magazines. Each of the British battlecruisers was penetrated through a turret roof and their magazines ignited by flash fires passing through the turret and shell-handling rooms.{{sfn|Massie|2003|pp=666–667}}''Lützow'' sustained 24 hits and her flooding could not be contained. She was eventually sunk by her escorts' torpedoes after most of her crew had been safely removed (though six trapped stokers died when the ship was scuttled{{sfn|Staff|2014|p=278}}. ''Derfflinger'' and ''Seydlitz'' sustained 22 hits each but reached port (although in ''Seydlitz'''s case only just).{{sfn|Massie|2003|p=666}}

{{blockquote|The disturbing feature of the battlecruiser action is the fact that five German battle-cruisers engaging six British vessels of this class, supported after the first twenty minutes, although at great range, by the fire of four battleships of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, were yet able to sink 'Queen Mary' and 'Indefatigable'....The facts which contributed to the British losses, first, were the indifferent armour protection of our battle-cruisers, particularly as regards turret armour, and, second, deck plating and the disadvantage under which our vessels laboured in regard to the light. Of this there can be no question. But it is also undoubted that the gunnery of the German battle-cruisers in the early stages was of a very high standard.|Sir John Jellicoe|''Jellicoe's official despatch''<ref>{{citation |url=http://www.gwpda.org/naval/jut02.htm |title=Battle of Jutland – Jellicoe's Despatch |publisher=referencing Battle of Jutland – Official Despatches with Appendicies, "Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1920 |access-date=20 October 2004 |archive-date=24 October 2004 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20041024213136/http://www.gwpda.org/naval/jut02.htm |url-status=live}}</ref>}}

Jellicoe and Beatty, as well as other senior officers, gave an impression that the loss of the battlecruisers was caused by weak armour, despite reports by two committees and earlier statements by Jellicoe and other senior officers that Cordite and its management were to blame. This led to calls for armour to be increased, and an additional {{cvt|1|in|cm}} was placed over the relatively thin decks above magazines. To compensate for the increase in weight, ships had to carry correspondingly less fuel, water and other supplies. Whether or not thin deck armour was a potential weakness of British ships, the battle provided no evidence that it was the case. At least amongst the surviving ships, no enemy shell was found to have penetrated deck armour anywhere. The design of the new battlecruiser {{HMS|Hood|51|6}} (which was being built at the time of the battle) was altered to give her {{cvt|5000|LT|t}} of additional armour.{{sfn|Marder|1966|pp=218–219}}