Editing Utilitarianism (section)

===Motive utilitarianism===
{{See also|Virtue ethics}}
Motive utilitarianism was first proposed by [[Robert Merrihew Adams]] in 1976.<ref>Robert Merrihew Adams, ''Motive Utilitarianism'', The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, No. 14, On Motives and Morals (12 August 1976), pp. 467–81</ref> Whereas [[act utilitarianism]] requires us to choose our actions by calculating which action will maximize [[utility]] and [[rule utilitarianism]] requires us to implement rules that will, on the whole, maximize utility, ''motive utilitarianism'' "has the utility calculus being used to select motives and dispositions according to their general felicific effects, and those motives and dispositions then dictate our choices of actions."<ref name=":2">Goodin, Robert E. "Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy." ''Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Public Policy''. Cambridge University Press.</ref>{{Rp|60}}

The arguments for moving to some form of motive utilitarianism at the personal level can be seen as mirroring the arguments for moving to some form of rule utilitarianism at the social level.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|17}} Adams (1976) refers to [[Henry Sidgwick|Sidgwick's]] observation that "Happiness (general as well as individual) is likely to be better attained if the extent to which we set ourselves consciously to aim at it be carefully restricted."<ref name=":3">Adams, Robert Merrihew. 1976. "Motive Utilitarianism. ''[[The Journal of Philosophy]]'' 73(14).</ref>{{Rp|467}}<ref>{{cite web|title=ME Book 3 Chapter 14 Section 5|url=https://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/sidgwick/me/me.b03.c14.s05.html|access-date=2021-05-13|website=www.laits.utexas.edu}}</ref> Trying to apply the utility calculation on each and every occasion is likely to lead to a sub-optimal outcome. It is argued that applying carefully selected rules at the social level and encouraging appropriate motives at the personal level are likely to lead to better overall outcomes; even though on some individual occasions it leads to the wrong action when assessed according to act utilitarian standards.<ref name=":3" />{{Rp|471}}

Adams concludes that "right action, by act-utilitarian standards, and right motivation, by motive-utilitarian standards, are incompatible in some cases."<ref name=":3" />{{Rp|475}} The necessity of this conclusion is rejected by [[Fred Feldman (philosopher)|Fred Feldman]] who argues that "the conflict in question results from an inadequate formulation of the utilitarian doctrines; motives play no essential role in it&nbsp;... [and that]&nbsp;... [p]recisely the same sort of conflict arises even when MU is left out of consideration and AU is applied by itself."<ref>{{cite journal |last=Feldman |first=Fred |title=On the Consistency of Act- and Motive-Utilitarianism: A Reply to Robert Adams |journal=Philosophical Studies |volume=70 |issue=2 |date=May 1993 |pages=211–12 |doi=10.1007/BF00989590 |s2cid=170691423 }}</ref> Instead, [[Fred Feldman (philosopher)|Feldman]] proposes a variant of act utilitarianism that results in there being no conflict between it and motive utilitarianism.