Editing Science (section)

== Philosophy of science ==
{{anchor|ConjectureAndRefutation}}[[File:Epicycle and deferent.svg|thumb|For [[Thomas Kuhn|Kuhn]], the addition of [[epicycles]] in Ptolemaic astronomy was "normal science" within a paradigm, whereas the [[The Structure of Scientific Revolutions#Copernican Revolution|Copernican Revolution]] was a paradigm shift|alt=Depiction of epicycles, where a planet orbit is going around in a bigger orbit]]

There are different schools of thought in the [[philosophy of science]]. The most popular position is [[empiricism]], which holds that knowledge is created by a process involving observation; scientific theories generalise observations.<ref name="Godfrey-Smith2003a">{{cite book |last=Godfrey-Smith |first=Peter |url=https://archive.org/details/theoryrealityint00godf |title=Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science |publisher=University of Chicago |year=2003c |isbn=978-0-226-30062-7 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/theoryrealityint00godf/page/n53 39]–56 |chapter=Induction and confirmation |url-access=limited}}</ref> Empiricism generally encompasses [[inductivism]], a position that explains how general theories can be made from the finite amount of empirical evidence available. Many versions of empiricism exist, with the predominant ones being [[Bayesianism]] and the [[hypothetico-deductive method]].<ref>{{cite book |last=Godfrey-Smith |first=Peter |url=https://archive.org/details/theoryrealityint00godf |title=Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science |publisher=University of Chicago |year=2003o |isbn=978-0-226-30062-7 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/theoryrealityint00godf/page/n233 219]–232 |chapter=Empiricism, naturalism, and scientific realism? |url-access=limited}}</ref><ref name="Godfrey-Smith2003a" />

Empiricism has stood in contrast to [[rationalism]], the position originally associated with [[Descartes]], which holds that knowledge is created by the human intellect, not by observation.<ref>{{cite book |last=Godfrey-Smith |first=Peter |url=https://archive.org/details/theoryrealityint00godf |title=Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science |publisher=University of Chicago |year=2003b |isbn=978-0-226-30062-7 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/theoryrealityint00godf/page/n33 19]–38 |chapter=Logic plus empiricism |url-access=limited}}</ref> [[Critical rationalism]] is a contrasting 20th-century approach to science, first defined by Austrian-British philosopher [[Karl Popper]]. Popper rejected the way that empiricism describes the connection between theory and observation. He claimed that theories are not generated by observation, but that observation is made in the light of theories, and that the only way theory A can be affected by observation is after theory A were to conflict with observation, but theory B were to survive the observation.<ref name="Godfrey-Smith2003b">{{cite book |last=Godfrey-Smith |first=Peter |url=https://archive.org/details/theoryrealityint00godf |title=Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science |publisher=University of Chicago |year=2003d |isbn=978-0-226-30062-7 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/theoryrealityint00godf/page/n71 57]–74 |chapter=Popper: Conjecture and refutation |url-access=limited}}</ref>
Popper proposed replacing verifiability with [[falsifiability]] as the landmark of scientific theories, replacing induction with [[Critical rationalism|falsification]] as the empirical method.<ref name="Godfrey-Smith2003b" /> Popper further claimed that there is actually only one universal method, not specific to science: the negative method of criticism, [[trial and error]],<ref>{{cite book |last=Godfrey-Smith |first=Peter |url=https://archive.org/details/theoryrealityint00godf |title=Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science |publisher=University of Chicago |year=2003g |isbn=978-0-226-30062-7 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/theoryrealityint00godf/page/n116 102]–121 |chapter=Lakatos, Laudan, Feyerabend, and frameworks |url-access=limited}}</ref> covering all products of the human mind, including science, mathematics, philosophy, and art.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Popper |first=Karl |title=Objective Knowledge |year=1972}}</ref>

Another approach, [[instrumentalism]], emphasises the utility of theories as instruments for explaining and predicting phenomena. It views scientific theories as black boxes, with only their input (initial conditions) and output (predictions) being relevant. Consequences, theoretical entities, and logical structure are claimed to be things that should be ignored.<ref>{{cite book |last=Newton-Smith |first=W. H. |url=https://archive.org/details/rationalityofsci0000newt |title=The Rationality of Science |publisher=Routledge |year=1994 |isbn=978-0-7100-0913-5 |location=London |page=[https://archive.org/details/rationalityofsci0000newt/page/30 30] |url-access=registration}}</ref> Close to instrumentalism is [[constructive empiricism]], according to which the main criterion for the success of a scientific theory is whether what it says about observable entities is true.<ref>{{cite thesis |last=Votsis |first=I. |year=2004 |title=The Epistemological Status of Scientific Theories: An Investigation of the Structural Realist Account |publisher=University of London, London School of Economics |degree=PhD |page=39}}</ref>

[[Thomas Kuhn]] argued that the process of observation and evaluation takes place within a paradigm, a [[logically consistent]] "portrait" of the world that is consistent with observations made from its framing. He characterised ''normal science'' as the process of observation and "puzzle solving", which takes place within a paradigm, whereas ''revolutionary science'' occurs when one paradigm overtakes another in a [[paradigm shift]].<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia |last=Bird |first=Alexander |year=2013 |editor1-last=Zalta |editor1-first=Edward N. |title=Thomas Kuhn |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/thomas-kuhn/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200715191833/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/thomas-kuhn/ |archive-date=15 July 2020 |access-date=26 October 2015 |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> Each paradigm has its own distinct questions, aims, and interpretations. The choice between paradigms involves setting two or more "portraits" against the world and deciding which likeness is most promising. A paradigm shift occurs when a significant number of observational anomalies arise in the old paradigm and a new paradigm makes sense of them. That is, the choice of a new paradigm is based on observations, even though those observations are made against the background of the old paradigm. For Kuhn, acceptance or rejection of a paradigm is a social process as much as a logical process. Kuhn's position, however, is not one of [[relativism]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Kuhn |first=Thomas S. |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KUHTSO-2 |title=The Structure of Scientific Revolutions |publisher=University of Chicago Press |year=1970 |isbn=978-0-226-45804-5 |edition=2nd |page=206 |access-date=30 May 2022 |archive-date=19 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211019102817/https://philpapers.org/rec/KUHTSO-2 |url-status=live}}</ref>

Another approach often cited in debates of [[scientific scepticism]] against controversial movements like "[[creation science]]" is [[methodological naturalism]]. Naturalists maintain that a difference should be made between natural and supernatural, and science should be restricted to natural explanations.<ref>{{cite book |last=Godfrey-Smith |first=Peter |url=https://archive.org/details/theoryrealityint00godf |title=Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science |publisher=University of Chicago |year=2003 |isbn=978-0-226-30062-7 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/theoryrealityint00godf/page/n163 149]–162 |chapter=Naturalistic philosophy in theory and practice |url-access=limited}}</ref> Methodological naturalism maintains that science requires strict adherence to [[empirical]] study and independent verification.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Brugger |first=E. Christian |year=2004 |title=Casebeer, William D. Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition |journal=The Review of Metaphysics |volume=58 |issue=2}}</ref>