Editing Republic of China Armed Forces (section)

==Reforms and development==

===Civilian control of the military===
[[File:Soldiers Taken out Machine Guns of CM-12 Tank 20120211.jpg|thumb|300px|[[Republic of China Army|R.O.C. Army]] soldiers removing the machine guns from a CM-12 Tank]]

The modern day ROC military is styled after western military systems, mostly the US military. Internally, it has a political warfare branch/department that tightly controls and monitors each level of the ROC military, and reports directly to the General Headquarters of the ROC military, and if necessary, directly to the President of the ROC. This is a carryover from the pre-1949 era, when KMT and its army were penetrated by Communist agents repeatedly and led to frontline units defecting to Communist China. To strengthen their control over the military and prevent massive defection after retreating to Taiwan in 1949, CKS and CCK employed tight control over the military, by installing political officers and commissioners down to the company level, in order to ensure political correctness in the military and loyalty toward ROC leadership. This gave the political officers/commissars a great deal of power, allowing them to overrule the unit commander and take over the unit. Only in recent years has the political warfare department (due to cutbacks) reduced its power within the ROC military.

Two defense reform laws implemented in 2002 granted the civilian defense minister [[civilian control of the military|control]] over the entire military, and expanded legislative oversight authority for the first time in history.<ref>{{cite web | last = Peter | first = Brookes | year = 2003 | url = http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/hl808.cfm | title = U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relations in the Bush Administration | work = Heritage Lecture #808 | publisher = The Heritage Foundation | access-date = 2006-03-05 | url-status = unfit | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20060316065901/http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/hl808.cfm | archive-date = 2006-03-16 }}</ref> In the past the ROC military was closely linked with and controlled by the KMT (Nationalist Party). Following the democratization of the 1990s the military moved to a politically neutral position, though the senior officer ranks remained dominated by [[KMT]] members in 2001.<ref name=swaine>{{cite book | last1 = Swaine | first1 = Michael D. | author-link1 = Michael D. Swaine | first2 = James C. | last2 = Mulvenon | title = Tawian's Foreign and Defense Policies: Features and Determinants | chapter-url = http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1383/MR1383.ch3.pdf | access-date = 2006-03-05 | publisher = RAND Corporation | isbn = 0-8330-3094-9 | page = 65 | chapter = 3 | year = 2001 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20060311012120/http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1383/MR1383.ch3.pdf | archive-date = 11 March 2006 | url-status = dead }}</ref> In the years following the handover of control to civilian authority politicians remained wary of associating too closely with the military  due to the legacy of martial law and the associated abuses conducted by the military. Support for the military increased in accordance with threats from the PRC and the Russian invasion of Ukraine however even in the 2020s many Taiwanese were still distrustful of the military.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Hawkins |first1=Amy |title='Ukrainian strategy has become a model': Taiwanese beef up military to face China threat |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/09/ukrainian-strategy-has-become-a-model-taiwanese-beef-up-military-to-face-china-threat |website=[[The Guardian]] |date=9 July 2023 |access-date=10 July 2023}}</ref>

===Doctrine and exercises===
[[File:IDF F-CK-1A Single Front View.jpg|thumb|300px|ROCAF [[AIDC F-CK Indigenous Defense Fighter]]]]
[[File:ROCN cheng kung class PFG2-1105 and PFG2-1101 20050624.jpg|thumb|300px|ROCN [[Cheng Kung-class frigate]]]]
[[File:Thunderbolt 2000 MLRS Side View 20111105a.jpg|thumb|300px|ROCA [[Thunderbolt-2000]]]]

The primary goal of the ROC Armed Forces is to provide a credible deterrent against hostile action by establishing effective counterstrike and defense capabilities. ROC military doctrine in 2004 centered upon the principle of "offshore engagement" where the primary goal of the armed forces in any conflict with the PRC would be to keep as much of the fighting away from Taiwan proper for as long as possible to minimize damage to infrastructure and civilian casualties. As of 2004 the military had also begun to take the threat of a sudden "decapitation attack" by the PRC seriously. Consequently, there was growing emphasis on the role of the Navy and Air Force (where the Army had traditionally dominated); as well as the development of rapid reaction forces and quick mobilization of local reserve forces.<ref name=mnd2004 />

As of 2021 training for [[electronic warfare]] had been emphasized with significant offensive and defensive capabilities having been fielded.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Chen |first1=Kelvin |title=Taiwan rolls out Chinese electronic warfare countermeasures |url=https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4194705 |website=www.taiwannews.com.tw |date=4 May 2021 |publisher=Taiwan News |access-date=4 May 2021}}</ref>

The [[Han Kuang Exercise]] is the annual [[military exercise]] of the Republic of China Armed Forces for combat readiness in the event of an attack by the People's Liberation Army.<ref name="voanews">{{cite web|url=https://www.voanews.com/a/taiwan-begins-largest-military-drills-since-2008/1643028.html|title=Taiwan Begins Largest Military Drills Since 2008|date=17 April 2013 |publisher=Voice of America|access-date=2014-09-18}}</ref>

===Strategy===
Mainland China has removed the phrase "peaceful" in official government documents regarding plans to take back Taiwan.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-taiwan/china-drops-word-peaceful-in-latest-push-for-taiwan-reunification-idUSKBN22Y06S|title=China drops word 'peaceful' in latest push for Taiwan 'reunification'|newspaper=Reuters|date=22 May 2020}}</ref>  Though the Army had previously been the dominant service, the shift to a defensive orientation has shifted importance to the Navy and Air Force to conduct most fighting away from population centers.  Given the current budgetary and numerical superiority of the Chinese military, Taiwan has moved towards an asymmetric [[anti-access/area denial]] system to imperil China's ability to operate in the Taiwan Strait rather than try to match its strength.  The RoCN, which was once the most neglected force, has become the most important to defeat an invasion fleet.  Combating the enemy fleet and sinking transport ships would take out large amounts of the ground invasion force and permanently degrade amphibious capabilities.  Surface ships primarily consist of guided missile destroyers and frigates, as well as four dozen small, fast missile boats to take out much larger Chinese surface and amphibious ships.  The RoCAF is optimized for air superiority and was once the more formidable of the two countries, but current Chinese technology investments have made China much more able to contest airspace.  Air bases are likely to come under attack from Chinese conventional ballistic missiles in range of the island. Taiwan has equipment to keep exposed bases operating while under fire with runway repair systems and mobile aircraft arresting systems.  There are two [[underground hangar|underground air bases]] used by the RoCAF: [[Chiashan Air Force Base]] which is in a hollowed-out mountain that can protect 200 fighters and [[Chihhang Air Base]] which can protect 80 aircraft. The RoCAF operates a nationwide air defense network to engage targets anywhere over the mainland; some anti-aircraft missile batteries are also located in underground silos.  The Army would only fight if Chinese forces manage to land and would engage in asymmetric warfare.  In 2014 Taiwan Minister of National Defense [[Yen Ming]] believed that the country would be able to hold off a Chinese invasion for at least one month.<ref>[http://news.usni.org/2014/03/26/taiwan-defend-chinese-attack How Taiwan Would Defend Against a Chinese Attack] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140330023130/http://news.usni.org/2014/03/26/taiwan-defend-chinese-attack |date=2014-03-30 }} – News.USNI.org, 26 March 2014</ref>

In the late 2010s, Taiwan's military adopted a new strategy called the [[Porcupine strategy|Overall Defense Concept]] (ODC), according to The Diplomat "In short, the ODC is a holistically integrated strategy for guiding Taiwan's military force development and joint operations, emphasizing Taiwan's existing natural advantages, civilian infrastructure and asymmetrical warfare capabilities. It is designed to deter and, if necessary, defeat an invasion by China's People's Liberation Army (PLA)."<ref>{{cite web |last1=Lee|first1=Hsi-min  |last2=Lee |first2=Eric |title=Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept, Explained |url=https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/taiwans-overall-defense-concept-explained/ |website=thediplomat.com |publisher=The Diplomat |access-date=4 May 2021}}</ref> In 2021 Defense Minister [[Chiu Kuo-cheng]] said that “I always tell my peers to stop asking, ‘how many days we need to hold out?’ The question is, ‘how many days does China want to fight?’ We’ll keep them company for as many days as they want to fight.”<ref>{{cite web |last1=Sun |first1=Shao-cheng |title=Biden's Taiwan Policy Under the Mounting China's Threat |url=https://indsr.org.tw/uploads/indsr/files/202202/ba595006-02f1-4458-a9a3-aee8a5fc6640.pdf |website=indsr.org.tw |publisher=INDSR |access-date=9 July 2022}}</ref> The adopted ODC emphasizes deep strike and layered deterrence.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Chun-lin |first1=Hsieh |last2=Tu |first2=Aaron |last3=Chin |first3=Jonathan |title=Officials should address military flaws: lawmaker |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2023/01/04/2003791953 |website=taipeitimes.com |date=4 January 2023 |publisher=Taipei Times |access-date=5 January 2023}}</ref>