Editing Precedent (section)

===Statutory interpretation in the UK===
A judge's normal aids include access to all previous cases in which a precedent has been set, and a good English dictionary.

Judges and barristers in the UK use three primary rules for interpreting the law.

Under the [[literal rule]], the judge should do what the actual legislation states rather than trying to do what the judge thinks that it means. The judge should use the plain everyday ordinary meaning of the words, even if this produces an unjust or undesirable outcome. A good example of problems with this method is ''R v Maginnis'' (1987),<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1987/4.html |title=R v Maginnis [1987&#93; UKHL 4 (05 March 1987) |publisher=Bailii.org |date= |accessdate=2022-03-16}}</ref> in which several judges in separate opinions found several different dictionary meanings of the word ''supply''. Another example is ''[[Fisher v Bell]]'', where it was held that a shopkeeper who placed an illegal item in a shop window with a price tag did not make an offer to sell it, because of the specific meaning of "offer for sale" in [[contract law]], merely an invitation to treat. As a result of this case, Parliament amended the statute concerned to end this discrepancy.

The [[golden rule (law)|golden rule]] is used when use of the literal rule would obviously create an absurd result. There are two ways in which the golden rule can be applied: a narrow method, and a broad method. Under the narrow method, when there are apparently two contradictory meanings to the wording of a legislative provision, or the wording is ambiguous, the least absurd is to be preferred. Under the broad method, the court modifies the literal meaning in such a way as to avoid the absurd result.<ref name="Lawade">{{cite web |url=http://www.lawade.com/the-english-legal-system/statutory-interpretation/the-golden-rule/ |title=The Golden Rule |website=Lawade.com |access-date=29 March 2018 |date=22 March 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180329220909/http://www.lawade.com/the-english-legal-system/statutory-interpretation/the-golden-rule/ |archive-date=29 March 2018 |url-status=dead }}</ref> An example of the latter approach is ''Adler v George'' (1964). Under the Official Secrets Act 1920 it was an offence to obstruct HM Forces "in the vicinity of" a prohibited place. Adler argued that he was not in the ''vicinity'' of such a place but was actually ''in'' it. The court chose not to read the statutory wording in a literal sense to avoid what would otherwise be an absurd result, and Adler was convicted.<ref>{{cite web|title=Part E - The rules of statutory interpretation - The golden rule|url=http://labspace.open.ac.uk/mod/resource/view.php?id=415851|publisher=Labspace|access-date=11 December 2012}}</ref>

The [[mischief rule]] is the most flexible of the interpretation methods. Stemming from ''[[Heydon's Case]]'' (1584), it allows the court to enforce what the statute is intended to remedy rather than what the words actually say. For example, in ''Corkery v Carpenter'' (1950), a man was found guilty of being drunk in charge of a carriage, although in fact he only had a bicycle. The final rule; although will no longer be used after the UK fully transitions out of the European Union. Known as the Purposive approach- this considers the intention of the European Court of Justice when the act was passed.