Editing Political corruption (section)

== Conditions unfavorable for corruption ==
Wealth and power can have a compounding effect on political corruption, however, the immunity from the law that money and influence bring will not come into effect when a powerful individual injures or harms another powerful individual. An example of this immunity being broken is [[Bernie Madoff]], who while being rich and powerful himself, stole from other rich and powerful individuals. This resulted in his eventual arrest despite his status.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qg520|title=When Governments Break the Law: The Rule of Law and the Prosecution of the Bush Administration|date=2010|publisher=NYU Press|jstor=j.ctt9qg520|isbn=978-0-8147-4139-9}}</ref> Level of [[Electoral competition|political competitiveness]] can affect the degree of political corruption.<ref name="r846">{{cite journal | last1=Alfano | first1=Maria Rosaria | last2=Baraldi | first2=Anna Laura | last3=Cantabene | first3=Claudia | title=The role of political competition in the link between electoral systems and corruption: The Italian case | journal=The Journal of Socio-Economics | volume=47 | date=2013 | doi=10.1016/j.socec.2013.07.005 | pages=1–10}}</ref> Increasing salaries can decrease political corruption in lower income countries,<ref name="e189">{{cite journal | last=Van Rijckeghem | first=Caroline | last2=Weder | first2=Beatrice | title=Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much? | journal=Journal of Development Economics | volume=65 | issue=2 | date=2001 | doi=10.1016/S0304-3878(01)00139-0 | pages=307–331}}</ref> while another study found an increase of political corruption with larger [[List of heads of state and government salaries|salaries of politicians]] relative to the [[average wage]].<ref name="q972">{{cite journal | last=Benito | first=Bernardino | last2=Guillamón | first2=María-Dolores | last3=Ríos | first3=Ana-María | last4=Bastida | first4=Francisco | title=Can salaries and re-election prevent political corruption? An empirical evidence | journal=Revista de Contabilidad | publisher=Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Murcia | volume=21 | issue=1 | year=2018 | issn=1138-4891 | doi=10.1016/j.rcsar.2017.04.003 | doi-access=free | pages=19–27}}</ref> Lower political corruption was found for [[incumbent]] politicians seeking re-election.<ref name="q972"/>