Editing Parmenides (section)

=== ''The Way of Opinion'' ===
In the significantly longer, but far worse preserved latter section of the poem, ''Way of Opinion'', Parmenides propounds a theory of the world of apperance and its development, pointing out, however, that, in accordance with the principles already laid down, these cosmological speculations do not pretend to anything more than mere appearance. The structure of the cosmos is a fundamental binary principle that governs the manifestations of all the particulars: "the Aether fire of flame" (B 8.56), which is gentle, mild, soft, thin and clear, and self-identical, and the other is "ignorant night", body thick and heavy.{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p= 61–62}}{{efn|{{harvnb|DK 28B8}}, lines 53–54.}} [[Cosmology]] originally comprised the greater part of his poem, explaining the world's origins and operations.{{efn|[[Stobaeus]], i. 22. 1a}} Some idea of the [[Spherical Earth|sphericity of the Earth]] also seems to have been known to Parmenides.{{sfn|Palmer|2020}}{{efn|DK 28B10}}

==== B8.50-52, 34-41: The Fates ====
The end of fragment 8, preserved by Simplicius, corresponds to an initial characterization of the opinion pathway. The goddess indicates that with the above considerations trustworthy speech ends, and a "deceitful order of words" begins: that of the opinions of mortals (vv. 50-52). The content of lines 34 to 36{{efn|''What are given as verses 34-41 in [[Diels-Kranz numbering]] have been displaced from the original position after verse 52 (See {{harvnb|Palmer|2020|loc=2.3}})}} is deeply related to fragment B3: it postulates that what must be intellectively known is that by which intellection is: intellective knowing itself (''noein'') is revealed in "what is"; in fact, there is nothing more than "what is" Lines 34 to 36 and the first half of 37 are linked to the verse that constitutes fragment 3 and its meaning. And this is revealed by the parallelism of the construction νοεῖν ἔστιν (fr. 3) / ἔστιν νοεῖν (fr.8, v. 34). The [[Moirai]] keeps the entity whole and motionless (vv. 37–38); This forces us to think that everything that mortals have thought to be true is nothing more than a network of mere names that designate changes: to be born and to perish, to be and not to be, to vary in place and color (vv. 39–41). Guthrie notes that, in this passage, Parmenides elevates his diction to epic and religious solemnity, and gives an important role to the divinities Moiras and Ananke. The use of the word refers to the scene of [[Hector]] who, chained to his Destiny, has ''remained'' outside the walls of [[Troy]] ('' Il ''. XXII, 1– 6). Guthrie understands that Parmenides' reason for holding the idea of immobility is that "what is" is continuous and indistinguishable in parts, which prevents it from moving as a whole or changing internally.{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=50}}

The first line is interpretable in multiple ways.{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=53}} First of all, the interpretation depends on the determination of the [[Subject (grammar)|subject]]. Thus, Guthrie, following [[Eduard Zeller|Zeller]], [[Hermann Fränkel|Fränkel]] and [[Walther Kranz|Kranz]], understands that νοῆμα is linked to the verb ἔστι, so that the subject would be «what what can be thought. The meaning of the first line would be: "What can be thought and the thought that 'is' are the same."{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=53}} On the other hand, [[Hermann Diels|Diels]], Von Fritz and [[Gregory Vlastos|Vlastos]], among others, have thought that the subject is the [[Infinitive|infinitive Mood]] νοεῖν: that is “thinking”. Diels and Von Fritz,<ref>''Von Fritz, «Classical Philology» 1945, p. 238''</ref> following the interpretation of Simplicius, they have also understood that οὐνεκέν has a causal or consecutive value (Guthrie gives it the value of a mere [[Conjunction (grammar)|conjunction]]), so the meaning of this verse would be: "Thinking is the same as that which is the cause of thinking." Ultimately, there are two possible interpretations: 1) the one that maintains that what is said here is that thinking and being have a relationship of identity.<ref name="Vlastos53">Vlastos, «Jean Zafiropoulo: L'école éléate». ''Gnomon'' 1953, p. 168</ref> 2) that the idea of fragment 3 is being repeated here. and that of verse 2 of fragment 2: That is, that thought only reveals itself and realizes itself in "what is".{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=45}} Vlastos argues that the thought he knows can hardly be denied existence. But if it exists, it must be part of what it is. But what is has no parts, but is homogeneous. Then thinking can only be the totality of what it is. What it is is intelligence.<ref name="Vlastos53" /> In this dispute, [[Francis Macdonald Cornford|Cornford]] rightly points out that nowhere in the poem does Parmenides indicate that his One thinks, and that no Greek of his day would have held that 'if A exists, A thinks'. Rather he held that thought cannot exist without something existing.<ref>Cornford, '' Plato and Parmenides '', p.34, n. 1</ref> Owen points out that Plato, in ''Sophist'' 248d–249a, hinted that Parmenides was not faced with the problem of whether the real possesses life, soul, and understanding.<ref>Owen, ''Eleatic Questions» , p. 95, no. 5''</ref> The only sure thing is that there is a close relationship between what is and knowing, which are faced by the actions of being born and perishing, being and not being, changing place or color, which strictly speaking "are mere names" which mortals have agreed to assign to things that are unreal, and then persuaded themselves of their reality. The whole of these names is the content of the way of opinion.{{sfn|Kirk|Raven|Schofield|1982}}{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=55}}

==== B8.53-64: Primordial Elements ====
[[File:Olympians.jpg|thumb|The cosmology of Parmenides gave a [[theogony]], a story of the origin of the gods.]]
In fragment 8, the elements that make up the opposition to which the world of appearance can be reduced have been presented: φλογός αἰθέριον πῦρ (''phlogós aitherion pŷr'', «ethereal fire of the flame», v. 56) and νύξ (''nýx'', «night», v. 59).  Mortals have distinguished two forms, πῦρ (''pŷr'', "fire", v. 56) and νῦξ (''nŷx'', "night", v. 59). In relation to these opposites, the goddess says that "the mortals have erred", however line 54, which contains the reason for the error, presents three possibilities of translation. She literally says τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστιv. These three interpretations exhaust the possibilities of the text, and all have been supported by specialists.

These, the mortals, have given names to two forms, with which they have gone astray, because it is only lawful to name one (v. 54). They assigned these forms different properties, and considered them opposite: on the one hand, fire, soft, light and homogeneous; on the other, the night, compact and heavy (vv. 55–59). The goddess declares this speech no longer true, but plausible in appearance, and communicates it so that, in the order of opinions, the sage is not surpassed either (vv. 60-61). [[Simplicius of Cilicia|Simplicius]], pointed out that in this passage Parmenides transits from the objects of reason to sensible objects.<ref>''Commentary on Physics'' 30, 14</ref> The goddess calls the content of this second part βροτῶν δόξας (''brotôn dóxas'', "opinions of mortals", v. 51). Keep in mind that δόξα means ''what seems real'' or is presented to the senses; ''what seems true'' constituting the beliefs of all men; and ''what seems right'' to man.<ref name="Cornford p. 100"/> The speech does not pretend to be "true", since everything that could be said reliably has already been said. On the contrary, what he will present will be a κόσμος ἀπατηλός (''kósmos apatēlós'', «deceitful order»), since he presents beliefs as if they were presided over by an order.{{sfn|Kirk|Raven|Schofield|1982}}

# The first interpretation consists in indicating that the error is to name the two forms, since only one must be named.
##[[Aristotle]] understood that, once Parmenides considered that outside of what is nothing there is, he was forced to take phenomena into account, and to explain them he postulated opposites: cold and hot, or fire and earth , and that hot is «what is» and cold «what is not» (''Met'' I 5, 986b30 = A 24).
## [[Eduard Zeller|Zeller]] translated the passage as "one of which should not be named". This means that the other exists and can be named.<ref>Zeller, ''Die Philosophie der Griechen'', p. 701.</ref>
## Burnet followed this interpretation, adding that these forms can be identified with the Pythagorean principles of limit and limitlessness.{{sfn|Burnet|1892|p=186}}
## Schofield reflects this interpretation by translating the passage "of which they must not necessarily name more than one".{{sfn|Kirk|Raven|Schofield|1982}}
# In contrast to this, another interpretation indicates that none of the forms should be named.
# The most accepted interpretation indicates that the error is not to consider these two forms at the same time, but to name only one.
##Simplicius, who transmits the quote, thought that the error consists in not naming both contraries in the description of the physical world. The sentence would then say "of which it is not proper to name a single one." Modern philology has followed this interpretation in some of its exponents, such as Coxon and [[John Raven]].
## The first indicates that Parmenides knows that starting from a single form necessarily leads to uniformity, since only one element can originate itself. He begins in two ways, deliberately, in order to explain not only the multiplicity, but the contradiction in the world.<ref>Coxon, «The Philosophy of Parmenides», p. 142.</ref>

[[Hermann Fränkel|Fränkel]], even deciding on an intertextual interpretation that corresponds to the first exposed here: «only one should be named», does so without this implying that one of the two forms is more real than the other. The Light must not be identified with the first way. Men name two forms, light and night, and this is the mistake, since one should be named, "what is".<ref>Fränkel, ''Wege und Formen des frühgriechischen Denkens'', p. 180</ref> Guthrie, who makes a critical compilation of all the positions on the matter, does not find Cornford and Diels' objection to Zeller's translation convincing, since Parmenides' expression is irregular. Cornford's translation would also be better represented by the textual presence of a οὐδὲ μίαν (''udé mían'', «none») and that of Simplicius and Raven by a μίαν μόνην (''mían mónēn'', «only one» ).{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=64}} Guthrie argues that Parmenides thinks that it is illogical to accept, on the one hand, that the world contains a plurality of things, and on the other, that this plurality can arise from a single principle.{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=68}} The passage from the way of truth to the deceptive words of mortal opinions is a real problem for specialists. Even when the goddess tells the "man who knows" that she reveals this order to him as plausible, so that no mortal can outdo him (vv. 60–61), this reason has been interpreted in various ways. In antiquity, [[Aristotle]] conceived the first part of the poem as the consideration of the One κατὰ τὸν λόγον (''katá tón lógon'', «regarding the concept»<ref>García Yebra, ''Metaphysics of Aristotle'', p.41</ref> or "as to definition" or "as to reason"<ref>Guthrie, ''History of Greek Philosophy'', II, p. 70, n. 67</ref>), and the second as the consideration of the world according to the senses (''Met'' 986b31 = A 24). [[Theophrastus]] followed him at this point,<ref>Theophrastus in [[Alexander of Aphrodisias]], ''in Met.'' A 3, 984b3 (A7).</ref> and Simplicius adds that, although the goddess calls the speech of the second part "conjectural" and "misleading", she does not consider it completely false (''Physics'' 39, 10–12 = A 34). [[Werner Jaeger|Jaeger]], following Reinhardt,{{sfn|Reinhardt|p=90}} he thought that Parmenides was presented with the need to explain the origin of the deceptive appearance. And he had no other means than to narrate the origin of the world constituted by appearances, that is, to compose a cosmogony.<ref>Jaeger, ''The Theology of the First Greek Philosophers'', p. 106</ref> Owen argues that the content of the second part is merely a dialectical device, and does not imply an ontological claim.<ref>Owen, «Eleatic Questions», p. 85</ref>

==== B9: Day and Night ====
Fragment 9 mentions again what was described in the final part of Fragment 8 as what mortals have conceived as the dual foundation of the world of appearance: the opposing principles "light" and "night", and says that everything is full of these opposites, and that nothing belongs exclusively to one of the two. In Fragment 9, Parmenides goes a step further, and states that the entire sensible realm can be reduced to manifestations of this pair of opposites, night and light ({{langx|grs|φάος}}, v.1), and that both penetrate the whole of reality equally.{{sfn|Kirk|Raven|Schofield|1982}} These forms can be considered to head a list of opposites, which serve as qualities to sensible things.{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=72}}

The idea of grouping under the fundamental opposite pair all the attributes of it has its parallel in the [[table of opposites]] of [[Pythagoras]].<ref>(58 B 4–5 = ''Met''. 986a23)</ref> Of course, in the Parmenidean table, oppositions that are not sensible must be excluded.{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=90}} For Simplicius,<ref>''Physics'' 38, 18–28</ref> it was clear that assigning fire the attribute of agent, which [[Alexander of Aphrodisias]] had done,<ref>''Commentary on Aristotle's Meteorology'', 31, 7 = A 7</ref> was a mistake. The reliability of all such evidence dependent on Aristotle is now highly doubted,<ref>Cherniss, ''Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, 1935, p. 48, no. 192.''</ref> even when they reflect previous cosmogonic beliefs and it is not too risky to consider fire as active and earth as passive.{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=72}}

The fact that the goddess indicates (v.3-4) that everything is full of both night and light "equally" (ἴσων ἀμφοτέρων, ''ísōn amphotérōn'') is ambiguous; it could either mean "of equal rank," which would agree with Aristotle's interpretation, according to which one form "is" and the other "is not,"<ref>(''Met. 986b31'')</ref>{{sfn|Kirk|Raven|Schofield|1982}}<ref>Fränkel, ''Wege und Formen Frühgriechischen Denkens'', pp. 180–181.</ref><ref>Coxon, The Philosophy of Parmenides, p. 141</ref> or it could refer to an equality in quantity or extension, which would parallel a Pythagorean expression<ref>quoted by Diogenes Laertius, in ''Lives'' VIII, 26</ref> where in the cosmos, light and darkness are posited to equally cover (ἰσόμοιρα) the earth.{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=72}}

==== B10-15: Cosmology ====
[[File:Milky_Way_Night_Sky_Black_Rock_Desert_Nevada.jpg|thumb|The milky way features in Parmenides' cosmology]]
Although the second half of the poem is less well preserved, a rough outline of Parmenides' cosmology can still be tentatively reconstructed on the basis of the surviving fragments along with testimony of his philosophical theories from ancient doxographers, especially [[Aetius (philosopher)|Aetius]] and [[Plutarch]]. [[Plutarch]] says in ''adv. Colotem'' 1114b (A10) that, from the original opposites, Parmenides elaborates an order in which the [[Earth]], the [[heaven]], the [[Sun]], the [[Moon]], the origin of man, and that he "did not fail to discuss any of the important questions." Simplicius,<ref>in ''de Caelo'' 559, 26 (A11)</ref> says that Parmenides also dealt with the parts of animals. Plato places him alongside [[Hesiod]] as the creator of a [[theogony]],<ref>(''Symposium'' 195c)</ref> and Cicero<ref>(''de Natura Deorum'' I, 11, 28 = A37)</ref> reports that the poem contained certain Hesiodic abstract divinities,<ref>(''Theogony'' 223– 232)</ref> such as Love, War and Discord.{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=74}}

Fragments 10 and 11, which are introductory to cosmology, confirm what is expressed by the testimonies, at least with regard to the Sun, the Moon, and the sky, although it also includes the [[Aether (classical element)|aether]], the stars, the constellations (n.b.: the word σήματα used by Parmenides can mean both "constellations" and "signs"){{sfn|Kirk|Raven|Schofield|1982}} and the Milky Way, and mythical elements such as [[Mount Olympus]]. The Parmenidean goddess presents a cosmic order in fr. B12<ref>Simplicius in his ''Physics'', 39, 14 and 31, 13</ref> and the summary of Aetius<ref>II, 7, 1 = fr. A 37</ref> that is extremely difficult to reconstruct, due to the scarcity and obscurity of the fragments.{{sfn|Kirk|Raven|Schofield|1982}}{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=76}}{{sfn|Kirk|Raven|Schofield|1982}} The beginning of fragment 12 and the testimony of Aetius <ref>(II, 7, 1 = A37)</ref> introduce into cosmology certain "rings"<ref>(στεφάναι ''stephánai'', which should be translated by «rings» and not by «crowns», as does [[Cicero]], ''De nat. deor.'' I 11, 28 = A37</ref>) The existence of concentric rings of a diverse nature is postulated as the structure of the cosmos: some rings were of pure fire and others of a mixture of fire and darkness, the rings closer to the center participated more in fire, while those further from the center were more filled with night. There are also rarified and dense ones. Surrounding everything is a solid wall. The doctrine of the rings seems to be the influence of [[Anaximander]]<ref>(12 A 11 and Aetius, II, 20, 1; 21, 1 and 16, 5)</ref> and of [[Hesiod]],<ref>''Theogony'' 382</ref> who speaks of the "crowned" sky and the stars. At the center of the system, an unnamed [[daimon]]<ref>(δαίμων "dáimōn", "goddess" or "demon")</ref> coordinates all the cosmological elements, both sensible opposites and Necessity, and presides over the mixture and attraction of the sexes, and the "abhorrent" birth.<ref>(B 12, 3-6)</ref> [[Plutarch]]<ref>('' Amat. '' 756e–f)</ref> calls her [[Aphrodite]], before citing fragment 13 of her, which marks her as the mother of [[Eros]], while Aetius identifies her with Ananke and also Dike, Δίκη, present in the proem, here presiding over movement and birth. 
[[File:Ananka i Mojre.JPG|thumb|Modern illustration of Ananke, the personification of Necessity, above the Moirai, the Fates in the [[Myth of Er]] of Plato's ''Republic'']]
Fragment 10 gives a predominant role to [[Ananke]](Ἀνάγκη, ''Anánkē''), the personification of Necessity, which obliges Heaven to keep the stars within its limits (πεῖρατα).{{sfn|Kirk|Raven|Schofield|1982}} The role of Necessity in this system has been compared to the one Plato gives it in the [[Myth of Er]].<ref>''Republic'' 616b–621d</ref> There Plato places it in the center of certain concentrically arranged turrets, each one representing the celestial spheres that support the fixed stars, the nearby heavenly bodies, the planets, the Moon and the Sun.<ref>Morrison, «Parmenides and Er», in: ''[[The Journal of Hellenic Studies]]'' 75 (1955).</ref>{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=76-77}}{{sfn|Kirk|Raven|Schofield|1982}} Both this cosmology and the Myth of Er  also have similarities with Pythagorean cosmology, where the center of the universe was generally identified with [[Hestia]] (in non-geocentric Pythagorean systems such as [[Philolaus]]) and with Mother Earth (in geocentric Pythagorean systems).{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=77}} Diogenes Laertius claims that to Parmenides was the first to state idea that the Earth has a spherical shape and that it is located in the center,<ref>(''Lives'', IX 21)</ref> but he also cites testimonies that affirm that it was [[Pythagoras]] and not Parmenides who held these ideas<ref>(''Lives'', VIII, 48)</ref> and also that it was [[Anaximander]].<ref>(''Lives'' II, 1)</ref> Beyond the evident doubts that these contradictory affirmations generate, Guthrie believes that in this Parmenides followed Pythagoras in the general lines of the description of the physical world.{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=79}}

Various reconstructions of the concentric annular strata and their identification with the substantial elements of the cosmos have been attempted: 
* The solid wall that surrounds everything is sometimes identified with the [[Aether (mythology)|ether]],<ref name="MorrC">Morrison, «Parmenides and Er», p. 64.</ref><ref name="UntC">Untersteiner, ''Parmenide'', p. 83.</ref> or as distinct from all other elements.<ref name="FC">Finkelberg, «The Cosmology of Parmenides», p. 313ff.</ref>
* The ethereal ring of pure fire is where the morning star is located.<ref name="FC"/>
* Rings of mixed nature. The upper ring of these is the sky proper where the Sun is, and a little lower down, the stars, the Milky Way and, closer to the dense rings, the Moon.<ref name="UntC"/><ref name="FC"/>
* The dense rings, whose substance is night, are usually identified with the Earth.<ref name="UntC"/><ref name="MorrC"/><ref name="FC"/>

Fragments 14 and 15 refer to the [[Moon]]: alien light (ἀλλότριον φώς) shining around the Earth» and always looking at the Sun, which has been interpreted as the observation that the Moon reflects the rays of the Sun.{{sfn|Kirk|Raven|Schofield|1982}} Aetius attributes this view Parmenides,<ref>(II, 26, 2 = A 42)</ref> but claims that Thales had already said it, and later Parmenides and [[Pythagoras]] added to this,<ref>(II, 28, 5 = A42)</ref> On the other hand, [[Plato]] attributes the idea to [[Anaxagoras]], and elsewhere Aetius says that Parmenides thought that the Moon was made of fire (A 43) —implying that he thought he had his own light.{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=80}} In the Homeric poems,<ref>(''Il''. V, 214; ''Od''. XVIII, 219)</ref> "alien light" simply means "foreigner", without reference to light.{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=80}}

In fragment 15a there is only one word: ὑδατόριζον:(''hydatórizon'', “rooted in water”) an adjective referring, according to its transmitter ([[Basil of Caesarea]]), to [[Earth]]. This idea has been compared to the Homeric tradition that conceived of [[Ocean (mythology)|Ocean]] as the origin of all things,<ref>(''Iliad'' XIV, 246)</ref><ref>Sapphiropulus, ''L'Ecole eleate'', p. 124.</ref> as a more general allusion to the Homeric world, which located various rivers in [[Hades]],<ref>(v. ''Od.'' X, 513)</ref>{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=79}} to the roots of the Earth mentioned by [[Hesiod]]<ref>(''Theogony'', 728)</ref> and [[Xenophanes]],<ref>(21 A 41)</ref> or to [[Thales of Miletus]]'s view that the Earth floated on water.<ref>Joge Pérez Tudela, ''Poema'', pp. 216-217.</ref>

==== B16:  Sense perception ====
Parmenides also provided a theory of knowledge through sense perception, a description of which is preserved by [[Theophrastus]]. Theophrastus, in recording Parmenides' opinion on sensation,{{efn|''de Sensu 3'', DK 28A46}} indicates that Parmenides holds that sense perception proceeds by resemblance between what feels and the thing felt. He reports Parmenides as saying that everything is composed of two elements, hot and cold, and their intelligence depends on this mixture, present in the limbs of humans. In fact, the nature of each limb or organ, what is preponderant in them, is what is perceived. That is why corpses, which have been abandoned by fire, light and heat, can only perceive the opposite, cold and silence. Everything that exists, he concludes, contains some knowledge. Just as [[Empedocles]] later said that "we see earth with earth, water with water" ,{{efn|31 B 109}} he held, in accordance with his doctrine of sensible opposites, that mortal perception depends on the admixture of these opposites in the different parts of the body (μέλεα). But, following his teacher's interpretation of the Parmenidean opposites, he says that the thought that arises from the hot is purer. Fränkel therefore thought that this theory of knowledge was valid not only for sensory perception, but also for the thought of "what is".<ref>Fränkel, ''Wege und Formen Frühgriechischen Denkens, pp. 170 and 174.''</ref> Vlastos maintains that the identity of the subject and the object of thought is valid both for the knowledge of what is (B3) and for sensible knowledge, although he accepts that «what is" is "everything identical" (B8, v. 22), while the structure of the body is a mixture of different elements,<ref>Vlastos, "Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge", p. 68.</ref> and that the preponderance of light does not physically justify the knowledge of "what is". The way to conceive a pure knowledge is not by imagining a situation in which the body has more light, but that it is made of pure light, and this is what Parmenides does in the journey recounted in the proem.<ref>Vlastos, « Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge”, pp. 71–73.</ref> Other commentators disagree with transposing this "physical" explanation to the plane of the path of truth. Guthrie{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=83}} and Schofield{{sfn|Kirk|Raven|Schofield|1982}} emphasize the exclusive belonging of this theory to the field of the sensible, of mortal opinion.

==== B17-18: Embryology ====
Parmenides cosmology also included medical theories: two testimonies<ref>(Aetius, [[Censorinus]] and [[Lactantius]] in A 53 and A 54)</ref> indicate that Parmenides was interested in [[embryology]], and two fragments, preserved by [[Galen]] (B17), and [[Caelius Aurelianus]] (B18) are from medical contexts.

Parmenides' theory of embryology claims that each of the sexes is conceived on a different side in the mother's womb:{{efn|on the right boys, on the left girls{{harv|DK 28B17}}}} the sex of the embryo depends, on the one hand, on the side from which it is conceived in the womb, and on the other, on the side from which the father's seed comes. But the character and traits of the begotten being depend on the mixture of masculine and feminine potencies (B18). So that:
# If the semen comes from the right side and lodges in the right side of the womb, the embryo will be a well-built and masculine man.
# If the semen comes from the left side and lodges in the left side of the womb, the result is a female with feminine features.
# When the semen comes from the left, and lodges to the right of the uterus, it gives rise to a man, but with feminine traits such as outstanding beauty, whiteness, small stature, etc.
# If the semen originates on the right and descends to the left of the uterus, this time it forms a woman, but with markedly masculine traits: virility, excessive height, etc.<ref name="Poema226">Jorge Pérez Tudela, '' Poem'', p. 226.</ref>

This medical theory exhibits similarities to the medical doctrine of [[Alcmaeon of Croton]],<ref>(DK24 B4)</ref> which conceived a "equal distribution" (ἰσονομία) of forces between man and woman in determining the child's sex,{{sfn|Kirk|Raven|Schofield|1982}} and contrasts with the later theory of [[Anaxagoras]], to whom Aristotle<ref>''[[Generation of animals|de Generatione animalium]]'', IV, I 763b 30</ref> attributes the theory that only male seed determines sex.<ref name="Poema226" />

Parmenides' association of boys with "the right" and girls with "the left" in Fragment B17, combined with the testimony of Aristotle (A52) and Aetius (A53) attribute to Parmenides the view that the masculine is associated with the cold and the dense,<ref>(Aetius V, 7, 1–7 = A53)</ref> and the feminine with the hot and diffuse,<ref>Aristotle, ''De part. an.'' 648a25 = A 52</ref> upsets the general Greek conception, which associates right with light and warm, and left with dark and cold,{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=90}} but resembles a Pythagorean [[Table of opposites]], leading some scholars{{efn|Burnet|1892|p=185}} to postulate that Parmenides probably carried out an outline of Pythagorean cosmology. However,  on the other hand, many of the other opposites in the Pythagorean table are never mentioned by Parmenides, there are elements completely unrelated to Pythagoreanism, such as the "rings" in fragment 12, and no ancient commentators claimed to find any traces of Pythagorean doctrine in his poem, instead the Way of Opinion is unanimously considered to be Parmenides' own invention.{{sfn|Kirk|Raven|p=391}} Another possibility is that, unlike in cosmology, Parmenides did not see masculine and feminine as pure opposites in embryology, where observation and empirical guidance allowed for a greater variety of opinions on the role of males.{{sfn|Guthrie|1979|p=90}}

==== B19: Conclusion ====
Fragment B19,<ref>Simplicius, ''de Caelo'', 558, 8-10</ref> located at the conclusion of the Way of Opinion, reaffirms the concepts expressed before<ref>fr. B 8, vv. 50-61)</ref> that the cosmos belongs to the Way of Opinion (v. 1), that the things with in the cosmos come to be and pass away (v. 1 and 2), and that these things are predicated on names assigned by mortals (v. 3).<ref>Jorge Pérez Tudela, ''Poema, pp. 231-232.''</ref>