Editing Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (section)

==Aftermath==
[[File:Curzon line en.svg|thumb|Grey area: [[Kresy|prewar Polish territory]] east of the [[Curzon Line]] annexed by the Soviet Union after the war]]
[[File:EasternBloc BorderChange38-48.svg|thumb|Soviet expansion, changes to Central European borders and creation of the [[Eastern bloc]] after World War II]]

===Discovery of the secret protocol===
The German original of the secret protocols was presumably destroyed in the bombing of Germany,<ref name="dreifields"/> but in late 1943, Ribbentrop had ordered the most secret records of the German Foreign Office from 1933 onward, amounting to some 9,800 pages, to be microfilmed. When the various departments of the Foreign Office in Berlin were evacuated to [[Thuringia]] at the end of the war, Karl von Loesch, a civil servant who had worked for the chief interpreter Paul Otto Schmidt, was entrusted with the microfilm copies. He eventually received orders to destroy the secret documents but decided to bury the metal container with the microfilms as personal insurance for his future well-being. In May 1945, von Loesch approached the British Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Thomson with the request to transmit a personal letter to [[Duncan Sandys]], Churchill's son-in-law. In the letter, von Loesch revealed that he had knowledge of the documents' whereabouts but expected preferential treatment in return. Thomson and his American counterpart, Ralph Collins, agreed to transfer von Loesch to [[Marburg]], in the American zone if he would produce the microfilms. The microfilms contained a copy of the Non-Aggression Treaty as well as the Secret Protocol.{{Sfn|Eckert|2012|pp=62–67}} Both documents were discovered as part of the microfilmed records in August 1945 by US State Department employee Wendell B. Blancke, the head of a special unit called "Exploitation German Archives" (EGA).<ref>{{Cite book|publisher=National Archives and Records Administration|title=Record Group 84, POLAD, Classified General Correspondence, 1945–49|id=Box 100. [Archive] Location 350/57/18/02}}.</ref>

News of the secret protocols first appeared during the [[Nuremberg trials]]. Alfred Seidl, the attorney for defendant [[Hans Frank]], was able to place into evidence an affidavit that described them. It was written from memory by Nazi Foreign Office lawyer {{interlanguage link|Friedrich Gaus|de}}, who wrote the text and was present at its signing in Moscow. Later, Seidl obtained the German-language text of the secret protocols from an anonymous Allied source and attempted to place them into evidence while he was questioning witness [[Ernst von Weizsäcker]], a former Foreign Office State Secretary. The Allied prosecutors objected, and the texts were not accepted into evidence, but Weizsäcker was permitted to describe them from memory, thus corroborating the Gaus affidavit. Finally, at the request of a ''[[St. Louis Post-Dispatch]]'' reporter, American deputy prosecutor [[Thomas J. Dodd]] acquired a copy of the secret protocols from Seidl and had it translated into English. They were first published on 22 May 1946 in a front-page story in that newspaper.<ref>{{cite news|first=Richard L.|last=Stokes|title=Secret Soviet-Nazi Pacts on Eastern Europe Aired: Purported Texts on Agreed Spheres of Influence Produced at Nuernberg but Not Admitted at Trial|newspaper=St. Louis Post-Dispatch|url=https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/138237790/|page=1|date=22 May 1946|access-date=24 May 2019|archive-date=18 July 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220718083554/https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/138237790/|url-status=live}}</ref> Later, in Britain, they were published by ''[[The Manchester Guardian]]''.

The protocols gained wider media attention when they were included in an official State Department collection, ''Nazi–Soviet Relations 1939–1941'', edited by [[Raymond J. Sontag]] and James S. Beddie and published on 21 January 1948. The decision to publish the key documents on German–Soviet relations, including the treaty and protocol, had been taken already in spring 1947. Sontag and Beddie prepared the collection throughout the summer of 1947. In November 1947, President [[Harry S. Truman]] personally approved the publication, but it was held back in view of the Foreign Ministers Conference in London scheduled for December. Since negotiations at that conference did not prove to be constructive from an American point of view, the document edition was sent to press. The documents made headlines worldwide.<ref>{{cite news|agency=United Press|title=Stalin-Hitler Plot to Divide Europe Told: U.S. Discloses Top Secret Documents Dealing With Plans|page=1|date=22 January 1948|access-date=24 May 2019|newspaper=Los Angeles Times|url=https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/380953974/|archive-date=27 January 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220127230857/https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/380953974/|url-status=live}}</ref> State Department officials counted it as a success: "The Soviet Government was caught flat-footed in what was the first effective blow from our side in a clear-cut propaganda war."{{Sfn|Eckert|2012|p=94}}

Despite publication of the recovered copy in [[western media]], for decades, the official policy of the Soviet Union was to deny the existence of the secret protocol.{{Sfn|Biskupski|Wandycz|2003|p=147}} The secret protocol's existence was officially denied until 1989. [[Vyacheslav Molotov]], one of the signatories, went to his grave categorically rejecting its existence.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8221119.stm|publisher=BBC|work=News|title=Modern views on the Nazi–Soviet pact|date=26 August 2009|access-date=27 March 2010|archive-date=10 April 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220410092321/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8221119.stm|url-status=live}}</ref> The [[French Communist Party]] did not acknowledge the existence of the secret protocol until 1968, as the party [[de-Stalinization|de-Stalinized]].<ref name ="jackson2001">{{cite book|title=France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944|publisher=Oxford University Press|last=Jackson|first=Julian|year=2001|pages=[https://archive.org/details/france00juli/page/18 18, 114–15]|isbn=0-19-820706-9|url=https://archive.org/details/france00juli/page/18}}</ref>

On 23 August 1986, tens of thousands of demonstrators in 21 western cities, including New York, London, Stockholm, Toronto, Seattle, and Perth participated in [[Black Ribbon Day]] Rallies to draw attention to the secret protocols.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://enrs.eu/docs/studies.pdf | title=Remembrance and Solidarity. Studies in 20th Century European History | publisher=European Network Remembrance and Solidarity | work=Issue 1, Number 1 | date=December 2012 | access-date=24 August 2014 | pages=18 | format=PDF file, direct download | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130929013543/http://enrs.eu/docs/studies.pdf | archive-date=29 September 2013 | url-status=dead }}</ref>

===Stalin's "Falsifiers of History" and Axis negotiations===
In response to the publication of the secret protocols and other secret German–Soviet relations documents in the State Department edition ''Nazi–Soviet Relations'' (1948), Stalin published ''[[Falsifiers of History]]'', which included the claim that during the pact's operation, Stalin rejected Hitler's claim to share in a division of the world,<ref name="nekrich202">{{Harvnb|Nekrich|Ulam|Freeze|1997|pp=202–205}}</ref> without mentioning the [[German–Soviet Axis talks|Soviet offer to join the Axis]]. That version persisted, without exception, in historical studies, official accounts, memoirs, and textbooks published in the Soviet Union until the [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]].<ref name="nekrich202" />

The book also claimed that the [[Munich Agreement]] was a "secret agreement" between Germany and "the west" and a "highly important phase in their policy aimed at goading the Hitlerite aggressors against the Soviet Union."<ref>{{cite book|last=Taubert|first=Fritz|title=The Myth of Munich|publisher=Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag|year=2003|isbn=3-486-56673-3|page=318}}.</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Henig|first=Ruth Beatrice|title=The Origins of the Second World War, 1933–41|url=https://archive.org/details/originssecondwor00heni|url-access=limited|publisher=Routledge|year=2005|isbn=0-415-33262-1|pages=[https://archive.org/details/originssecondwor00heni/page/n83 67]–68}}.</ref>

===Denial of the secret protocol===
For decades, it was the official policy of the Soviet Union to deny the existence of the secret protocol to the Soviet–German Pact. At the behest of [[Mikhail Gorbachev]], [[Alexander Yakovlev]] headed a commission investigating the existence of such a protocol. In December 1989, the commission concluded that the protocol had existed and revealed its findings to the [[Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union]].<ref name="dreifields">{{cite book|last=Dreifeilds|first=Juris|title=Latvia in Transition|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1996|isbn=0-521-55537-X|pages=34–5}}.</ref> As a result, the Congress passed the declaration confirming the existence of the secret protocols and condemning and denouncing them.<ref name="VS1989">{{cite web|publisher=Law mix|place=[[Russia|RU]]|url=http://www.lawmix.ru/docs_cccp.php?id=1241|script-title=ru:Ведомости Съезда народных депутатов СССР и Верховного Совета СССР|year=1989|id=Ст. 579|type=text of the declaration|issue=29|language=ru|access-date=15 November 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101223141052/http://www.lawmix.ru/docs_cccp.php?id=1241|archive-date=23 December 2010|url-status=dead}}.</ref><ref>{{cite book|first1=Jerzy W|last1=Borejsza|first2=Klaus|last2=Ziemer|first3=Magdalena|last3=Hułas|title=Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes in Europe|publisher=Berghahn|year=2006|page=521}}.</ref> The Soviet government thus finally acknowledged and denounced the Secret Treaty<ref name="chathamhouse.org, 2011">{{cite web|url=http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/ia/archive/view/164427|title=Russian historians defend the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact|access-date=22 January 2015|archive-date=8 December 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208113010/https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/ia/archive/view/164427|url-status=dead}}</ref> and [[Mikhail Gorbachev]], the last [[List of heads of state of the Soviet Union|Head of State]] condemned the pact. [[Vladimir Putin]] condemned the pact as "immoral" but also defended it as a "[[necessary evil]]".<ref>{{cite news |url= https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-putin/11213255/Vladimir-Putin-says-there-was-nothing-wrong-with-Soviet-Unions-pact-with-Adolf-Hitlers-Nazi-Germany.html |work= [[Daily Telegraph]] |first= Tom |last= Parfitt |title= Vladimir Putin says there was nothing wrong with Soviet Union's pact with Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany |date= 6 November 2014 |access-date= 20 May 2015 |archive-date= 3 September 2022 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20220903221334/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-putin/11213255/Vladimir-Putin-says-there-was-nothing-wrong-with-Soviet-Unions-pact-with-Adolf-Hitlers-Nazi-Germany.html |url-status= live }}</ref><ref>Timothy Snyder, NYreview of books,[http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/nov/10/putin-nostalgia-stalin-hitler/ putin nostalgia hitler stalin] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151002042925/http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/nov/10/putin-nostalgia-stalin-hitler/ |date=2 October 2015 }}</ref> At a press conference on 19 December 2019, Putin went further and announced that the signing of the pact was no worse than the 1938 [[Munich Agreement]], which led to the partition of Czechoslovakia.<ref>[http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62366 The great press-conference of Vladimir Putin (Большая пресс-конференция Владимира Путина)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201203233504/http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62366 |date=3 December 2020 }}. [[President of Russia]]. 19 December 2019 {{in lang|ru}}</ref><ref>Ivan Beliayev. ''[https://www.svoboda.org/a/30345335.html Putin and pigs: social networks about interest of the president to history (Путин и свиньи: соцсети о странном интересе президента к истории)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230411131132/https://www.svoboda.org/a/30345335.html |date=11 April 2023 }}''. [[Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty]]. 26 December 2019 {{in lang|ru}}</ref>

Both successor states of the pact parties have declared the secret protocols to be invalid from the moment that they were signed: the Federal Republic of Germany on 1 September 1989 and the Soviet Union on 24 December 1989,<ref>{{cite web|publisher=LFPR|url=http://www.lfpr.lt/uploads/File/1999-4/Loeber.pdf|title=Consequences of The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact for Lithuania of Today International Law Aspects|first=Dietrich A|last=Loeber|access-date=7 November 2009|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090530061314/http://www.lfpr.lt/uploads/File/1999-4/Loeber.pdf|archive-date=30 May 2009}}</ref> following an examination of the microfilmed copy of the German originals.<ref name="Chavkin2007">{{Cite book|last=Борис|first=Хавкин (Boris Xavkin)|title=Inhalt ForuumRuss 1,2006|url=http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/inhaltruss7.html|place=[[Germany|DE]]|publisher=KU Eichstaett|script-title=ru:"К истории публикации советских текстов советско-германских секретных документов 1939—1941 гг." Форум новейшей восточноевропейской истории и культуры — Русское издание|year=2007|issue=1|language=ru|access-date=7 August 2010|archive-date=2 May 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110502134826/http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/inhaltruss7.html|url-status=live}}.</ref>

The Soviet copy of the original document was declassified in 1992 and published in a scientific journal in early 1993.<ref name="Chavkin2007"/>

In August 2009, in an article written for the Polish newspaper ''[[Gazeta Wyborcza]]'', Russian Prime Minister [[Vladimir Putin]] condemned the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact as "immoral".<ref name="bbcbews0809">{{cite news|title=Putin condemns Nazi–Soviet pact|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8230387.stm|work=[[BBC News]]|date=31 August 2009|access-date=31 August 2009|archive-date=21 March 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220321000122/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8230387.stm|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author=Tom Parfitt|date=6 November 2014|title=Vladimir Putin says there was nothing wrong with Soviet Union's pact with Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany|newspaper=Telegraph|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-putin/11213255/Vladimir-Putin-says-there-was-nothing-wrong-with-Soviet-Unions-pact-with-Adolf-Hitlers-Nazi-Germany.html|access-date=6 November 2014|archive-date=3 September 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220903221334/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-putin/11213255/Vladimir-Putin-says-there-was-nothing-wrong-with-Soviet-Unions-pact-with-Adolf-Hitlers-Nazi-Germany.html|url-status=live}} "The Russian president made the comments at a meeting with young historians in Moscow, during which he urged them to examine the lead-up to the war, among other subjects." - how does Parfitt know that ? Which young historicans ? Where in Moscow ?</ref>

The new Russian nationalists and [[historical revisionism (negationism)|revisionists]], including Russian negationist [[Aleksandr Dyukov (historian)|Aleksandr Dyukov]] and [[Natalya Narochnitskaya|Nataliya Narotchnitskaya]], whose book carried an approving foreword by the Russian foreign Minister [[Sergei Lavrov]], described the pact as a necessary measure because of the British and French failure to enter into an [[antifascist]] pact.<ref name="chathamhouse.org, 2011"/>

===Postwar commentary on motives of Stalin and Hitler===
Some scholars believe that, from the very beginning of the Tripartite negotiations between the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France, the Soviets clearly required the other parties to agree to a Soviet occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,<ref name="Grogin"/> and for Finland to be included in the Soviet sphere of influence.<ref name="Scandinavia">{{cite book|last=Salmon|first=Patrick|title=Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940|year=2002|publisher=Cambridge University Press}}.</ref>

On the timing of German rapprochement, many historians agree that the dismissal of [[Maxim Litvinov]], whose Jewish ethnicity was viewed unfavourably by [[Nazi Germany]], removed an obstacle to negotiations with Germany.{{Sfn|Nekrich|Ulam|Freeze|1997|pp=109–10}}<ref>{{cite book|last=Israėli︠|first=Viktor Levonovich|title=On the Battlefields of the Cold War: A Soviet Ambassador's Confession|publisher=Penn State Press|year=2003|isbn=0-271-02297-3|page=10}}.</ref>{{Sfn|Shirer|1990|pp=480–1}}{{Sfn|Ulam|1989|p=508}}<ref name="Herf 2006 97–98">{{cite book|last=Herf|first=Jeffrey|title=The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda During World War II and the Holocaust|url=https://archive.org/details/jewishenemynazip00herf_880|url-access=limited|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=2006|isbn=0-674-02175-4|pages=[https://archive.org/details/jewishenemynazip00herf_880/page/n107 97]–98}}.</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Osborn|first=Patrick R|title=Operation Pike: Britain Versus the Soviet Union, 1939–1941|publisher=Greenwood|year=2000|isbn=0-313-31368-7|page=xix}}.</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Levin|first=Nora|title=The Jews in the Soviet Union Since 1917: Paradox of Survival|publisher=NYU Press|year=1988|isbn=0-8147-5051-6|page=330|quote=[Litvinov] was referred to by the German radio as 'Litvinov-Finkelstein' – was dropped in favor of Vyascheslav Molotov. 'The eminent Jew', as Churchill put it, 'the target of German antagonism was flung aside{{nbsp}}... like a broken tool{{nbsp}}... The Jew Litvinov was gone and Hitler's dominant prejudice placated.'}}</ref>{{Sfn|Roberts|1992b|loc=Introduction|ps =: 'Perhaps the only thing that can be salvaged from the wreckage of the orthodox interpretation of Litvinov's dismissal is some notion that, by appointing Molotov foreign minister, Stalin was preparing for the contingency of a possible deal with Hitler. In view of Litvinov's Jewish heritage and his militant anti-Nazism, that is not an unreasonable supposition. But it is a hypothesis for which there is as yet no evidence. Moreover, we shall see that what evidence there is suggests that Stalin's decision was determined by a quite different set of circumstances and calculations.'}} Stalin immediately directed Molotov to "purge the ministry of Jews."{{Sfn|Resis|2000|p=35}}<ref name="Herf 2006 97–98"/><ref>{{cite book|last=Moss|first=Walter|title=A History of Russia: Since 1855|publisher=Anthem|year=2005|isbn=1-84331-034-1|page=283}}</ref> Given Litvinov's prior attempts to create an anti-fascist coalition, association with the doctrine of [[collective security]] with France and Britain and a pro-Western orientation<ref>{{cite book|last=Gorodetsky|first=Gabriel |title=Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1991: A Retrospective|publisher=Routledge|year=1994|isbn=0-7146-4506-0|page=55}}.</ref> by the standards of the Kremlin, his dismissal indicated the existence of a Soviet option of rapprochement with Germany.{{Sfn|Resis|2000|p=51}}{{Efn|According to Paul Flewers, Stalin's [[s:Author:Joseph Stalin|address]] to the eighteenth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 10 March 1939, discounted any idea of German designs on the Soviet Union. Stalin had intended: "To be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them." This was intended to warn the Western powers that they could not necessarily rely upon the support of the Soviet Union.<ref name="What Next"/>}} Likewise, Molotov's appointment served as a signal to Germany that the Soviet Union was open to offers.{{Sfn|Resis|2000|p=51}} The dismissal also signaled to France and Britain the existence of a potential negotiation option with Germany.{{Sfn|Watson|2000|pp=696–8}}{{Sfn|Resis|2000|pp=33–56}} One British official wrote that Litvinov's termination also meant the loss of an admirable technician or shock-absorber but that Molotov's "modus operandi" was "more truly Bolshevik than diplomatic or cosmopolitan."{{Sfn|Watson|2000|p=699}} Carr argued that the Soviet Union's replacement of Litvinov with Molotov on 3 May 1939 indicated not an irrevocable shift towards alignment with Germany but rather was Stalin's way of engaging in hard bargaining with the British and the French by appointing a proverbial hard man to the Foreign Commissariat.{{sfn|Carr|1979|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=PgBsST4r9CQC&pg=PA129 129–130]}} Historian [[Albert Resis]] stated that the Litvinov dismissal gave the Soviets freedom to pursue faster German negotiations but that they did not abandon British–French talks.{{Sfn|Resis|2000|p=33|ps =: 'By replacing Litvinov with Molotov, Stalin significantly increased his options in foreign policy. Litvinov's dismissal served as a warning to London and Paris that Moscow had a third option-rapprochement with Germany. After Litvinov's dismissal, the pace of Soviet–German contacts quickened. This did not, however, mean that Moscow had abandoned the search for collective security, now exemplified by the Soviet draft triple alliance. Meanwhile, Molotov's appointment served as an additional signal to Berlin that Moscow was open to offers. The signal worked; the warning did not.'}} Derek Watson argued that Molotov could get the best deal with Britain and France because he was not encumbered with the baggage of collective security and could negotiate with Germany.{{Sfn|Watson|2000|pp=695–722|ps =: 'The choice of Molotov reflected not only the appointment of a nationalist and one of Stalin's leading lieutenants, a Russian who was not a Jew and who could negotiate with Nazi Germany, but also someone unencumbered with the baggage of collective security who could obtain the best deal with Britain and France, if they could be forced into an agreement.'}} [[Geoffrey Roberts]] argued that Litvinov's dismissal helped the Soviets with British–French talks because Litvinov doubted or maybe even opposed such discussions.{{Sfn|Roberts|1992b|pp=639–57|ps =: 'the foreign policy factor in Litvinov's downfall was the desire of Stalin and Molotov to take charge of foreign relations in order to pursue their policy of a triple alliance with Britain and France – a policy whose utility Litvinov doubted and may even have opposed or obstructed.'}}

[[E. H. Carr]] stated: "In return for 'non-intervention' Stalin secured a breathing space of immunity from German attack."{{sfn|Carr|1979|p=136}} According to Carr, the "bastion" created by means of the pact "was and could only be, a line of defense against potential German attack."{{sfn|Carr|1979|p={{page needed|date =August 2013}}}} According to Carr, an important advantage was that "if Soviet Russia had eventually to fight Hitler, the Western Powers would already be involved."{{sfn|Carr|1979|p={{page needed|date =August 2013}}}}{{sfn|Taylor|1961|pp=262–3}} However, during the last decades, that view has been disputed. Historian [[Werner Maser]] - who served the German army during the second World War<ref>{{cite journal|title=Werner Maser|journal=The New York Times|year=2007|page=60}}</ref> - stated that "the claim that the Soviet Union was at the time threatened by [[Hitler]], as Stalin supposed{{nbsp}}... is a legend, to whose creators Stalin himself belonged.{{sfn|Maser|1994|p=64}} In Maser's view, "neither Germany nor Japan were in a situation [of] invading the USSR even with the least perspective {{sic}} of success," which must not have been known to Stalin.{{sfn|Maser|1994|p=42}} Carr further stated that for a long time, the primary motive of Stalin's sudden change of course was assumed to be the fear of German aggressive intentions.{{Sfn|Carr|1949a|pp=3–17}} On the other hand, Soviet-born Australian historical writer Alex Ryvchin characterized the pact as "a Soviet deal with the devil, which contained a secret protocol providing for the remaining independent states of East-Central Europe to be treated as courses on some debauched degustation menu for two of the greatest monsters in history."<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Ryvchin |first=Alex |date=4 August 2022 |title=Understanding the Russo–Ukrainian War Through the Prism of Russian History |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2022.2105487 |journal=Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs |volume=16 |issue=2 |pages=184–187 |doi=10.1080/23739770.2022.2105487 |s2cid=251353823 |issn=2373-9770}}</ref>

Two weeks after [[Soviet occupation of Baltic states|Soviet armies had entered the Baltic states]], Berlin requested Finland to permit the transit of German troops, and five weeks later Hitler issued a secret directive "to take up the Russian problem, to think about war preparations," a war whose objective would include establishment of a Baltic confederation.<ref>{{cite book|first=Franz|last=Halder|author-link=Franz Halder|title=Generaloberst Halder. Kriegstagebuch|place=Stuttgart|year=1962|volume=II|pages=31–2}}.</ref>

A number of German historians have debunked the claim that Operation Barbarossa was a preemptive strike, such as [[Andreas Hillgruber]], [[Rolf-Dieter Müller]], and [[Christian Hartmann (historian)|Christian Hartmann]], but they also acknowledge that the Soviets were aggressive to their neighbors.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hillgruber |first=Andreas |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5woxABMUOlIC |title=Germany and the Two World Wars |date=1981 |publisher=[[Harvard University Press]] |isbn=978-0-674-35322-0 |pages=86 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Hartmann |first=Christian |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1005849626 |title=Operation Barbarossa: Nazi Germany's War in the East, 1941-1945 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2011 |isbn=978-0-19-870170-5 |location= |pages=24 |language=en |oclc=1005849626}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last1=Müller|first1=Rolf-Dieter|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/836636715|title=Hitler's war in the east, 1941-1945: a critical assessment|last2=Ueberschär|first2=Gerd R|date=2002|publisher=Berghahn|isbn=978-1-84545-501-9|location=New York|pages=39–40|language=en|oclc=836636715}}</ref>

According to Stalin's daughter, [[Svetlana Alliluyeva]] she "remembered her father saying after [the war]: 'Together with the Germans we would have been invincible'."<ref>{{cite book |last1=Lukacs |first1=John |title=June 1941: Hitler and Stalin |date=2006 |publisher=Yale University Press |location=New Haven London |isbn=0300123647 |page=160}}</ref>

Russian [[Trotskyism|Trotskyist]] historian, [[Vadim Rogovin]] argued that Stalin had destroyed thousands of foreign communists capable of leading socialist change in their respective countries. He referenced the thousands of German communists that were handed over from Stalin to the Gestapo after the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Rogovin also noted that sixteen members of the [[Central Committee]] of the [[German Communist Party]] became victims of Stalinist terror.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Rogovin |first1=Vadim Zakharovich |title=Was There an Alternative? Trotskyism: a Look Back Through the Years |date=2021 |publisher=Mehring Books |isbn=978-1-893638-97-6 |pages=380 |language=en}}</ref> Similarly, historian [[Eric D. Weitz]] discussed the areas of collaboration between the regimes in which hundreds of German citizens, the majority of whom were Communists, had been handed over to the Gestapo from Stalin's administration. Weitz also stated that a higher proportion of the KPD Politburo members had died in the Soviet Union than in Nazi Germany.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Weitz |first1=Eric D. |title=Creating German Communism, 1890-1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State |date=13 April 2021 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-22812-9 |page=280 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JOgSEAAAQBAJ&dq=stalin+handed+over+german+communists+gestapo&pg=PA280 |language=en |access-date=30 October 2023 |archive-date=6 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231106233635/https://books.google.com/books?id=JOgSEAAAQBAJ&dq=stalin+handed+over+german+communists+gestapo&pg=PA280 |url-status=live }}</ref> However, according to the work of [[Wilhelm Mensing]], there is no evidence which suggests that the Soviets specifically targeted German and Austrian Communists or others who perceived themselves as "anti-fascists" for deportations to Nazi Germany.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mensing |first=Wilhelm |date=2006 |title=Eine "Morgengabe" Stalins an den Paktfreund Hitler? Die Auslieferung deutscher Emigranten an das NS-Regime nach Abschluß des Hitler-Stalin-Pakts – eine zwischen den Diktatoren arrangierte Preisgabe von "Antifaschisten"? |url=https://zeitschrift-fsed.fu-berlin.de/index.php/zfsed/article/view/236 |journal=Zeitschrift des Forschungsverbundes SED-Staat |language=de |volume=20 |issue=20 |issn=0948-9878}}</ref>