Editing James G. Blaine (section)

== Secretary of State, 1889–1892 ==
[[File:JBlaine-1890.jpg|thumb|Blaine in his office, 1890]]
Harrison had developed his foreign policy based largely on Blaine's ideas, and at the start of his term, Harrison and Blaine had very similar views on the United States' place in the world.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=111–113|Calhoun||2pp=74–75}} In spite of their shared worldview, however, the two men became personally unfriendly as the term went on.{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=389–391, 462–464|Calhoun||2pp=75–77}} Harrison was conscious that his Secretary of State was more popular than he, and while he admired Blaine's gift for diplomacy, he grew displeased with Blaine's frequent absence from his post because of illness, and suspected that Blaine was angling for the [[1892 Republican National Convention|presidential nomination in 1892]].{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=389–391, 462–464|Calhoun||2pp=75–77}} Harrison tried to limit how many "Blaine men" filled subordinate positions in the State Department and denied Blaine's request that his son, [[Walker Blaine|Walker]], be appointed [[Assistant Secretary of State|First Assistant Secretary]], instead naming him [[Legal Adviser of the Department of State|Solicitor of the Department of State]].{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=389–391, 462–464|Calhoun||2pp=75–77}} Despite the growing personal rancor, the two men continued, with one exception, to agree on the foreign policy questions of the day.{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=389–391, 462–464|Calhoun||2pp=75–77}}

=== Pacific diplomacy ===
Blaine and Harrison wished to see American power and trade expanded across the Pacific and were especially interested in securing rights to harbors in [[Pearl Harbor]], [[Hawaii]], and [[Pago Pago]], [[Samoa]].{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=116–117|Calhoun||2pp=77–80, 125–126|Rigby||3loc=''passim''}} When Blaine entered office, the United States, Great Britain, and the [[German Empire]] were [[Samoan Civil War|disputing their respective rights]] in Samoa.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=116–117|Muzzey||2pp=394–402}} [[Thomas F. Bayard]], Blaine's predecessor, had accepted an invitation to a three-party conference in Berlin aimed at resolving the dispute, and Blaine appointed American representatives to attend.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=116–117|Muzzey||2pp=394–402}} The result was [[Treaty of Berlin (1889)|a treaty]] that created a [[Condominium (international law)|condominium]] among the three powers, allowing all of them access to the harbor.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=116–117|Muzzey||2pp=394–402}}

In Hawaii, Blaine worked to bind the kingdom more closely to the United States and to avoid its becoming a British [[protectorate]].{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=123–125|Calhoun||2pp=125–126, 152–157}} When the [[McKinley Tariff]] of 1890 eliminated the [[Duty (economics)|duty]] on [[sugar]], Hawaiian sugar-growers looked for a way to retain their once-exclusive access to the American market.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=123–125|Calhoun||2pp=125–126, 152–157}} The Hawaiian [[Minister (diplomacy)|minister]] to the United States, [[Henry A. P. Carter]], tried to arrange for Hawaii to have complete trade reciprocity with the United States, but Blaine proposed instead that Hawaii become an American protectorate; Carter favored the idea, but the Hawaiian king, [[Kalākaua]], rejected the infringement on his sovereignty.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=123–125|Calhoun||2pp=125–126, 152–157}} Blaine next procured the appointment of his former newspaper colleague [[John L. Stevens]] as minister to Hawaii.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=125–129|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=204–207}} Stevens had long believed that the United States should annex Hawaii, and as minister he co-operated with Americans living in Hawaii in their efforts to bring about annexation.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=125–129|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=204–207}} Their efforts ultimately culminated in a [[Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii|coup d'état]] against Kalākaua's successor, [[Liliuokalani]], in 1893.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=125–129|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=204–207}} Blaine's precise involvement is undocumented, but the results of Stevens' diplomacy were in accord with his ambitions for American power in the region.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=125–129|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=204–207}} The new government petitioned the United States for annexation, but by that time Blaine was no longer in office.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=125–129|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=204–207}}

=== Latin America and reciprocity ===
Soon after taking office, Blaine revived his old idea of an international conference of Western hemisphere nations.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=118–122|Muzzey||2pp=426–437|Pletcher||3pp=56–57}} The result was the [[First International Conference of American States]], which met in Washington in 1890.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=118–122|Muzzey||2pp=426–437|Pletcher||3pp=56–57}} Blaine and Harrison had high hopes for the conference, including proposals for a [[customs union]], a pan-American railroad line, and an arbitration process to settle disputes among member nations.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=118–122|Muzzey||2pp=426–437|Pletcher||3pp=56–57}} Their overall goal was to extend trade and political influence over the entire hemisphere; some of the other nations understood this and were wary of deepening ties with the United States to the exclusion of European powers.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=118–122|Muzzey||2pp=426–437|Pletcher||3pp=56–57}} Blaine said publicly that his only interest was in "annexation of trade," not annexation of territory, but privately he wrote to Harrison of a desire for some territorial enlargement of the United States:

{{blockquote|I think there are only three places that are of value enough to be taken&nbsp;... One is Hawaii and the others are [[Cuba]] and [[Puerto Rico|Porto Rico]] {{sic}}. Cuba and Porto Rico are not now imminent and will not be for a generation. Hawaii may come up for decision at an unexpected hour and I hope we shall be prepared to decide it in the affirmative.{{sfn|Crapol|pp=122–124}}}}

Congress was not as enthusiastic about a customs union as Blaine and Harrison were, but tariff reciprocity provisions were ultimately included in the [[McKinley Tariff]] that reduced duties on some inter-American trade.{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=120–122|Calhoun||2pp=81–82}} Otherwise, the conference achieved none of Blaine's goals in the short-term, but did lead to further communication and what would eventually become the [[Organization of American States]].{{sfnm|Crapol||1pp=120–122|Calhoun||2pp=81–82}}

[[File:Uss baltimore c-3.jpg|thumb|left|Sailors from the {{USS|Baltimore|C-3|6}} caused the major foreign affairs crisis of Blaine's second term as Secretary of State.]]

In 1891, [[Baltimore Crisis|a diplomatic crisis]] arose in [[Chile]] that drove a wedge between Harrison and Blaine. The American minister to Chile, [[Patrick Egan (land reformer and diplomat)|Patrick Egan]], a political friend of Blaine's, granted asylum to Chileans who were seeking refuge from the [[1891 Chilean Civil War|Chilean Civil War]].{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=415–416|Socolofsky & Spetter||2p=146|Healy||3p=207}} Chile was already suspicious of Blaine because of his War of the Pacific diplomacy ten years earlier, and this incident raised tensions even further.{{sfn|Crapol|pp=130–131}} When sailors from the ''[[USS Baltimore (C-3)|Baltimore]]'' took [[shore leave]] in [[Valparaíso]], a fight broke out, resulting in the deaths of two American sailors and three dozen arrested.{{sfnm|Muzzey||1p=418|Calhoun||2p=127}} When the news reached Washington, Blaine was in Bar Harbor recuperating from a bout of ill health and Harrison himself drafted a demand for reparations.{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=419–421|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=147–149}} The Chilean foreign minister, [[Manuel Antonio Matta]], replied that Harrison's message was "erroneous or deliberately incorrect" and said that the Chilean government was treating the affair the same as any other criminal matter.{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=419–421|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=147–149}} Tensions increased as Harrison threatened to break off diplomatic relations unless the United States received a suitable apology.{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=419–421|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=147–149}} Blaine returned to the capital and made conciliatory overtures to the Chilean government, offering to submit the dispute to arbitration and recall Egan.{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=419–421|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=147–149}} Harrison still insisted on an apology and submitted a special message to Congress about the threat of war.{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=421–423|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=150–152}} Chile issued an apology for the incident, and the threat of war subsided.{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=421–423|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=150–152}}

=== Relations with European powers ===
[[File:JudgeMagazine16Aug1890.jpg|thumb|1890 political cartoon depicting Blaine "outplaying" British Prime Minister [[Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury]].]]
Blaine's earliest expressions in the foreign policy sphere were those of a reactionary Anglophobe, but by the end of his career his relationship with the United Kingdom had become more moderate and nuanced.{{sfn|Crapol|pp=105–106, 138–139}}{{efn|Some scholars have suggested that Blaine's Anglophobia was always more for political advantage than out of genuine sentiment.{{sfn|Sewell|loc=''passim''}}}} A dispute over [[seal hunting]] in the waters off [[Alaska]] was the cause of Blaine's first interaction with Britain as Harrison's Secretary of State. A law passed in 1889 required Harrison to ban seal hunting in Alaskan waters, but Canadian fishermen believed they had the right to continue fishing there.{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=403–405|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=137–138}} Soon thereafter, the [[United States Navy]] seized several Canadian ships near the [[Pribilof Islands]].{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=403–405|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=137–138}} Blaine entered into negotiations with Britain and the two nations agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration by a neutral tribunal.{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=408–409|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=140–143}} Blaine was no longer in office when the tribunal began its work, but the result was to allow the hunting once more, albeit with some regulation, and to require the United States to pay damages of $473,151.{{efn|Equivalent to ${{Formatprice|{{Inflation|US-GDP|473151|1898}}}} in {{Inflation/year|US-GDP}}{{Inflation/fn|US-GDP}}}}{{sfnm|Muzzey||1pp=408–409|Socolofsky & Spetter||2pp=140–143}} Ultimately, the nations signed the [[North Pacific Fur Seal Convention of 1911]], which outlawed open-water seal hunting.

At the same time as the Pribilof Islands dispute, an outbreak of mob violence in [[New Orleans]] became an international incident. After New Orleans police chief [[David Hennessy]] led a crackdown against local [[American Mafia|mafiosi]], he was assassinated on October 14, 1890.{{sfnm|Socolofsky & Spetter||1pp=153–154|Muzzey||2pp=411–412}} After the alleged murderers were found not guilty on March 14, 1891, a mob stormed the jail and [[March 14, 1891 lynchings|lynched]] eleven of them.{{sfnm|Socolofsky & Spetter||1pp=153–154|Muzzey||2pp=411–412}} Since many of those killed were Italian citizens the Italian minister, [[Saverio Fava]], protested to Blaine.{{sfnm|Socolofsky & Spetter||1pp=153–154|Muzzey||2pp=411–412}} Blaine explained that federal officials could not control how state officials deal with criminal matters, and Fava announced that he would withdraw the legation back to Italy. Blaine and Harrison believed the Italians' response to be an overreaction, and did nothing.{{sfnm|Socolofsky & Spetter||1pp=153–154|Muzzey||2pp=411–412}} Tensions slowly cooled, and after nearly a year, the Italian minister returned to the United States to negotiate an indemnity.{{sfnm|Socolofsky & Spetter||1pp=155–156|Muzzey||2pp=412–414|Calhoun||3pp=126–127}} After some internal dispute—Blaine wanted conciliation with Italy, Harrison was reluctant to admit fault—the United States agreed to pay an indemnity of $25,000,{{efn|Equivalent to ${{formatprice|{{Inflation|US-GDP|25000|1892}}}} in {{Inflation/year|US-GDP}}{{Inflation/fn|US-GDP}}}} and normal diplomatic relations resumed.{{sfnm|Socolofsky & Spetter||1pp=155–156|Muzzey||2pp=412–414|Calhoun||3pp=126–127}}