Editing Hugh Gaitskell (section)

=== Suez ===
In 1956 the Egyptian ruler Colonel [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] nationalised the [[Suez Company (1858–1997)|Suez Canal Company]], beginning the [[Suez Crisis]]. Gaitskell initially told the Prime Minister, Sir [[Anthony Eden]], and the Chancellor of the Exchequer [[Harold Macmillan]] at a dinner with King [[Faisal II of Iraq|Faisal II]] of [[Iraq]] on 26 July 1956, that they would have the support of public opinion for the use of military action against Nasser, but warned Eden that he must act quickly and would have to keep the Americans closely informed.<ref name="Barry Turner 2006 pp 231-232">Barry Turner, ''Suez 1956'' (2006) pp 231-232.</ref><ref>Williams 1985, p419</ref> Gaitskell denounced Nasser's action at 11am on 27 July in the House of Commons debate.<ref>Thorpe 1989, p217-8</ref>

Gaitskell's position became more cautious during the summer, and he suggested the dispute with Egypt should be referred to the United Nations. His first speech on Suez (2 August 1956) attacked Nasser and was welcomed by many Conservatives, and implied that he would support the use of force, but in Brivati's view did not give enough emphasis to his stipulation that it be done through the United Nations.<ref name="Matthew 2004, p.289" /> He had believed Eden's assurances that he had no intention of using force.<ref>Campbell 2010, p231</ref> In two letters to Eden sent on 3 and 10 August Gaitskell condemned Nasser, but warned that he would not support any action that violated the United Nations charter.<ref name="Barry Turner 2006 pp 231-232" /> In his letter of 10 August, Gaitskell wrote: "Lest there should be any doubt in your mind about my personal attitude, let me say that I could not regard an armed attack on Egypt by ourselves and the French as justified by anything which Nasser has done so far or as consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Nor, in my opinion, would such an attack be justified in order to impose a system of international control over the canal – desirable though this is. If, of course, the whole matter were to be taken to the United Nations and if Egypt were to be condemned by them as aggressors, then, of course, the position would be different. And if further action which amounted to obvious aggression by Egypt were taken by Nasser, then again it would be different. So far what Nasser has done amounts to a threat, a grave threat to us and to others, which certainly cannot be ignored; but it is only a threat, not in my opinion justifying retaliation by war."<ref name="Barry Turner 2006 pp 231-232" />

Gaitskell passionately condemned the eventual Anglo-French military intervention to secure the Suez Canal, supposedly launched to enforce international law and to separate the Egyptian and Israeli combatants; the Israeli attack had in fact been launched in collusion with the British and French to supply a pretext for the invasion.<ref name="Barry Turner 2006 pp 231-232" /> On 31 October he publicly called the invasion "an act of disastrous folly" which threatened the Atlantic Alliance, the United Nations and Commonwealth solidarity.<ref name="Matthew 2004, p.289" /> On 4 November 1956 Gaitskell gave a powerful broadcast, attacking the Prime Minister now it was clear Eden had been lying to him in private. Gaitskell was accused by the Conservatives of trying to appeal to the Labour Left, and of betrayal.<ref name="Matthew 2004, p.289" /><ref>Turner, ''Suez 1956'', p 232.</ref>

Gaitskell's stance on Suez attracted some Liberal support. The pollster Mark Abrams convinced him of the need to broaden Labour's appeal by picking up anti-colonialist votes, but this would be a development of longer-term importance to the Labour Party. At the time Gaitskell was much-criticised in the press, especially for his ill-judged and unsuccessful plea for Tory dissidents to remove Eden from power.<ref name="Matthew 2004, p.290" /> The Conservatives not only attacked Gaitskell as unpatriotic for failing to support British troops in action, but also tried to exploit perceived differences between Gaitskell and Bevan, who had rejoined the Shadow Cabinet earlier in the year and who had now been promoted to Shadow Foreign Secretary. Crossman noted that this forced Bevan to be loyal to Gaitskell (15 December 1956), making the two men allies of a kind.<ref>Campbell 2010, p231-2</ref>