Editing Gamal Abdel Nasser (section)

== Six-Day War ==
{{Main|Six-Day War}}
[[File:Nasser, Hussein and Amer before signing Egyptian-Jordanian defense pact.jpg|thumb|alt=Three important men walking in a hall, the first and the third are in military garb, the second is in a suit and tie. Behind them are three other men|Nasser (center), King [[Hussein of Jordan]] (left) and Egyptian Army Chief of Staff [[Abdel Hakim Amer]] (right) at the [[Supreme Council of the Armed Forces|Supreme Command of the Armed Forces]] headquarters in Cairo before signing a [[United Arab Command|mutual defense pact]], 30 May 1967|left]]

In mid May 1967, the Soviet Union issued warnings to Nasser of an impending Israeli attack on Syria, although Chief of Staff [[Mohamed Fawzi (general)|Mohamed Fawzi]] considered the warnings to be "baseless".<ref name="Aburish252">{{Harvnb|Aburish|2004|p=252}}</ref><ref name="Kandil76">{{Harvnb|Kandil|2012|p=76}}</ref> According to Kandil, without Nasser's authorization, Amer used the Soviet warnings as a pretext to dispatch troops to Sinai on 14 May, and Nasser subsequently demanded UNEF's withdrawal.<ref name="Kandil76" /><ref name="Brooks90">{{Harvnb|Brooks|2008|p=90}}</ref> Earlier that day, Nasser received a warning from King Hussein of Israeli-American collusion to drag Egypt into war.<ref name="Kandil77">{{Harvnb|Kandil|2012|p=77}}</ref> The message had been originally received by Amer on 2 May, but was withheld from Nasser until the Sinai deployment on 14 May.<ref name="Kandil77" /><ref>{{Harvnb|Parker|1996|p=159}}</ref> Although in the preceding months, Hussein and Nasser had been accusing each other of avoiding a fight with Israel,<ref>{{Harvnb|Parker|1996|pp=158–159}}</ref> Hussein was nonetheless wary that an Egyptian–Israeli war would risk the West Bank's occupation by Israel.<ref name="Kandil77" /> Nasser still felt that the US would restrain Israel from attacking due to assurances that he received from the US and Soviet Union.<ref name="Aburish254-5">{{Harvnb|Aburish|2004|pp=254–255}}</ref> In turn, he also reassured both powers that Egypt would only act defensively.<ref name="Aburish254-5" />

On 21 May, Amer asked Nasser to order the Straits of Tiran blockaded, a move Nasser believed Israel would use as a ''[[casus belli]]''.<ref name="Kandil77" /> Amer reassured him that the army was prepared for confrontation,<ref name="Brooks95">{{Harvnb|Brooks|2008|p=95}}</ref><ref name="Kandil77-8">{{Harvnb|Kandil|2012|pp=77–78}}</ref> but Nasser doubted Amer's assessment of the military's readiness.<ref name="Brooks95" /> According to Nasser's vice president Zakaria Mohieddin, although "Amer had absolute authority over the armed forces, Nasser had his ways of knowing what was really going on".<ref name="Parker1993p79" /> Moreover, Amer anticipated an impending Israeli attack and advocated a preemptive strike.<ref name="Aburish255">{{Harvnb|Aburish|2004|p=255}}</ref><ref name="Kandil86">{{Harvnb|Kandil|2012|p=86}}</ref> Nasser refused the call<ref name="Kandil86" /><ref name="Aburish257">{{Harvnb|Aburish|2004|p=257}}</ref> upon determination that the air force lacked pilots and Amer's handpicked officers were incompetent.<ref name="Aburish257" /> Still, Nasser concluded that if Israel attacked, Egypt's quantitative advantage in manpower and arms could stave off Israeli forces for at least two weeks, allowing for diplomacy towards a ceasefire.<ref name="Brooks97">{{Harvnb|Brooks|2008|p=97}}</ref> Israel repeated declarations it had made in 1957 that any closure of the Straits would be considered an act of war, or justification for war, but Nasser closed the Straits to Israeli shipping on 22–23 May. Towards the end of May, Nasser increasingly exchanged his positions of deterrence for deference to the inevitability of war,<ref name="Brooks97" /><ref name="Aburish258">{{Harvnb|Aburish|2004|p=258}}</ref> under increased pressure to act by both the general Arab populace and various Arab governments.<ref name="Aburish252" /><ref name="Aburish254">{{Harvnb|Aburish|2004|pp=252–254}}</ref> On 26 May Nasser declared, "our basic objective will be to destroy Israel".<ref name="Mutawi2002p95">{{Harvnb|Mutawi|2002|p=95}}</ref> On 30 May, King Hussein committed Jordan in an [[United Arab Command|alliance]] with Egypt and Syria.<ref name="Aburish256">{{Harvnb|Aburish|2004|p=256}}</ref>

[[File:Khartoum_Arab_Summit,_1967.jpg|alt=Khartoum Arab Summit, 1967|thumb|Some of the attending heads of state at the [[1967 Arab League summit|Arab League Summit in Khartoum]] following the Six-Day War. From left to right: [[Faisal of Saudi Arabia|Faisal]] of Saudi Arabia, Nasser, [[Abdullah al-Sallal]] of Yemen, [[Sabah Al-Salim Al-Sabah]] of Kuwait and [[Abdul Rahman Arif|Abd al-Rahman Arif]] of Iraq, 2 September 1967]]
On the morning of 5 June, the [[Israeli Air Force]] struck Egyptian air fields, destroying much of the Egyptian Air Force. Before the day ended, Israeli armored units had cut through Egyptian defense lines and captured the town of [[el-Arish]].<ref name="Aburish261">{{Harvnb|Aburish|2004|pp=260–261}}</ref> The next day, Amer ordered the immediate withdrawal of Egyptian troops from Sinai—causing the majority of Egyptian casualties during the war.<ref name="Kandil82">{{Harvnb|Kandil|2012|p=82}}</ref> Israel quickly captured Sinai and the [[Gaza Strip]] from Egypt, the [[West Bank]] from Jordan, and the [[Golan Heights]] from Syria.

According to Sadat, it was only when the Israelis cut off the Egyptian garrison at [[Sharm el-Sheikh]] that Nasser became aware of the situation's gravity.<ref name="Aburish261" /> After hearing of the attack, he rushed to army headquarters to inquire about the military situation.<ref name="Aburish263">{{Harvnb|Aburish|2004|p=263}}</ref> The simmering conflict between Nasser and Amer subsequently came to the fore, and officers present reported the pair burst into "a nonstop shouting match".<ref name="Aburish263" /> The Supreme Executive Committee, set up by Nasser to oversee the conduct of the war, attributed the repeated Egyptian defeats to the Nasser–Amer rivalry and Amer's overall incompetence.<ref name="Aburish261" /> According to Egyptian diplomat [[Ismail Fahmi]], who became foreign minister during Sadat's presidency, the Israeli invasion and Egypt's consequent defeat was a result of Nasser's dismissal of all rational analysis of the situation and his undertaking of a series of irrational decisions.<ref name="Fahmy19">{{Harvnb|Fahmy|2013|p=19}}</ref>

=== Resignation and aftermath ===
[[File:Protests against Nassers resignation 1967.jpg|thumb|left|alt=A crowd of people, many waving. One person is holding up a portrait of a man|Egyptian demonstrators protesting Nasser's resignation, 1967]]
{{quote box
| quote  = I have taken a decision with which I need your help. I have decided to withdraw totally and for good from any official post or political role, and to return to the ranks of the masses, performing my duty in their midst, like any other citizen. This is a time for action, not grief. ... My whole heart is with you, and let your hearts be with me. May God be with us—hope, light, and guidance in our hearts.
| source = Nasser's 9 June resignation speech, which was retracted the next day<ref name="Aburish262">{{Harvnb|Aburish|2004|p=262}}</ref>
| quoted = 1
| align  = right
| width  = 35%
}}

During the first four days of the war, the general population of the Arab world believed Arab radio station fabrications of imminent Arab victory.<ref name="Aburish262" /> On 9 June, Nasser appeared on television to inform Egypt's citizens of their country's defeat.<ref name="Aburish262" /><ref name="Bidwell276">{{Harvnb|Bidwell|1998|p=276}}</ref> He announced his resignation on television later that day, and ceded all presidential powers to his then-Vice President Zakaria Mohieddin, who had no prior information of this decision and refused to accept the post.<ref name="Bidwell276" /> It was in this resignation
speech that the Six Day War was first called the "setback". The second sentence of his speech ran: "We cannot hide from ourselves the fact that we have met with a grave setback [naksa] in the last few days"—the "naksa" or "setback" for Egypt being the destruction of its armed forces, the loss of the entire Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza region, and the national humiliation and disgrace of losing a war to the vastly smaller Israeli Army.

Hundreds of thousands of sympathizers poured into the streets in mass demonstrations throughout Egypt and across the Arab world rejecting his resignation,<ref>{{Harvnb|Kandil|2012|p=84}}</ref> chanting, "We are your soldiers, Gamal!"<ref name="Aburish268">{{Harvnb|Aburish|2004|pp=268–269}}</ref> Nasser retracted his decision the next day.<ref name="Aburish268" />

[[File:خطاب تنحي الرئيس جمال عبد الناصر بعد النكسة.webm|thumb|right|A video clip of Nasser's resignation speech]]
On 11 July, Nasser replaced Amer with Mohamed Fawzi as general commander,<ref>{{Harvnb|Kandil|2012|p=85}}</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Nutting|1972|p=430}}</ref> over the protestations of Amer's loyalists in the military, 600 of whom marched on army headquarters and demanded Amer's reinstatement.<ref name="Kandil87">{{Harvnb|Kandil|2012|p=87}}</ref> After Nasser sacked thirty of the loyalists in response,<ref name="Kandil87" /> Amer and his allies devised a plan to topple him on 27 August.<ref name="Kandil88">{{Harvnb|Kandil|2012|p=88}}</ref> Nasser was tipped off about their activities and, after several invitations, he convinced Amer to meet him at his home on 24 August.<ref name="Kandil88" /> Nasser confronted Amer about the coup plot, which he denied before being arrested by Mohieddin. Amer committed suicide on 14 September.<ref name="Kandil89">{{Harvnb|Kandil|2012|pp=89–90}}</ref> Despite his souring relationship with Amer, Nasser spoke of losing "the person closest to [him]".<ref>{{Harvnb|Aburish|2004|p=277}}</ref> Thereafter, Nasser began a process of depoliticizing the armed forces, arresting dozens of leading military and intelligence figures loyal to Amer.<ref name="Kandil89" />

At the 29 August [[1967 Arab League summit|Arab League summit]] in Khartoum, Nasser's usual commanding position had receded as the attending heads of state expected Saudi King Faisal to lead. A ceasefire in the Yemen War was declared and the summit concluded with the [[Khartoum Resolution]],<ref>{{Harvnb|Aburish|2004|pp=270–271}}</ref> which, according to Abd al Azim Ramadan, left only one option—a war with [[Israel]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Meital |first1=Yoram |title=The Khartoum Conference and Egyptian Policy after the 1967 War: A Reexamination |journal=Middle East Journal |date=2000 |volume=54 |issue=1 |pages=64–82 |jstor=4329432 |url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329432}}</ref>

The Soviet Union soon resupplied the Egyptian military with about half of its former arsenals and broke diplomatic relations with Israel. Nasser cut relations with the US following the war, and, according to Aburish, his policy of "playing the superpowers against each other" ended.<ref>{{Harvnb|Aburish|2004|p=272}}</ref> In November, Nasser accepted [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 242|UN Resolution 242]], which called for Israel's withdrawal from territories acquired in the war. His supporters claimed Nasser's move was meant to buy time to prepare for another confrontation with Israel, while his detractors believed his acceptance of the resolution signaled a waning interest in Palestinian independence.<ref name="Aburish281">{{Harvnb|Aburish|2004|p=281}}</ref>