Editing Erwin Rommel (section)

=== Relationship with Italian forces ===
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1977-017-10A, Nordafrika, Rommel mit Offizieren.jpg|thumb|Rommel with German and Italian officers, 1942]]

Rommel's relationship with the Italian High Command in North Africa was generally poor. Although he was nominally subordinate to the Italians, he enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy from them; since he was directing their troops in battle as well as his own, this was bound to cause hostility among Italian commanders. Conversely, as the Italian command had control over the supplies of the forces in Africa, they resupplied Italian units preferentially, which was a source of resentment for Rommel and his staff.{{sfn|Watson|1999|p=133}} Rommel's direct and abrasive manner did nothing to smooth these issues.<ref>"Diario storico del Comando Supremo", vol.5 to 9, Italian Army General Staff Historical Office</ref><ref>"Verbali delle riunioni tenute dal Capo di SM Generale", vol. 2 and 3, Italian Army General Staff Historical Office</ref>{{sfn|Latimer|2002|p=31}}

While certainly much less proficient than Rommel in their leadership, aggression, tactical outlook and mobile warfare skills,<ref name="Knox">{{cite book|last1=Knox|first1=MacGregor|title=Hitler's Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the War of 1940–1943|date= 2000|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-139-43203-0|pages=[https://archive.org/details/hitlersitalianal00knox/page/2 2], 3, 10, 29, 116, 118|url=https://archive.org/details/hitlersitalianal00knox
|url-access=registration}}</ref> Italian commanders were competent in logistics, strategy and artillery doctrine: their troops were ill-equipped but well-trained. As such, the Italian commanders were repeatedly at odds with Rommel over concerns with issues of supply.<ref>Montanari, "Le operazioni in Africa Settentrionale", vol. 1 to 4, Italian Army General Staff Historical Office, 1985–1993.</ref> Field Marshal Kesselring was assigned Supreme Commander Mediterranean, at least in part to alleviate command problems between Rommel and the Italians. This effort resulted only in partial success, with Kesselring's own relationship with the Italians being unsteady and Kesselring claiming Rommel ignored him as readily as he ignored the Italians.<ref>Kesselring, ''The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring'', pp. 124–125.</ref>{{sfn|Zaloga|2013b|p=23}} Rommel often went directly to Hitler with his needs and concerns, taking advantage of the favouritism that the Führer displayed towards him and adding to the distrust that Kesselring and the German High Command already had of him.{{sfn|Watson|1999|pp=164–165}}

According to Scianna, the opinion among the Italian military leaders was not unanimous. In general, Rommel was a target of criticism and a scapegoat for defeat rather than a glorified figure, with certain generals also trying to replace him as the heroic leader or hijack the [[Rommel myth]] for their own benefit. Nevertheless, he never became a hated figure, although the "abandonment myth", despite being repudiated by officers of the X Corps themselves, was long-lived. Many found Rommel's chaotic leadership and emotional character hard to work with, yet the Italians held him in higher regard than other German senior commanders, militarily and personally.{{sfn|Scianna|2018|pp=125–146}}

Very different, however, was the perception of Rommel by Italian common soldiers and NCOs, who, like the German field troops, had the deepest trust and respect for him.<ref>M.Montanari, Le Operazioni in Africa Settentrionale, Vol.IV, chapter III, 1985–1993, pp. 119–197.</ref>{{refn|group=N|Spiegel quoted Goebbels: "Rommel is amazingly popular with the troops, German and Italian.  He is almost a mythical figure."{{sfn|Fleischhauer|Friedmann|2012}}}} Paolo Colacicchi, an officer in the Italian Tenth Army recalled that Rommel "became sort of a myth to the Italian soldiers".{{sfn|Caddick-Adams|2012|p=247}} Rommel himself held a much more generous view about the Italian soldier{{sfn|Butler|2015|pp=352–353}} than about their leadership, towards whom his disdain, deeply rooted in militarism, was not atypical, although unlike Kesselring he was incapable of concealing it.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Sangster|first1=Andrew|title=Field-Marshal Kesselring: Great Commander Or War Criminal?|date=2015|publisher=Cambridge Scholars Publishing|isbn=978-1-4438-7676-6|page=75|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6hToBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA75}}</ref> Unlike many of his superiors and subordinates who held racist views, he was usually "kindly disposed" to the Italians in general.<ref>{{cite book |last=Giannone |first=Elicia |title=Cultural Disparity and the Italo-German Alliance in the Second World War |date=August 2015 |publisher=University of Calgary |pages=57, 69–70, 72 |url=http://theses.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/11023/2434/4/ucalgary_2015_giannone_elicia.pdf |access-date=16 August 2016 |archive-date=19 September 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160919223922/http://theses.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/11023/2434/4/ucalgary_2015_giannone_elicia.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref>

James J. Sadkovich cites examples of Rommel abandoning his Italian units, refusing cooperation, rarely acknowledging their achievements and other improper behaviour towards his Italian allies, Giuseppe Mancinelli, who was the liaison between German and Italian command, accused Rommel of blaming Italians for his own errors. Sadkovich names Rommel as ''arrogantly ethnocentric'' and disdainful towards Italians.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Sadkovich|first1=James J.|last2=Hixson|first2=Walter L.|title=Of Myths and Men: Rommel and the Italians in North Africa, 1940–1942 (chapter) – The American Experience in World War II: The United States in the European theater|date=2003|publisher=Taylor & Francis|isbn=978-0-415-94033-7|pages=238–267|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qcQLQNxuHfUC&pg=PA238}}</ref>