Editing Determinism (section)

===Buddhism===
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{{Main|Enlightenment in Buddhism|Two truths doctrine}}
{{Further|Four stages of enlightenment|Sotāpanna|Three marks of existence}}

[[Buddhist philosophy]] contains several concepts which some scholars describe as deterministic to various levels. However, the direct analysis of Buddhist metaphysics through the lens of determinism is difficult, due to the differences between European and Buddhist traditions of thought.<ref name="Garfield 2014">{{cite book |author-last=Garfield |author-first=Jay L. |year=2014 |editor2-first=Edwin F. |chapter=Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency, and Ethics for Mādhyamikas |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Ru0VDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA172 |editor1-last=Dasti |editor1-first=Matthew R. |editor2-last=Bryant |title=Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy |location=Oxford and New York |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |pages=172–185 |doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199922734.003.0008 |isbn=9780199395675 |lccn=2013017925}}</ref>

One concept which is argued to support a hard determinism is the doctrine of [[Pratītyasamutpāda|dependent origination]] (''pratītyasamutpāda'') in the [[early Buddhist texts]], which states that all [[Dharma|phenomena]] (''dharma'') are necessarily caused by some other phenomenon, which it can be said to be ''dependent'' on, like links in a massive, never-ending chain; the basic principle is that all things (dharmas, phenomena, principles) arise in dependence upon other things, which means that they are [[Śūnyatā|fundamentally "empty" or devoid of any intrinsic, eternal essence]] and therefore [[Impermanence (Buddhism)|are impermanent]].<ref name="Garfield 2014"/><ref name="Stanford 2022">{{cite encyclopedia |last=Thakchoe |first=Sonam |date=Summer 2022 |title=The Theory of Two Truths in Tibet |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-tibet/ |url-status=live |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |editor-link=Edward N. Zalta |encyclopedia=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=The Metaphysics Research Lab, [[Center for the Study of Language and Information]], [[Stanford University]] |issn=1095-5054 |oclc=643092515 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220528014845/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-tibet/ |archive-date=28 May 2022 |access-date=5 July 2022}}</ref> In traditional Buddhist philosophy, this concept is used to explain the functioning of the [[Saṃsāra|eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth]] (''saṃsāra''); all thoughts and actions exert a [[Karma|karmic force]] that attaches to the individual's [[consciousness]], which will manifest through [[Rebirth (Buddhism)|reincarnation]] and results in future lives.<ref name="Garfield 2014"/> In other words, righteous or unrighteous actions in one life will necessarily cause good or bad responses in another future life or more lives.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tricycle.org/magazine/dependent-origination/|title=Dependent Origination: The Twelve Links Explained|last=Goldstein|first=Joseph|website=Tricycle: The Buddhist Review|date=4 June 2008 |language=en|access-date=2020-01-26}}</ref> The early Buddhist texts and later [[Tibetan Buddhist canon|Tibetan Buddhist scriptures]] associate dependent arising with the fundamental Buddhist doctrines of [[Śūnyatā|emptiness]] (''śūnyatā'') and [[Anatta|non-self]] (''anattā'').<ref name="Garfield 2014"/><ref name="Stanford 2022"/>

Another Buddhist concept which many scholars perceive to be deterministic is the doctrine of [[Anatta|non-self]] (''anattā'').<ref name="Garfield 2014"/> In Buddhism, [[Enlightenment in Buddhism|attaining enlightenment]] involves one realizing that neither in [[humans]] nor any other [[Sentient beings (Buddhism)|sentient beings]] there is a fundamental core of permanent being, identity, or personality which can be called the "soul", and that all sentient beings (including humans) are instead made of [[Skandha|several, constantly changing factors]] which bind them to the [[Saṃsāra|eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth]] (''saṃsāra'').<ref name="Garfield 2014"/><ref name="Stanford 2022"/> Sentient beings are composed of the [[Skandha|five aggregates of existence]] (''skandha''): matter, sensation, perception, [[Mental factors (Buddhism)|mental formations]], and consciousness.<ref name="Garfield 2014"/> In the ''[[Saṃyutta Nikāya]]'' of the [[Pali Canon|Pāli Canon]], the [[Gautama Buddha|historical Buddha]] is recorded as saying that "just as the word 'chariot' exists on the basis of the aggregation of parts, even so the concept of 'being' exists when the five aggregates are available."<ref>David Kalupahana, ''Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism.'' The University Press of Hawaii, 1975, page 78.</ref> The early Buddhist texts outline different ways in which dependent origination is a middle way between different sets of "extreme" views (such as "[[Monism|monist]]" and "[[Pluralism (philosophy)|pluralist]]" ontologies or [[Materialism|materialist]] and [[Mind–body dualism|dualist]] views of mind-body relation).<ref>Choong, Mun-keat (2000). ''The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism: A Comparative Study Based on the Sutranga Portion of the Pali Samyutta-Nikaya and the Chinese Samyuktagama'', pp. 192-197. Otto Harrassowitz Verlag.</ref> In the ''[[Kaccānagotta Sutta]]'' of the [[Pali Canon|Pāli Canon]] ([[Saṃyutta Nikāya|SN]] 12.15, parallel at [[Āgama (Buddhism)#Saṃyukta Āgama|SA]] 301), the [[Gautama Buddha|historical Buddha]] stated that "this world mostly relies on the dual notions of existence and non-existence" and then explains the right view as follows:<ref name=":34">Choong, Mun-keat (2000). ''The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism: A Comparative Study Based on the Sutranga Portion of the Pali Samyutta-Nikaya and the Chinese Samyuktagama,'' p. 192. Otto Harrassowitz Verlag.</ref>
{{Blockquote|But when you truly see the origin of the world with right understanding, you won't have the notion of non-existence regarding the world. And when you truly see the cessation of the world with right understanding, you won't have the notion of existence regarding the world.<ref name=":35">Kaccānagottasutta SN 12.15 SN ii 16, translated by Bhikkhu Sujato https://suttacentral.net/sn12.15/en/sujato</ref>}}

Some Western scholars argue that the concept of non-self necessarily disproves the ideas of [[free will]] and [[moral responsibility]].<ref name="Garfield 2014"/><ref name="Repetti 2012"/> If there is no autonomous self, in this view, and all events are necessarily and unchangeably caused by others, then no type of autonomy can be said to exist, moral or otherwise.<ref name="Repetti 2012"/> However, other scholars disagree, claiming that the [[Buddhist cosmology|Buddhist conception of the universe]] allows for a form of [[compatibilism]].<ref name="Garfield 2014"/> Buddhism perceives reality occurring on [[Two truths doctrine|two different levels]]: the [[Nirvana|ultimate reality]], which can only be truly understood by the [[Enlightenment in Buddhism|enlightened ones]], and the [[Maya (religion)#Buddhism|illusory or false reality of the material world]], which is considered to be "real" or "true" by those who are [[Avidyā (Buddhism)|ignorant about the nature of metaphysical reality]]; i.e., those who still haven't achieved enlightenment.<ref name="Garfield 2014"/><ref name="Stanford 2022"/> Therefore, Buddhism perceives free will as a notion belonging to the [[Three marks of existence|illusory belief in the unchanging self or personhood]] that pertains to the false reality of the material world, while concepts like non-self and dependent origination belong to the ultimate reality; the transition between the two can be truly understood, Buddhists claim, by one who has attained enlightenment.<ref name="Garfield 2014"/><ref name="Stanford 2022"/><ref name="Repetti 2012">{{cite journal |last=Repetti |first=Ricardo |date=2012 |title=Buddhist Hard Determinism: No Self, No Free Will, No Responsibility |url=http://enlight.lib.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-MAG/mag388415.pdf |journal=Journal of Buddhist Ethics |volume=19 |pages=136–137, 143–145}}</ref>