Editing Bernard Montgomery (section)

==== Battle of the Bulge ====
On 16 December 1944, at the start of the [[Battle of the Bulge]], Montgomery's 21st Army Group was on the northern flank of the allied lines. Bradley's [[Twelfth United States Army Group|US 12th Army Group]] was to Montgomery's south, with [[William Hood Simpson|William Simpson]]'s [[Ninth United States Army|U.S. Ninth Army]] adjacent to 21st Army Group, [[Courtney Hodges]]' [[First United States Army|U.S. First Army]] holding the Ardennes and Patton's U.S. Third Army further south.<ref name=speer459>{{harvnb|Speer|1970|p=459}}</ref>

[[File:The British Army in North-west Europe 1944-45- the Prime Minister in Germany BU2239.jpg|thumb|left|Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery talking with Lieutenant General Simpson, GOC U.S. Ninth Army and Major General [[John B. Anderson (United States Army officer)|John Anderson]], GOC [[XVI Corps (United States)|U.S. XVI Corps]]. Behind are General Bradley and Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke.]]

[[SHAEF]] believed the Wehrmacht was no longer capable of launching a major offensive, and that no offensive could be launched through such rugged terrain as the Ardennes Forest. Because of this, the area was held by refitting and newly arrived American formations.<ref name=speer459/> The Wehrmacht planned to exploit this by making a surprise attack through the Ardennes Forest whilst bad weather grounded Allied air power, splitting the Allied Armies in two. They would then turn north to recapture the port of Antwerp.<ref>{{cite web |last=von Luttchau |first=Charles V. P. |title=The German Counteroffensive in the Ardennes |url=http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_20.htm |publisher=U.S. Army Center for Military History |access-date=17 November 2019 |archive-date=25 July 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100725042713/http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_20.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref> If the attack were to succeed in capturing Antwerp, the whole of 21st Army Group, along with U.S. Ninth Army and most of U.S. First Army would be trapped without supplies behind German lines.<ref>{{cite book |last=Cole |first=Hugh M. |chapter=Chapter V: The Sixth Panzer Army Attack |chapter-url=http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_5.htm |title=The Ardennes |series=United States Army in World War II, The European Theater of Operations |publisher=[[Office of the Chief of Military History]] |location=Washington, D.C. |year=1965 |access-date=17 November 2019 |archive-date=7 August 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100807183545/http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_5.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref>

The attack initially advanced rapidly, splitting U.S. 12th Army Group in two, with all of U.S. Ninth Army and the bulk of U.S. First Army on the northern shoulder of the German 'bulge'. The 12th Army Group commander, Bradley, was located in Luxembourg, making command of the U.S. forces north of the bulge problematic. As Montgomery was the nearest army group commander on the ground, on 20 December, Eisenhower temporarily transferred command of U.S. Ninth Army and U.S. First Army to Montgomery's 21st Army Group. Bradley was "concerned because it might discredit the American command" but that it might mean Montgomery would commit more of his reserves to the battle. In practice the change led to "great resentment on the part of many Americans, particularly at Headquarters, 12th Army Group, and Third Army".<ref>{{cite book|series=United States Army in World War II. European Theater of Operations | title=The Supreme Command|first=Forrest C.|last=Pogue|publisher=U.S. Department of the Army|year=1954| url=http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Supreme|chapter-url=http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Supreme/USA-E-Supreme-20.html|chapter=Chapter XX. Winter Counteroffensives |location=Washington DC|id=CMH Pub. 7-1 |page=378|via=Hyperwar Foundation}}</ref>

With the British and American forces under Montgomery's command holding the northern flank of the German assault, General Patton's Third Army, which was {{convert|90|mi|km}} to the south, turned north and fought its way through the severe weather and German opposition to relieve the besieged American forces in [[Bastogne]]. Four days after Montgomery took command of the northern flank, the bad weather cleared and the [[United States Army Air Forces|USAAF]] and RAF<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/worldwarii.cfm |title=The RAF in WWII |publisher=The Royal Air Force |date=7 May 1945 |access-date=21 October 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151019073942/http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/worldwarii.cfm |archive-date=19 October 2015 |url-status=dead  }}</ref> resumed operations, inflicting heavy casualties on German troops and vehicles. Six days after Montgomery took command of the northern flank, Patton's Third Army relieved the besieged American forces in Bastogne. Unable to advance further, and running out of fuel, the Wehrmacht abandoned the offensive.<ref name=speer459/><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/ardennes/aral.htm |title=The Battle of the Bulge |date=20 June 1999 |publisher=US Army |access-date=5 February 2017 |archive-date=6 December 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081206183021/http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/ardennes/aral.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref>

Morelock states that Montgomery was preoccupied with leading a "single thrust offensive" to Berlin as the overall commander of Allied ground forces, and that he accordingly treated the Ardennes counteroffensive "as a sideshow, to be finished with the least possible effort and expenditure of resources."{{sfn|Morelock|2015|p=65}}

Montgomery subsequently wrote of his actions:
{{Blockquote|The first thing to do was to see the battle on the northern flank as one whole, to ensure the vital areas were held securely, and to create reserves for counter-attack. I embarked on these measures: I put British troops under command of the Ninth Army to fight alongside American soldiers, and made that Army take over some of the First Army Front. I positioned British troops as reserves behind the First and Ninth Armies until such time as American reserves could be created.<ref>''The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery'' (1958) p. 308</ref> }}

After the war [[Hasso von Manteuffel]], who commanded the [[5th Panzer Army]] in the Ardennes, was imprisoned awaiting trial for war crimes. During this period he was interviewed by [[B. H. Liddell Hart]], a British author who has since been accused of putting words in the mouths of German generals, and attempting to "rewrite the historical record".<ref>In Pursuit of Military Excellence; The Evolution of Operational Theory'; by Shimon Naveh, pg 108-109. (London: Francass, 1997). {{ISBN|0-7146-4727-6}};</ref><ref>Liddell Hart and the Weight of History; by John Mearsheimer; pages 8-9, 203-204; Cornell University Press; 2010; {{ISBN|978-0-8014-7631-0}}</ref><ref>A Very Special Relationship: Basil Liddell Hart, Wehrmacht Generals and the Debate on West German Rearmament, 1945-1953, by Alaric Searle; War In History 1998 5: 327; published by SAGE for the University of Salford, Manchester; {{doi|10.1177/096834459800500304}}; available at: http://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/30779/ and https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/096834459800500304</ref><ref>"Liddell Hart and the Mearsheimer Critique: A 'Pupil's' Retrospective" (PDF); Strategic Studies Institute.; by Jay Luvaas; 1990; pg 12-13</ref> After conducting several interviews via an interpreter, Liddell Hart in a subsequent book attributed to Manteuffel the following statement about Montgomery's contribution to the battle in the Ardennes:

{{blockquote|The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough.{{sfn|Delaforce|2004|p=318}}}}

However, American historian [[Stephen E. Ambrose|Stephen Ambrose]], writing in 1997, maintained that "Putting Monty in command of the northern flank had no effect on the battle".{{sfn|Caddick-Adams|2015|p=644}} Ambrose wrote that: "Far from directing the victory, Montgomery had gotten in everyone's way, and had botched the counter-attack."{{sfn|Baxter|1999|p=111}} General Omar Bradley blamed Montgomery's "stagnating conservatism" for his failure to counter-attack when ordered to do so by Eisenhower.{{sfn|Morelock|2015|p=92}}

Command of U.S. First Army reverted to 12th Army Group on 17 January 1945,<ref>''The Supreme Command'', Forrest C Pogue, Chapter XX – The Winter Counteroffensives, pp. 378, 395</ref> whilst command of U.S. Ninth Army remained with 21st Army Group for the coming operations to cross the Rhine.<ref>''United States Army in World War II''; Part 3, Volume 4, United States. Dept. of the Army – Office of Military History; 1947; p. 439</ref>