Editing Battle of Britain (section)

==RAF strategy==
<gallery mode="packed" heights="130">
File:Hugh Dowding.jpg|Commander-in-Chief, Air Chief Marshal [[Hugh Dowding, 1st Baron Dowding|Sir Hugh Dowding]]
File:Sir Christopher Quintin Brand.jpg|10 Group Commander, Sir [[Quintin Brand]]
File:Sir Keith Park.jpg|11 Group Commander, [[Keith Park]]
File:Air Chf Mshl Leigh-Mallory.jpg|12 Group Commander, [[Trafford Leigh-Mallory]]
File:Air Vice-Marshal Richard Saul.jpg|13 Group Commander, [[Richard Saul]]
</gallery>

===The Dowding system===
[[File:Battle of Britain map.svg|thumb|RAF and Luftwaffe bases, group and ''Luftflotte'' boundaries, and range of Luftwaffe Bf 109 fighters. Southern part of British radar coverage: radar in North of Scotland not shown.]]
{{Main|Dowding system}}

During early tests of the [[Chain Home]] system, the slow flow of information from the CH radars and observers to the aircraft often caused them to miss their "bandits". The solution, today known as the "[[Dowding system]]", was to create a set of reporting chains to move information from the various observation points to the pilots in their fighters. It was named after its chief architect, "Stuffy" Dowding.<ref>{{harvnb|Korda|2010|p=18}}</ref>

Reports from CH radars and the [[Royal Observer Corps|Observer Corps]] were sent directly to Fighter Command Headquarters (FCHQ) at Bentley Priory where they were "filtered" to combine multiple reports of the same formations into single tracks. Telephone operators would then forward only the information of interest to the Group headquarters, where the map would be re-created. This process was repeated to produce another version of the map at the Sector level, covering a much smaller area. Looking over their maps, Group level commanders could select squadrons to attack particular targets. From that point, the Sector operators would give commands to the fighters to arrange an interception, as well as return them to base. Sector stations also controlled the [[anti-aircraft warfare|anti-aircraft batteries]] in their area; an army officer sat beside each fighter controller and directed the gun crews when to open and cease fire.<ref>{{harvnb|Price|1980|p=26}}</ref>

The Dowding system dramatically improved the speed and accuracy of the information that flowed to the pilots. During the early war period, it was expected that an average interception mission might have a 30% chance of ever seeing their target. During the battle, the Dowding system maintained an average rate over 75%, with several examples of 100% rates – every fighter dispatched found and intercepted its target. In contrast, Luftwaffe fighters attempting to intercept raids had to randomly seek their targets and often returned home having never seen enemy aircraft. The result is what is now known as an example of "[[force multiplication]]"; RAF fighters were as effective as two or more Luftwaffe fighters, greatly offsetting, or overturning, the disparity in actual numbers.{{Citation needed|date=April 2018}}

===Intelligence===
While Luftwaffe intelligence reports underestimated British fighter forces and aircraft production, the British intelligence estimates went the other way: they overestimated German aircraft production, numbers and range of aircraft available, and numbers of Luftwaffe pilots. In action, the Luftwaffe believed from their pilot claims and the impression given by aerial reconnaissance that the RAF was close to defeat, and the British made strenuous efforts to overcome the perceived advantages held by their opponents.{{sfn|Overy|2013|pp=79–80}}

It is unclear how much the British intercepts of the [[Enigma cipher]], used for high-security German radio communications, affected the battle. [[Ultra (cryptography)|Ultra]], the information obtained from Enigma intercepts, gave the highest echelons of the British command a view of German intentions. According to [[F. W. Winterbotham]], who was the senior Air Staff representative in the Secret Intelligence Service,<ref>{{harvnb|Winterbotham|1975|p=13}}</ref> Ultra helped establish the strength and composition of the Luftwaffe's formations, the aims of the commanders<ref>{{harvnb|Winterbotham|1975|pp=61–63}}</ref> and provided early warning of some raids.<ref>{{harvnb|Winterbotham|1975|pp=68–69}}</ref> In early August it was decided that a small unit would be set up at FCHQ, which would process the flow of information from Bletchley and provide Dowding only with the most essential Ultra material; thus the Air Ministry did not have to send a continual flow of information to FCHQ, preserving secrecy, and Dowding was not inundated with non-essential information. Keith Park and his controllers were also told about Ultra.<ref>{{harvnb|Winterbotham|1975|p=65}}</ref> In a further attempt to camouflage the existence of Ultra, Dowding created a unit named [[No. 421 (Reconnaissance) Flight RAF]]. This unit (which later became [[No. 91 Squadron RAF]]), was equipped with Hurricanes and Spitfires and sent out aircraft to search for and report Luftwaffe formations approaching England.<ref>{{harvnb|Ramsay|1989|p=5}}</ref> In addition, the radio listening service (known as [[Y-stations|Y Service]]), monitoring the patterns of Luftwaffe radio traffic contributed considerably to the early warning of raids.

===Tactics===
[[File:Aircraft of the Royal Air Force, 1939-1945- Supermarine Spitfire. CH1451.jpg|thumb|''X4474'', a late production Mk I Spitfire of [[No. 19 Squadron RAF|19 Squadron]], September 1940. During the battle 19 Squadron was part of the Duxford Wing.]]

====Fighter formations====
In the late 1930s, Fighter Command expected to face only bombers over Britain, not single-engined fighters. A series of "Fighting Area Tactics" were formulated and rigidly adhered to, involving a series of manoeuvres designed to concentrate a squadron's firepower to bring down bombers. RAF fighters flew in tight, [[vic formation|v-shaped sections]] ("vics") of three aircraft, with four such "sections" in tight formation. Only the [[squadron leader]] at the front was free to watch for the enemy; the other pilots had to concentrate on keeping station.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=249}}</ref> Training also emphasised by-the-book attacks by sections breaking away in sequence. Fighter Command recognised the weaknesses of this structure early in the battle, but it was felt too risky to change tactics during the battle because replacement pilots{{snd}}often with only minimal flying time{{snd}}could not be readily retrained,<ref>{{harvnb|Price|1996|p=26}}</ref> and inexperienced pilots needed firm leadership in the air only rigid formations could provide.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=250}}</ref> German pilots dubbed the RAF formations ''Idiotenreihen'' ("rows of idiots") because they left squadrons vulnerable to attack.<ref name="Bungay 2000, p. 260."/><ref>{{harvnb|Holmes|2007|p=61}}</ref>

Front line RAF pilots were acutely aware of the inherent deficiencies of their own tactics. A compromise was adopted whereby squadron formations used much looser formations with one or two "weavers" flying independently above and behind to provide increased observation and rear protection; these tended to be the least experienced men and were often the first to be shot down without the other pilots even noticing that they were under attack.<ref name="Bungay 2000, p. 260."/><ref>{{harvnb|Price|1980|pp=28–30}}</ref> During the battle, [[No. 74 Squadron RAF|74 Squadron]] under Squadron Leader [[Adolph Malan|Adolph "Sailor" Malan]] adopted a variation of the German formation called the "fours in line astern", which was a vast improvement on the old three aircraft "vic". Malan's formation was later generally used by Fighter Command.<ref>{{harvnb|Price|1996|p=55}}</ref>

====Squadron- and higher-level deployment====
The weight of the battle fell upon 11 Group. Keith Park's tactics were to dispatch individual squadrons to intercept raids. The intention was to subject incoming bombers to continual attacks by relatively small numbers of fighters and try to break up the tight German formations. Once formations had fallen apart, stragglers could be picked off one by one. Where multiple squadrons reached a raid the procedure was for the slower Hurricanes to tackle the bombers while the more agile Spitfires held up the fighter escort. This ideal was not always achieved, resulting in occasions when Spitfires and Hurricanes reversed roles.<ref name="Orange 2001, pp. 96, 100">{{harvnb|Orange|2001|pp=96, 100}}</ref> Park also issued instructions to his units to engage in frontal attacks against the bombers, which were more vulnerable to such attacks. Again, in the environment of fast-moving, three-dimensional air battles, few RAF fighter units were able to attack the bombers from head-on.<ref name="Orange 2001, pp. 96, 100"/>

[[File:The Battle of Britain HU54418.jpg|thumb|[[Royal Air Force]] (RAF) pilots during the Battle of Britain, with a [[Hawker Hurricane]] Mk I ''P3522'' in the backdrop]]

During the battle, some commanders, notably Leigh-Mallory, proposed squadrons be formed into "[[Big Wing]]s," consisting of at least three squadrons, to attack the enemy ''en masse'', a method pioneered by [[Douglas Bader]].

Proponents of this tactic claimed interceptions in large numbers caused greater enemy losses while reducing their own casualties. Opponents pointed out the big wings would take too long to form up, and the strategy ran a greater risk of fighters being caught on the ground refuelling. The big wing idea also caused pilots to overclaim their kills, due to the confusion of a more intense battle zone. This led to the belief big wings were far more effective than they actually were.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|pp=276–277, 309–310, 313–314, 320–321, 329–330, 331}}</ref>

The issue caused intense friction between Park and Leigh-Mallory, as 12 Group was tasked with protecting 11 Group's airfields whilst Park's squadrons intercepted incoming raids. The delay in forming up Big Wings meant the formations often did not arrive at all or until after German bombers had hit 11 Group's airfields.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=356}}</ref> Dowding, to highlight the problem of the Big Wing's performance, submitted a report compiled by Park to the Air Ministry on 15 November. In the report, he highlighted that during the period of 11 September – 31 October, the extensive use of the Big Wing had resulted in just 10 interceptions and one German aircraft destroyed, but his report was ignored.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=359}}</ref> Post-war analysis agrees Dowding and Park's approach was best for 11 Group.

Dowding's removal from his post in November 1940 has been blamed on this struggle between Park and Leigh-Mallory's daylight strategy. The intensive raids and destruction wrought during [[the Blitz]] damaged both Dowding and Park in particular, for the failure to produce an effective night-fighter defence system, something for which the influential Leigh-Mallory had long criticised them.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=354}}</ref>

===Bomber and Coastal Command contributions===
[[File:RAFBristolBlenheimWWIIColour.jpg|thumb|A [[Bristol Blenheim]] Mk IV of [[No. 21 Squadron RAF|21 Squadron]]]]
[[RAF Bomber Command|Bomber Command]] and [[RAF Coastal Command|Coastal Command]] aircraft flew offensive sorties against targets in Germany and France during the battle. An hour after the declaration of war, Bomber Command launched raids on warships and naval ports by day, and in night raids dropped leaflets as it was considered illegal to bomb targets which could affect civilians. After the initial disasters of the war, with [[Vickers Wellington]] bombers shot down in large numbers attacking [[Wilhelmshaven]] and the slaughter of the [[Fairey Battle]] squadrons sent to France, it became clear that they would have to operate mainly at night to avoid incurring very high losses.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=90}}</ref> Churchill came to power on 10 May 1940, and the War Cabinet on 12 May agreed that German actions justified "unrestricted warfare", and on 14 May they authorised an attack on the night of 14/15 May against oil and rail targets in Germany. At the urging of [[Clement Attlee]], the Cabinet on 15 May authorised a full bombing strategy against "suitable military objectives", even where there could be civilian casualties. That evening, a night time bomber campaign began against the German oil industry, communications, and forests/crops, mainly in the [[Ruhr|Ruhr area]]. The RAF lacked accurate night navigation and carried small bomb loads.{{sfn|Overy|2013|pp=241–245}} As the threat mounted, Bomber Command changed targeting priority on 3 June 1940 to attack the German aircraft industry. On 4 July, the Air Ministry gave Bomber Command orders to attack ports and shipping. By September, the build-up of invasion barges in the Channel ports had become a top priority target.<ref name="Halpenny" />

On 7 September, the government issued a warning that the invasion could be expected within the next few days and, that night, Bomber Command attacked the Channel ports and supply dumps. On 13 September, they carried out another large raid on the Channel ports, sinking 80 large barges in the port of [[Ostend]].<ref name="Taylor and Mayer p.74"/> 84 barges were sunk in [[Dunkirk]] after another raid on 17 September and by 19 September, almost 200 barges had been sunk.<ref name="Halpenny"/> The loss of these barges may have contributed to Hitler's decision to postpone Operation Sea Lion indefinitely.<ref name="Halpenny">{{harvnb|Halpenny|1984|pp=8–9}}</ref> The success of these raids was in part because the Germans had few [[Freya radar]] stations set up in France, so that air defences of the French harbours were not nearly as good as the air defences over Germany; Bomber Command had directed some 60% of its strength against the Channel ports.

The [[Bristol Blenheim]] units also raided German-occupied airfields throughout July to December 1940, both during daylight hours and at night. Although most of these raids were unproductive, there were some successes; on 1 August, five out of twelve Blenheims sent to attack [[Haamstede]] and [[Haren Airport|Evere]] ([[Brussels]]) were able to destroy or heavily damage three Bf 109s of II./JG 27 and apparently kill a ''[[Staffelkapitän]]'' identified as a ''[[Hauptmann]]'' Albrecht von Ankum-Frank.{{Refn|Albrecht von Ankum-Frank was killed on 2 August 1940 in a [[crash landing]] at [[Leeuwarden Air Base|Leeuwarden Airfield]].{{sfn|Prien|Stemmer|Rodeike|Bock|2002|p=403}}|group=nb}} Two other 109s were claimed by Blenheim gunners.<ref>{{harvnb|Ramsay|1989|p=552}}</ref>{{refn|This account is from ''Warner 2005, p. 253'' Another source, ''Ramsay 1989, p. 555'', lists no aircrew casualties and three 109s in total destroyed or damaged.|group=nb}} Another successful raid on Haamstede was made by a single Blenheim on 7 August which destroyed one 109 of 4./JG 54, heavily damaged another and caused lighter damage to four more.<ref>{{harvnb|Warner|2005|p=253}}</ref>

[[File:BoulogneBarges1940.jpg|thumb|German invasion barges waiting at [[Boulogne-sur-Mer|Boulogne]] Harbour, France during the Battle of Britain]]

There were some missions that produced an almost 100% casualty rate amongst the Blenheims; one such operation was mounted on 13 August 1940 against a Luftwaffe airfield near [[Aalborg]] in north-eastern [[Denmark]] by 12 aircraft of [[No. 82 Squadron RAF|82 Squadron]]. One Blenheim returned early (the pilot was later charged and due to appear before a court martial, but was killed on another operation); the other eleven, which reached Denmark, were shot down, five by flak and six by Bf 109s. Of the 33 crewmen who took part in the attack, 20 were killed and 13 captured.<ref>{{harvnb|Warner|2005|pp=255, 266}}</ref>

As well as the bombing operations, Blenheim-equipped units had been formed to carry out long-range strategic reconnaissance missions over Germany and German-occupied territories. In this role, the Blenheims again proved to be too slow and vulnerable against Luftwaffe fighters, and they took constant casualties.<ref>{{harvnb|Warner|2005}}</ref>{{Page needed|date= March 2015}}

Coastal Command directed its attention towards the protection of British shipping, and the destruction of enemy shipping. As invasion became more likely, it participated in the strikes on French harbours and airfields, laying mines, and mounting numerous reconnaissance missions over the enemy-held coast. In all, some 9,180 sorties were flown by bombers from July to October 1940. Although this was much less than the 80,000 sorties flown by fighters, bomber crews suffered about half the total casualties borne by their fighter colleagues. The bomber contribution was, therefore, much more dangerous on a loss-per-sortie comparison.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=92}}</ref>

Bomber, reconnaissance, and antisubmarine patrol operations continued throughout these months with little respite and none of the publicity accorded to Fighter Command. In his famous 20 August speech about "[[The Few]]", praising Fighter Command, Churchill also made a point of mentioning Bomber Command's contribution, adding that bombers were even then striking back at Germany; this part of the speech is often overlooked, even today.<ref>{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|p=237}}</ref><ref name="Speech of 20 August 1940">[http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=420 "Speech of 20 August 1940."] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081216155830/http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=420 |date=16 December 2008 }} ''Winston Churchill''. Retrieved: 16 April 2008.</ref> The [[Battle of Britain Chapel]] in [[Westminster Abbey]] lists in a roll of honour, 718 Bomber Command crew members, and 280 from Coastal Command who were killed between 10 July and 31 October.<ref>{{harvnb|Warner|2005|p=251}}</ref>

Bomber and Coastal Command attacks against invasion barge concentrations in Channel ports were widely reported by the British media during September and October 1940.<ref>{{harvnb|Campion|2015|pp=65–88}}</ref> In what became known as 'the Battle of the Barges' RAF attacks were claimed in British propaganda to have sunk large numbers of barges, and to have created widespread chaos and disruption to German invasion preparations. Given the volume of British propaganda interest in these bomber attacks during September and earlier October, it is striking how quickly this was overlooked once the Battle of Britain had been concluded. Even by mid-war, the bomber pilots' efforts had been largely eclipsed by a continuing focus on the Few, this a result of the Air Ministry's continuing valorisation of the ″fighter boys″, beginning with the March 1941 Battle of Britain propaganda pamphlet.<ref>{{harvnb|Campion|2015|pp=91–161}}</ref>

===Air-sea rescue===
{{Main|Royal Air Force Marine Branch}}
One of the biggest oversights of the entire system was the lack of adequate air-sea rescue organisation. The RAF had started organising a system in 1940 with High Speed Launches (HSLs) based on flying boat bases and at some overseas locations, but it was still believed that the amount of cross-Channel traffic meant that there was no need for a rescue service to cover these areas. Downed pilots and aircrew, it was hoped, would be picked up by any boats or ships which happened to be passing by. Otherwise, the local life boat would be alerted, assuming someone had seen the pilot going into the water.<ref>[http://www.raf.mod.uk/history_old/sar601.html "RAF History: Air/Sea Search and Rescue – 60th Anniversary."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081024163019/http://www.raf.mod.uk/history_old/sar601.html |date=24 October 2008 }} UK: ''RAF''. Retrieved: 24 May 2008.</ref>

RAF aircrew were issued with a life jacket, nicknamed the "[[Personal flotation device|Mae West]]," but in 1940 it still required manual inflation, which was almost impossible for someone who was injured or in shock. The waters of the [[English Channel]] and [[Dover Straits]] are cold, even in the middle of summer, and clothing issued to RAF aircrew did little to insulate them against these freezing conditions.{{r|Bungay 2000, p. 68}} The RAF also imitated the German practice of issuing [[fluorescein]].<ref name="Richards p. 159">{{harvnb|Richards|1953|p=159}}</ref> A conference in 1939 had placed air-sea rescue under Coastal Command. Because pilots had been lost at sea during the "Channel Battle", on 22 August, control of RAF rescue launches was passed to the local naval authorities and 12 [[Westland Lysander|Lysanders]] were given to Fighter Command to help look for pilots at sea. In all, some 200 pilots and aircrew were lost at sea during the battle. No proper air-sea rescue service was formed until 1941.<ref name="Bungay 2000, p. 68"/>