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==Aftermath== {{Main|Consequences of the attack on Pearl Harbor|Day of Infamy speech}} [[File:Remember december 7th.jpg|thumb|A 1942 poster by [[Allen Saalburg]] issued by the [[United States Office of War Information]]]] The day after the attack, U.S. President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] delivered his famous [[Day of Infamy speech]] to a [[Joint Session of Congress]], calling for a [[United States declaration of war on Japan|formal declaration of war on the Empire of Japan]]. Congress obliged his request less than an hour later. On December 11, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States, even though the Tripartite Pact did not require it.{{refn|The pact had one of its objectives limiting US intervention in conflicts involving the three nations.<ref>{{Harvnb|Liddell Hart|1971|p=[https://archive.org/details/historyofsecondw00lidd/page/n225/206 206]}}</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Shirer|1960|p=[https://archive.org/details/risefallthirdreich00shir/page/873/ 873]}}</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Keegan|1990|p=[https://archive.org/details/secondworldwar00john/page/130/ 130]}}</ref>|group=nb}} Congress issued a declaration of war against Germany and Italy later that same day. The United Kingdom had already been at war with Germany since September 1939 and with Italy since June 1940, and British Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] had promised to declare war "within the hour" of a Japanese attack on the United States.<ref>{{cite magazine |mode=cs2 |url=http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,772812,00.html |magazine=Time |title=The U.S. At War, The Last Stage |date=December 15, 1941 |access-date=August 12, 2014 |archive-date=August 10, 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140810134435/http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,772812,00.html |url-status=live}}</ref> Upon learning of the Japanese attacks on [[British Malaya|Malaya]], [[Colony of Singapore|Singapore]], and [[British Hong Kong|Hong Kong]], Churchill promptly determined there was no need to either wait or further consult the US government and immediately summoned the Japanese ambassador. As a result, [[United Kingdom declaration of war on Japan|the United Kingdom declared war on Japan]] nine hours before the United States did. The attack was an initial shock to all the Allies in the Pacific Theater. Further losses compounded the alarming setback. Japan [[Philippines campaign (1941–1942)|attacked the Philippines]] hours later (because of the time difference, it was December 8 in the Philippines). Only three days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, [[sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse|the battleship ''Prince of Wales'' and battlecruiser ''Repulse'' were sunk]] off the coast of Malaya, causing Churchill later to recollect "In all the war I never received a more direct shock. As I turned and twisted in bed the full horror of the news sank in upon me. There were no British or American capital ships in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific except the American survivors of Pearl Harbor who were hastening back to California. Over this vast expanse of waters, Japan was supreme and we everywhere were weak and naked."<ref>{{Harvnb|Churchill|Gilbert|2001|pp=1593–1594}}</ref> Throughout the war, Pearl Harbor was frequently used in [[American propaganda during World War II|American propaganda]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Rhodes|1987|p=257}}</ref> One further consequence of the attack on Pearl Harbor and its aftermath (notably the [[Niihau incident]]) was that Japanese-American residents and citizens were relocated to nearby [[Japanese-American internment]] camps. Within hours of the attack, hundreds of Japanese-American leaders were rounded up and taken to high-security camps such as [[Sand Island (Hawaii)|Sand Island]] at the mouth of Honolulu harbor and [[Kilauea Military Camp]] on the [[Hawaii (island)|island of Hawaii]].{{sfn|Levine|1995}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}<ref>{{cite web |mode=cs2 |title=The Untold Story |publisher=Japanese Cultural Center of Hawaiʻi |website=The Untold Story: Internment of Japanese Americans in Hawaiʻi |url=https://www.hawaiiinternment.org/untold-story/untold-story |access-date=December 10, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210813150853/https://www.hawaiiinternment.org/untold-story/untold-story |archive-date=August 13, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> Eventually, more than 110,000 Japanese Americans, nearly all who lived on the West Coast, were forced into interior camps, but in [[Territory of Hawaii|Hawaii]], where the 150,000-plus Japanese Americans composed over one-third of the population, only 1,200 to 1,800 were interned.{{sfn|Daniels|1972}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.pearlharboroahu.com/after.htm |title=What Happened After the Attack? |access-date=2011-11-13 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111201005141/http://www.pearlharboroahu.com/after.htm |archive-date=December 1, 2011 |website=The Official Pearl Harbor Tour Site}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://newmexicohistory.org/2014/01/17/japanese-american-internment-camps-in-new-mexico-1942-1946/ |title=Japanese-American Internment Camps in New Mexico 1942-1946 |website=New Mexico History.org |access-date=December 7, 2021 |archive-date=October 17, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211017223234/https://newmexicohistory.org/2014/01/17/japanese-american-internment-camps-in-new-mexico-1942-1946/ |url-status=live}}</ref> The attack also had international consequences. The Canadian province of [[British Columbia]], bordering the Pacific Ocean, had long had a large population of Japanese immigrants and their [[Japanese Canadians|Japanese-Canadian]] descendants. Pre-war tensions were exacerbated by the Pearl Harbor attack, leading to a reaction from the [[government of Canada]]. On February 24, 1942, Order-in-Council P.C. no. 1486 was passed under the [[War Measures Act]], allowing for the forced removal of any and all Canadians of Japanese descent from British Columbia, as well as prohibiting them from returning to the province. On March 4, regulations under the act were adopted to evacuate Japanese Canadians.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/canada-gazette/093/001060-119.01-e.php?image_id_nbr=335121&document_id_nbr=8985&f=g&PHPSESSID=t6i5g5h5dhq1c9qvlkttga2l80 |title=Regulations made 4 March 1942 |access-date=November 23, 2016 |archive-date=November 24, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161124025400/http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/canada-gazette/093/001060-119.01-e.php?image_id_nbr=335121&document_id_nbr=8985&f=g&PHPSESSID=t6i5g5h5dhq1c9qvlkttga2l80 |url-status=live}}</ref> As a result, 12,000 were [[interned]] in interior camps, 2,000 were sent to road camps, and another 2,000 were forced to work in the [[Canadian Prairies|prairies]] on sugar beet farms.<ref>{{Cite conference |mode=cs2 |ref={{harvid|War Measures Act Conference|1978}} |date=1978 |title=The Japanese Canadian Experience: The October Crisis |conference=War Measures Act Conference (1977, McMaster University) |publisher=P. Anas Pub. |location=London, Ontario |pages=12–14}}</ref> In the wake of the attack, fifteen [[Medal of Honor|Medals of Honor]], fifty-one [[Navy Cross]]es, fifty-three [[Silver Star]]s, four [[Navy and Marine Corps Medal]]s, one [[Distinguished Flying Cross (United States)|Distinguished Flying Cross]], four [[Distinguished Service Cross (United States)|Distinguished Service Crosses]], one [[Navy Distinguished Service Medal|Distinguished Service Medal]], and three [[Bronze Star Medal]]s were awarded to the American servicemen who distinguished themselves in combat at Pearl Harbor.<ref>{{Harvnb|Smith|1999}}{{page needed|date=September 2010}}.</ref> Additionally, a special [[Awards and decorations of the United States military|military award]], the [[Pearl Harbor Commemorative Medal]], was later authorized for all military veterans of the attack. ===Niihau Incident=== {{Main|Niihau incident}} [[File:Nishikaichi's Zero BII-120.jpg|thumb|Petty Officer Shigenori Nishikaichi's aircraft ten days after it crashed]] Japanese planners of the Pearl Harbor attack had determined that some means were required for rescuing fliers whose aircraft were damaged too badly to return to the carriers. The island of [[Niihau]], only thirty minutes by air from Pearl Harbor, was designated as the rescue point.{{citation needed|date=May 2019}} During the second wave, a Zero fighter flown by Petty Officer Shigenori Nishikaichi of ''Hiryu'' was damaged in the attack on Wheeler, so he flew to the rescue point. The aircraft was further damaged on his crash landing. Nishikaichi was helped from the wreckage by one of the Native Hawaiians, who, aware of the tension between the United States and Japan, took the pilot's pistol, maps, codes and other documents. The island's residents had no telephones or radios and were completely unaware of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nishikaichi enlisted the support of three Japanese-American residents in an attempt to recover the documents. During the ensuing struggles, Nishikaichi was killed, and a Hawaiian civilian was wounded; one collaborator committed suicide, and his wife and the third collaborator were sent to prison.{{citation needed|date=May 2019}} The ease with which the local ethnic Japanese residents had apparently gone to Nishikaichi's assistance was a source of concern for many and tended to support those who believed that local Japanese could not be trusted.<ref>{{Harvnb|Fuchida|2011|pp=293–294}}</ref> ===Strategic implications=== Rear Admiral [[Chūichi Hara]] summed up the Japanese result by saying, "We won a great tactical victory at Pearl Harbor and thereby lost the war."<ref>{{Harvnb|Haufler|2003|p=127}}</ref> While the attack accomplished its intended objective, it turned out to be largely unnecessary. Unbeknownst to Yamamoto, who conceived the original plan, the United States Navy had decided as far back as 1935 to abandon "charging" across the Pacific towards the Philippines in response to an outbreak of war (in keeping with the evolution of [[War Plan Orange|Plan Orange]]).{{sfn|Evans|Peattie|1997}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}} The United States instead adopted "[[Plan Dog]]" in 1940, which emphasized keeping the IJN out of the eastern Pacific and away from the shipping lanes to Australia, while the United States concentrated on defeating Nazi Germany.<ref>{{harvnb|Hakim|1995}}</ref>{{Better source needed|reason=Source is a textbook written for middle-school kids or younger, which does not meet the requirements of reliable tertiary sources for this type of article.|date=December 2021}} Fortunately for the United States, the American aircraft carriers were untouched; otherwise the Pacific Fleet's ability to conduct offensive operations would have been crippled for a year or more (given no diversions from the Atlantic Fleet). As it was, the Navy was left with no choice but to rely on carriers and submarines. While six of the eight battleships were repaired and returned to service, their relatively low speed and high fuel consumption limited their deployment, and they served mainly in shore bombardment roles (their only major action being the [[Battle of Surigao Strait]] in October 1944). A major flaw in Japanese strategic thinking was a belief that the ultimate Pacific battle would be fought by battleships, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain [[Alfred Thayer Mahan]]. As a result, Yamamoto (and his successors) hoarded battleships for a "decisive battle" that never happened.{{sfn|Willmott|1983}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}{{sfn|Miller|2007}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}} The Japanese confidence in their ability to win a quick victory meant that they neglected Pearl Harbor's navy repair yards, oil tank farms, submarine base and old headquarters building.{{sfn|Willmott|1983}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}} All of these targets were omitted from Genda's list, yet they proved more important than any battleship to the American war effort in the Pacific. The survival of the repair shops and fuel depots allowed Pearl Harbor to maintain logistical support of the Navy,<ref>{{cite web |url=http://combinedfleet.com/battles/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor |title=Attack on Pearl Harbor | Nihon Kaigun |publisher=Combinedfleet.com |access-date=March 6, 2014 |archive-date=March 19, 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140319100939/http://combinedfleet.com/battles/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.kalonanews.com/articles/2013/04/17/community/doc516eb7c9cbba1744569185.txt |title=Pearl Harbor vet remembers Dec. 7, 1941, sneak attack |work=The [[Kalona, Iowa|Kalona]] News |date=April 17, 2013 |access-date=March 6, 2014 |archive-date=August 1, 2013 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130801200017/http://www.kalonanews.com/articles/2013/04/17/community/doc516eb7c9cbba1744569185.txt }}</ref> such as the [[Doolittle Raid]] and the [[Battle of the Coral Sea|Battles of the Coral Sea]] and [[Battle of Midway|Midway]]. It was submarines that immobilized the Imperial Japanese Navy's heavy ships and brought Japan's economy to a virtual standstill by crippling the importation of oil and raw materials: by the end of 1942, the amount of raw materials brought in was cut in half, "to a disastrous ten million tons", while oil "was almost completely stopped".{{refn|In less than eleven months, most of Many of Japan's elite naval aviators who had been at Pearl Harbor were lost in subsequent battles. Lack of fuel and an inflexible training policy meant that they could not be readily replaced.{{sfn|Evans|Peattie|1997}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}|group=nb}} Lastly, the basement of the Old Administration Building was the home of the [[Station HYPO|cryptanalytic unit]] which contributed significantly to the Midway ambush and the Submarine Force's success.<ref>{{harvnb|Blair|1975|pp=360, 816}}</ref> ===Debate on the failure of American intelligence=== {{Main|Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory}} [[File:Arizona Memorial Wall.jpg|thumb|The [[USS Arizona Memorial|USS ''Arizona'' Memorial]]]] There has been debate as to how and why the United States had been caught unaware, and how much and when American officials knew of Japanese plans and related topics. As early as 1924, Chief of United States Air Service [[Mason Patrick]] showed concern for military vulnerabilities in the Pacific, having sent General [[Billy Mitchell]] on a survey of the Pacific and the East. Patrick called Mitchell's subsequent report, which identified vulnerabilities in Hawaii, a "theoretical treatise on employment of airpower in the Pacific, which, in all probability undoubtedly will be of extreme value some 10 or 15 years hence".{{sfn|Wolk|2007}} At least two naval war games, one in 1932 and another in 1936, proved that Pearl was vulnerable to such an attack. Admiral [[James O. Richardson|James Richardson]] was removed from command shortly after protesting President Roosevelt's decision to move the bulk of the Pacific fleet to Pearl Harbor.{{sfn|Wallin|1968|p=41-42}}<ref>{{cite web |mode=cs2 |date=December 15, 2020 |title=Commander at Pearl Harbor relieved of his duties |url=https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/commander-at-pearl-harbor-canned |access-date=December 8, 2021 |website=History.com |archive-date=April 25, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210425072542/https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/commander-at-pearl-harbor-canned |url-status=live}}</ref>{{Unreliable source?|date=November 2024|certain=y|reason=The History Channel is generally unreliable}} The decisions of military and political leadership to ignore these warnings have contributed to conspiracy theories. Several writers, including decorated World War{{spaces}}II veteran and journalist [[Robert Stinnett]], author of ''[[Day of Deceit]]'', and former United States Rear Admiral [[Robert Alfred Theobald]], author of ''The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor: The Washington Background of the Pearl Harbor Attack'', have argued that various parties high in the American and British governments knew of the attack in advance and may even have let it happen or encouraged it in order to force the United States into the war via the so-called "back door". However, this [[Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory|conspiracy theory]] is rejected by mainstream historians.{{sfn|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1986}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}{{sfn|Prados|1995|pp=[https://archive.org/details/combinedfleetdec00prad/page/161 161–177]}}{{sfn|Budiansky|2002}}{{page needed|date=December 2021}}<ref>{{cite news |mode=cs2 |last=Stevenson |first=Richard W. |date=August 3, 1994 |title=New Light Shed on Churchill and Pearl Harbor |newspaper=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/03/world/new-light-shed-on-churchill-and-pearl-harbor.html |access-date=March 4, 2014 |archive-date=July 15, 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140715175819/http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/03/world/new-light-shed-on-churchill-and-pearl-harbor.html |url-status=live}}</ref>{{refn|[[Gordon Prange]] specifically addresses some revisionist works, including [[Charles A. Beard]], ''President Roosevelt and the Coming War 1941''; [[William Henry Chamberlin]], ''America's Second Crusade''; [[John T. Flynn]], ''The Roosevelt Myth''; George Morgenstern, ''Pearl Harbor''; Frederic R. Sanborn, ''Design for War''; [[Robert Alfred Theobald]], ''The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor''; Harry E. Barnes, ed., ''Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace'' and ''The Court Historians versus Revisionism''; [[Husband E. Kimmel]], ''Admiral Kimmel's Story''.{{sfn|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1991|p=867}}|group=nb}} The theory that the Americans were warned in advance, however, is supported by statements made by [[Dick Ellis]], a British-Australian intelligence officer for MI6 who helped [[William J. Donovan]] set up the [[Office of Strategic Services]]. Ellis was deputy to [[William Stephenson]] at [[British Security Co-ordination]]. In [[Jesse Fink]]'s 2023 biography of Ellis, ''The Eagle in the Mirror'', Ellis is quoted as saying: "[Stephenson] was convinced from the information that was reaching him that this attack was imminent, and through [[James Roosevelt|Jimmy Roosevelt]], President Roosevelt's son, he passed this information to the President. Now whether the President at that time had other information which corroborated this... it's impossible to say."<ref>{{cite book |last1=Fink |first1=Jesse |title=The Eagle in the Mirror |date=2023 |publisher=Black & White Publishing |location=Edinburgh |isbn=9781785305108 |page=101}}</ref>
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