Editing Yom Kippur War (section)

===Israeli strategic response===
Around midnight, Hofi, at Safed, began to understand the magnitude of the Syrian breakthrough. He warned chief-of-staff Elazar that the entire Golan might be lost. Overhearing this message, an alarmed Dayan decided to personally visit the Northern Command headquarters.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=187}} In the late night, Hofi informed Dayan that an estimated three hundred Syrian tanks had entered the southern Golan. No reserves were available to stop a Syrian incursion into Galilee. Visibly shaken by this news, the Israeli minister of defence ordered the Jordan bridges to be prepared for detonation.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=194}}

Next, he contacted [[Benjamin Peled]], commander of the Israeli Air Force. He shocked Peled by announcing that the [[Third Temple]] was about to fall. The IAF had just made a successful start with Operation Tagar, a very complex plan to neutralise the Egyptian AA-missile belt. Overruling objections by Peled, Dayan ordered to immediately carry out [[Operation Doogman 5]] instead, the destruction of the Syrian SAM-belt, to allow the IAF to halt the Syrian advance.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=195}}

As there was no time to obtain recent information on the location of the batteries,{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=198}} the attempt was a costly failure. The Israelis destroyed only one Syrian missile battery but lost six Phantom II aircraft.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=199}} As a result, the IAF was unable to make a significant contribution to the defensive battle on the Golan. Over both fronts together, on 7 October only 129 bombardment sorties were flown.{{sfnp|Bar-Joseph|2012|p=220}} It also proved impossible to restart Tagar, curtailing IAF operations on the Sinai front for the duration of the war.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=200}}

Less pessimistic than Dayan, Elazar was not ready yet to abandon the Golan Heights.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=157}} Israeli High Command had a strategic reserve, consisting of the 146th Ugda that was earmarked for Central Command, controlling the eastern border with Jordan. In the evening of 6 October, Elazar had considered sending this division to the collapsing Sinai front in view of the initial defensive success at the Golan. The unexpected crisis led to an about-face. Priority was given to the north because of its proximity to Israeli population centers at [[Tiberias]], Safed, [[Haifa]] and [[Netanya]]. Elazar ordered that, after mobilisation, the 146th Ugda was to reconquer the southern Golan.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=189}}

This division would take some time to deploy. Some smaller units could be quickly mobilised to bolster the defenses. The Syrians had expected it to take at least twenty-four hours for Israeli reserves to reach the front lines; in fact, they began to join the fight only nine hours after the war began, twelve hours after the start of the mobilisation.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=185}} The Golan position had been at only 80% of its planned strength for the defensive phase of a full war with Syria.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=106}} Northern Command had a headquarters reserve consisting of a unnumbered rapid deployment Centurion tank battalion. Also, the 71st Mechanised Infantry Battalion, with two organic tank companies, of the 188th AB had not yet been activated. During the night of 6/7 October these two battalions were gradually brought up.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|pp=134–135}}

Around 01:00 on 7 October, the [[36th Division (Israel)|36th Division]] was activated as a divisional headquarters under Brigadier [[Rafael Eitan]], to take direct command of the northern front.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=188}} The 7th Armored Brigade did not have this division as its original destination. It was an elite active General Headquarters reserve, moved from the Sinai to the Golan in reaction to the Syrian build-up. Under the original mobilisation Plan ''Gir'' ("Chalk"), the 36th Division was to be expanded by the 179th Armored Brigade. In the evening of 6 October, it was considered to send this brigade to the Sinai instead but this option was abandoned after the Syrian breakthrough. To speed up the relocation of 7th Armored Brigade to the north, this brigade had left its tanks at Tasa, the main mobilisation complex of the Sinai, and used the stocked vehicles of the 179th Armored Brigade to rebuild itself at Nafah.{{sfnp|Bar-Joseph|2012|p=227}}

In turn, the 179th Armored Brigade began to mobilise in eastern Galilee, from the mobilisation complex at the foot of the Golan Heights, using the stocked vehicles of the 164th Armoured Brigade. This latter brigade was earmarked for the 240th Division, a division to be held in reserve. Assuming that a sustained Syrian offensive would have led to crippling Arab tank losses, 36th and 240th divisions were in the prewar planning intended to execute an advance in the direction of Damascus, Operation Ze'ev Aravot ("Desert Wolf"). All remaining stocked Centurions in the north were eventually used to rebuild 7th and 188th brigades on the night of 9/10 October. The 164th Armored Brigade was ultimately sent to the Sinai, to activate itself using the old 7th Armored Brigade matériel.{{sfnp|Bar-Joseph|2012|p=227}}

The 679th Armored Brigade was intended to join the 240th Division and ordered to mobilise at noon 6 October.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=170}} Reservists of both brigades arriving at the Galilee army depots were quickly assigned to tanks and sent to the front, without waiting for the crews they trained with to arrive,{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=190}} machine guns to be installed, or the tank guns to be calibrated, a time-consuming process known as [[Boresight (firearm)|bore-sighting]].{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=209}} Elements of such larger units were during 7 October fed into the battle piece-meal.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=171}}