Editing V-1 flying bomb (section)

==Assessment==
Unlike the V-2, the V-1 was a cost-effective weapon for the Germans as it forced the Allies to spend heavily on defensive measures and divert bombers from other targets. More than 25% of [[Combined Bomber Offensive]]'s bombs in July and August 1944 were used against V-weapon sites, often ineffectively.{{sfn|Levine|1992|pp=137, 139}} In early December 1944, American General [[Clayton Bissell]] wrote a paper that strongly demonstrated the cost-effectiveness for the Germans of the V-1 when compared with conventional bombers.{{sfn|Irons|2003|p=199}} The following is a table he produced:
[[File:DoodleBug1.JPG|thumb|A V-1 and launching ramp section on display at the [[Imperial War Museum Duxford]] (2009)]]

{|class="wikitable"
|+ [[The Blitz|Blitz]] (12 months) vs V-1 flying bombs (2¾ months){{sfn|Irons|2003|p=199}}
|-
|
!Blitz
!V-1
|-
|colspan=3|'''1. Cost to Germany'''
|-
|Sorties||90,000||8,025
|-
|Weight of bombs tons||61,149||14,600
|-
|Fuel consumed tons||71,700||4,681
|-
|Aircraft lost||3,075||0
|-
|Personnel lost||7,690||0
|-
|colspan=3|'''2. Results'''
|-
|Structures damaged/destroyed
|1,150,000
|1,127,000
|-
|Casualties||92,566||22,892
|-
|Rate casualties/bombs tons||1.6||1.6
|-
|colspan=3|'''3. Allied air effort'''
|-
|Sorties
|86,800
|44,770
|-
|Aircraft lost
|1,260
|351
|-
|Personnel lost||2,233||805
|}

The statistics of this report, however, have been the subject of some dispute. The V-1 missiles launched from bombers were often prone to exploding prematurely, occasionally resulting in the loss of the aircraft to which they were attached. The Luftwaffe lost 77 aircraft in 1,200 of these sorties.{{sfn|Hutchinson|2003|p={{page needed|date=July 2020}}}}

[[Wright Field]] technical personnel [[reverse-engineered]] the V-1 from the remains of one that had failed to detonate in Britain and the [[Republic-Ford JB-2]] was being delivered by early 1945. After the end of the war in Europe it was in consideration for use against Japan. General [[Hap Arnold]] of the United States Army Air Forces was concerned that this weapon would make his long-range bombers less important, since they were much cheaper and could be built of steel and wood, in 2,000 man-hours and approximate cost of US$600 (in 1943).{{sfn|Mindling|Bolton|2009|pp=6–31}}