Editing Utilitarianism (section)

===Negative utilitarianism===
{{Main|Negative utilitarianism}}
In ''[[The Open Society and Its Enemies|The Open Society and its Enemies]]'' (1945), [[Karl Popper]] argues that the principle "maximize pleasure" should be replaced by "minimize pain". He believes that "it is not only impossible but very dangerous to attempt to maximize the pleasure or the happiness of the people, since such an attempt must lead to totalitarianism."<ref>{{cite book |last=Popper|first=Karl|title=The Open Society and Its Enemies: Volume 2|year=2002|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-0-415-27842-3|page=339}}</ref> He claims that:<ref>{{cite book |last=Popper|first=Karl|title=The Open Society and Its Enemies: Volume 1: The Spell of Plato|year=2002|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-0-415-23731-4|pages=284–85}}</ref>

{{blockquote|[T]here is, from the ethical point of view, no symmetry between suffering and happiness, or between pain and pleasure... In my opinion human suffering makes a direct moral appeal, namely, the appeal for help, while there is no similar call to increase the happiness of a man who is doing well anyway. A further criticism of the Utilitarian formula "Maximize pleasure" is that it assumes a continuous pleasure-pain scale that lets us treat degrees of pain as negative degrees of pleasure. But, from the moral point of view, pain cannot be outweighed by pleasure, and especially not one man's pain by another man's pleasure. Instead of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, one should demand, more modestly, the least amount of avoidable suffering for all...|author=|title=|source=}}

The actual term ''negative utilitarianism'' itself was introduced by [[Ninian Smart|R. N. Smart]] as the title to his 1958 reply to Popper in which he argues that the principle would entail seeking the quickest and least painful method of killing the entirety of humanity.<ref name="Smart1958">{{cite journal|last=Smart|first=R.N.|date=October 1958|title=Negative Utilitarianism|journal=Mind|volume=67|issue=268|pages=542–43|doi=10.1093/mind/lxvii.268.542|jstor=2251207}}</ref>

In response to Smart's argument, Simon Knutsson (2019) has argued that classical utilitarianism and similar [[Consequentialism|consequentialist]] views are roughly equally likely to entail killing the entirety of humanity, as they would seem to imply that one should kill existing beings and replace them with happier beings if possible. Consequently, Knutsson argues:

{{blockquote|The world destruction argument is not a reason to reject negative utilitarianism in favour of these other forms of consequentialism, because there are similar arguments against such theories that are at least as persuasive as the world destruction argument is against negative utilitarianism.<ref name="Knutsson 1–20">{{Cite journal|last=Knutsson|first=Simon|date=2019-08-29|title=The world destruction argument|journal=Inquiry|volume=64|issue=10|pages=1004–1023|doi=10.1080/0020174X.2019.1658631|issn=0020-174X|doi-access=free}}</ref>}}

Furthermore, Knutsson notes that one could argue that other forms of consequentialism, such as classical utilitarianism, in some cases have less plausible implications than negative utilitarianism, such as in scenarios where classical utilitarianism implies it would be right to kill everyone and replace them in a manner that creates more suffering, but also more well-being such that the sum, on the classical [[Felicific calculus|utilitarian calculus]], is net positive. Negative utilitarianism, in contrast, would not allow such killing.<ref name="Knutsson 1–20"/>

Some versions of negative utilitarianism include:

* Negative total utilitarianism: tolerates suffering that can be compensated within the same person.<ref name=":1">Fabian, Fricke. 2002. "Verschiedene Versionen des negativen Utilitarismus." ''[[Kriterion]]'' 15(1): p. 14.</ref><ref>Gustav, Arrhenius. 2000. "Future Generations, A Challenge for Moral Theory" (FD-Diss.). Uppsala: [[Uppsala University]], Department of Philosophy. p. 100.</ref>
* Negative preference utilitarianism: avoids the problem of moral killing with reference to existing preferences that such killing would violate, while it still demands a justification for the creation of new lives.<ref>Fricke Fabian (2002), Verschiedene Versionen des negativen Utilitarismus, Kriterion, vol.15, no.1, pp. 20–22</ref> A possible justification is the reduction of the average level of preference-frustration.<ref>{[[Roger Chao|Chao]], "[http://www.philosophyoflife.org/jpl201204.pdf Negative Average Preference Utilitarianism"], ''Journal of Philosophy of Life'', 2012; 2(1): 55–66</ref>
* Pessimistic representatives of negative utilitarianism, which can be found in the environment of [[Buddhism]].<ref>Bruno Contestabile: ''Negative Utilitarianism and Buddhist Intuition''. In: ''Contemporary Buddhism'' Vol.15, Issue 2, S. 298–311, London 2014.</ref>
Some see negative utilitarianism as a branch within modern [[hedonistic utilitarianism]], which assigns a higher weight to the avoidance of suffering than to the promotion of happiness.<ref name=":1" /> The moral weight of suffering can be increased by using a "compassionate" utilitarian metric, so that the result is the same as in [[prioritarianism]].<ref>Broome John (1991), Weighing Goods, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 222</ref>