Editing Tragedy of the commons (section)

==Solutions==
{{see also|Externality#Possible solutions}}
Articulating solutions to the tragedy of the commons is one of the main problems of [[political philosophy]].<ref>{{Citation|title=One Man One Tree|date=2020-05-15|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv12pnnrp.37|work=Tragedy of the Commons (Poetry)|pages=54|publisher=Langaa RPCIG|doi=10.2307/j.ctv12pnnrp.37|isbn=978-9956-551-52-1|s2cid=243293265|access-date=2021-05-24}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Anukwonke |first1=Charles |title=The Concept of Tragedy of the Commons: Issues and Applications |date=2015 |doi=10.13140/RG.2.1.4977.9362 |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277708953 }}</ref> In some situations, locals implement (often complex) social schemes that work well.<ref name="OECD SE 2017">{{Cite book |title=OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 2017 {{!}} Figure 2.9. Many women work part time, often involuntarily |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933446195|access-date=2021-05-25|doi=10.1787/888933446195}}</ref> When these fail, there are many possible governmental solutions such as privatization, internalizing the externalities, and regulation.<ref name="OECD SE 2017" />

===Non-governmental solution===
[[Robert Axelrod (political scientist)|Robert Axelrod]] contends that even self-interested individuals will often find ways to cooperate, because collective restraint serves both the collective and individual interests.<ref>{{cite book |last=Axelrod |first=Robert |year=1984 |title=The Evolution of Cooperation |location=New York |publisher=Basic Books |isbn=978-0-465-02121-5|url=https://archive.org/details/evolutionofcoop00axel |url-access=registration }}</ref> Anthropologist G. N. Appell criticised those who cited Hardin to "impos[e] their own economic and environmental rationality on other social systems of which they have incomplete understanding and knowledge."<ref>{{Cite report |last=Appell |first=George N. |date=1993 |title=Hardin's Myth of the Commons: The Tragedy of Conceptual Confusions. With Appendix: Diagrams of Forms of Co-ownership |location=Phillips, ME |publisher=Social Transformation and Adaptation Research Institute|type=Working Paper|hdl=10535/4532|hdl-access=free|url=http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/4532/HARDIN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y}}</ref>

Political scientist [[Elinor Ostrom]], who was awarded 2009's [[Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences]] for her work on the issue, and others revisited Hardin's work in 1999.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ostrom |first1=Elinor |last2=Burger |first2=Joanna |last3=Field |first3=Christopher B. |last4=Norgaard |first4=Richard B. |last5=Policansky |first5=David |year=1999 |title=Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges |url=http://dusk2.geo.orst.edu/prosem/Ostrom_etal1999.pdf |journal=Science |volume=284 |issue=5412 |pages=278–282 |doi=10.1126/science.284.5412.278 |pmid=10195886 |bibcode=1999Sci...284..278. |citeseerx=10.1.1.510.4369 |s2cid=19472705 |access-date=2018-07-23 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170809075854/http://dusk2.geo.orst.edu/prosem/Ostrom_etal1999.pdf |archive-date=2017-08-09 |url-status=dead }}</ref> They found the tragedy of the commons not as prevalent or as difficult to solve as Hardin maintained, since locals have often come up with solutions to the commons problem themselves.<ref name="urlOstrom revisits the commons in Science">{{cite web |url=http://www.iuinfo.indiana.edu/HomePages/041699/text/ostrom.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120305182446/http://www.iuinfo.indiana.edu/HomePages/041699/text/ostrom.htm |archive-date=2012-03-05 |title=Ostrom 'revisits the commons' in 'Science' }}</ref> For example, another group found that a commons in the Swiss Alps has been run by a collective of farmers there to their mutual and individual benefit since 1517, in spite of the farmers also having access to their own farmland.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Mathevet|first1=Raphaël|last2=Vuillot|first2=Carole|last3=Sirami|first3=Clélia|date=2013-09-17|title=Effective Nature Conservation on Farmland: Can We Change Our Own Models, Not Just the Farmers?|journal=Conservation Letters|volume=7|issue=6|pages=575–576|doi=10.1111/conl.12064|s2cid=83309993 |issn=1755-263X|doi-access=free}}</ref> In general, it is in the interest of the users of a commons to keep them functioning and so complex social schemes are often invented by the users for maintaining them at optimum efficiency.<ref name=beyond /><ref name="forbes">{{Cite web |url=https://www.forbes.com/2009/10/12/elinor-ostrom-commons-nobel-economics-opinions-contributors-vernon-l-smith.html|title=Governing The Commons |last=Smith |first=Vernon L. |website=Forbes |language=en |access-date=2020-02-25|date=October 12, 2009}}</ref> Another prominent example of this is the deliberative process of granting legal personhood to a part of nature, for example rivers, with the aim of preserving their water resources and prevent environmental degradation. This process entails that a river is regarded as its own legal entity that can sue against environmental damage done to it while being represented by an independently appointed guardian advisory group.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Charpleix |first=Liz |date=March 2018 |title=The Whanganui River as Te Awa Tupua: Place-based law in a legally pluralistic society |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/geoj.12238 |journal=The Geographical Journal |language=en |volume=184 |issue=1 |pages=19–30 |doi=10.1111/geoj.12238|bibcode=2018GeogJ.184...19C }}</ref> This has happened as a bottom-up process in New Zealand: Here debates initiated by the Whanganui Iwi tribe have resulted in legal personhood for the river. The river is considered as a living whole, stretching from mountain to sea and even includes not only the physical but also its metaphysical elements.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=O'Donnell |first1=Erin L. |last2=Talbot-Jones |first2=Julia |date=2018 |title=Creating legal rights for rivers: lessons from Australia, New Zealand, and India |url=https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol23/iss1/art7/ |journal=Ecology and Society |language=en |volume=23 |issue=1 |pages=art7 |doi=10.5751/ES-09854-230107 |issn=1708-3087|doi-access=free |hdl=1885/265550 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>

Similarly, geographer Douglas L. Johnson remarks that many [[nomadic pastoralism|nomadic pastoralist]] societies of Africa and the Middle East in fact "balanced local stocking ratios against seasonal rangeland conditions in ways that were ecologically sound", reflecting a desire for lower risk rather than higher profit; in spite of this,<ref>{{Citation|title=Index|date=2006-01-01|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789047417750_040|journal=Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa|pages=1035–1060|publisher=Brill|doi=10.1163/9789047417750_040|isbn=978-90-474-1775-0|access-date=2021-05-24|last1=Chatty|first1=Dawn}}</ref> it was often the case that "the nomad was blamed for problems that were not of his own making and were a product of alien forces."<ref name="johnson1993">{{cite journal |last=Johnson |first=Douglas L. |date=1993 |title=Nomadism and Desertification in Africa and the Middle East |journal=GeoJournal |volume=31 |issue=1 |pages=51–66 |doi=10.1007/bf00815903|bibcode=1993GeoJo..31...51J |s2cid=153445920 }}</ref> Independently finding precedent in the opinions of previous scholars such as [[Ibn Khaldun]] as well as common currency in antagonistic cultural attitudes towards non-sedentary peoples,<ref name="johnson1993" /> governments and international organizations have made use of Hardin's work to help justify restrictions on land access and the eventual [[sedentarization]] of pastoral nomads despite its weak empirical basis.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=October 2009|title=Sedentarization of Tibetan Nomads|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1523-1739.2009.01312.x|journal=Conservation Biology|volume=23|issue=5|pages=1074|doi=10.1111/j.1523-1739.2009.01312.x|pmid=19765031|issn=0888-8892|last1=Lu|first1=T.|last2=Wu|first2=N.|last3=Luo|first3=P.|bibcode=2009ConBi..23.1074L |s2cid=19173099 }}</ref> Examining relations between historically nomadic [[Bedouin]] Arabs and the [[Syria]]n state in the 20th century, [[Dawn Chatty]] notes that "Hardin's argument was curiously accepted as the fundamental explanation for the degradation of the [[steppe]] land"<ref>{{Cite book|date=2006-01-01|editor-last=Chatty|editor-first=Dawn|title=Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789047417750|doi=10.1163/9789047417750|isbn=978-90-474-1775-0}}</ref> in development schemes for the arid interior of the country, downplaying the larger role of agricultural [[overexploitation]] in [[desertification]] as it melded with prevailing nationalist ideology which viewed nomads as socially backward and economically harmful.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Chatty |first=Dawn |s2cid=143487962 |date=2010 |title=The Bedouin in Contemporary Syria: The Persistence of Tribal Authority and Control |journal=Middle East Journal |volume=64 |issue=1 |pages=29–69 |url=https://www.academia.edu/4240985 |doi=10.3751/64.1.12}}</ref>

[[Elinor Ostrom]] and her colleagues looked at how real-world communities manage communal resources, such as fisheries, land irrigation systems, and farmlands, and they identified a number of factors conducive to successful resource management.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Ostrom|first1=Vincent|last2=Ostrom|first2=Elinor|date=1972|title=Legal and Political Conditions of Water Resource Development|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3145634|journal=Land Economics|volume=48|issue=1|pages=1–14|doi=10.2307/3145634|jstor=3145634|s2cid=152485064 |issn=0023-7639}}</ref> One factor is the resource itself; resources with definable boundaries (e.g. land) can be preserved much more easily.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=September 1975|title=Can glass recycling pay for itself?|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0301-4207(75)90060-4|journal=Resources Policy|volume=1|issue=5|pages=298|doi=10.1016/0301-4207(75)90060-4|issn=0301-4207}}</ref> A second factor is resource dependence; there must be a perceptible threat of [[resource depletion]], and it must be difficult to find substitutes.<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Resource development in western Canada: Indigenous peoples' human rights must be respected|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2210-7975_hrd-5411-2014011|access-date=2021-05-25|website=Human Rights Documents online|doi=10.1163/2210-7975_hrd-5411-2014011}}</ref> The third is the presence of a community; small and stable populations with a thick social network and social norms promoting conservation do better.<ref name=beyond>Elinor Ostrom: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ByXM47Ri1Kc ''Beyond the tragedy of commons'']. Stockholm whiteboard seminars. (Video, 8:26 min.)</ref> A final condition is that there be appropriate community-based rules and procedures in place with built-in incentives for responsible use and punishments for overuse.<ref>{{Citation|title=Introduction: Defining Community-Built|date=2016-11-25|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315545066-7|work=Community-Built|pages=15–34|location=New York|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9781315545066-7|isbn=978-1-315-54506-6|access-date=2021-05-25}}</ref> When the commons is taken over by non-locals, those solutions can no longer be used.<ref name="urlOstrom revisits the commons in Science" />

Many of the economic and social structures recommended by Ostrom coincide with the structures recommended by [[anarchism|anarchists]], particularly [[green anarchism]].<ref>{{cite web |url=https://c4ss.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Anarchist-Themes-in-the-Work-of-Elinor-Ostrom.pdf |publisher=Center for a Stateless Society |title=Governance, Agency and Autonomy: Anarchist Themes in the Work of Elinor Ostrom |last=Carson |first=Kevin |year=2013}}</ref> The largest contemporary societies that use these organizational strategies are the [[Rebel Zapatista Autonomous Municipalities]] and the [[Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria]] which have heavily been influenced by [[anarchism]] and other versions of [[libertarian socialism|libertarian]] and [[ecosocialism|ecological]] socialism.

Individuals may act in a deliberate way to avoid consumption habits that deplete natural resources. This consciousness promotes the [[boycotting]] of products or brands and seeking alternative, more sustainable options.

==== Altruistic punishment ====
Various well-established theories, such as theory of kin selection and direct reciprocity, have limitations in explaining patterns of cooperation emerging between unrelated individuals and in non-repeatable short-term interactions.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hamilton |first=W. D. |date=1964-07-01 |title=The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I |url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-5193%2864%2990038-4 |journal=Journal of Theoretical Biology |language=en |volume=7 |issue=1 |pages=1–16 |doi=10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 |pmid=5875341 |bibcode=1964JThBi...7....1H |s2cid=5310280 |issn=0022-5193}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Trivers |first=Robert L. |date=1971 |title=The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2822435 |journal=The Quarterly Review of Biology |volume=46 |issue=1 |pages=35–57 |doi=10.1086/406755 |jstor=2822435 |s2cid=19027999 |issn=0033-5770}}</ref> Studies have shown that punishment is an efficacious motivator for cooperation among humans.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Fehr |first1=Ernst |last2=Gächter |first2=Simon |date=2002 |title=Altruistic punishment in humans |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/415137a |journal=Nature |language=en |volume=415 |issue=6868 |pages=137–140 |doi=10.1038/415137a |pmid=11805825 |bibcode=2002Natur.415..137F |s2cid=4310962 |issn=1476-4687}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Balliet |first1=Daniel |last2=Mulder |first2=Laetitia B. |last3=Van Lange |first3=Paul A. M. |date=2011 |title=Reward, punishment, and cooperation: a meta-analysis |url=https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21574679/ |journal=Psychological Bulletin |volume=137 |issue=4 |pages=594–615 |doi=10.1037/a0023489 |issn=1939-1455 |pmid=21574679|s2cid=2057071 }}</ref>

Altruistic punishment entails the presence of individuals that punish defectors from a cooperative agreement, although doing so is costly and provides no material gain. These punishments effectively resolve tragedy of the commons scenarios by addressing both first-order free rider problems (i.e. defectors free riding on cooperators) and second-order free rider problems (i.e. cooperators free riding on work of punishers).<ref>{{Cite book |last=Greenwood |first=Garrison W. |title=2016 IEEE Conference on Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG) |chapter=Altruistic punishment can help resolve tragedy of the commons social dilemmas |date=2016 |chapter-url=https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7860402 |location=Santorini, Greece |publisher=IEEE |pages=1–7 |doi=10.1109/CIG.2016.7860402 |isbn=978-1-5090-1883-3|s2cid=14183178 |url=https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1417&context=ece_fac }}</ref> Such results can only be witnessed when the punishment levels are high enough.

While defectors are motivated by self-interest and cooperators feel morally obliged to practice self-restraint, punishers pursue this path when their emotions are clouded by annoyance and anger at free riders.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Seip |first1=Elise C. |last2=van Dijk |first2=Wilco W. |last3=Rotteveel |first3=Mark |date=2009 |title=On Hotheads and Dirty Harries: The Primacy of Anger in Altruistic Punishment |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04503.x |journal=Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences |language=en |volume=1167 |issue=1 |pages=190–196 |doi=10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04503.x|pmid=19580565 |s2cid=11960190 }}</ref>

===Governmental solutions===
Governmental solutions are used when the above conditions are not met (such as a community being larger than the cohesion of its social network).<ref>{{Citation|date=2011|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/9780471723172.ch18|work=It Sounded Good When We Started|publisher=IEEE|doi=10.1109/9780471723172.ch18|isbn=978-0-471-72317-2|access-date=2021-05-25 |title=Being Too Big for Your Britches: So Much Confidence with So Little Talent (Experience) }}</ref> Examples of government regulation include population control, privatization, regulation, and internalizing the externalities.<ref>{{Citation|last=Moosa|first=Imad A.|title=Bad Regulation: Too Big to Fail, Bail-Out and Bail-In|date=2015|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137447104_10|work=Good Regulation, Bad Regulation|pages=192–211|place=London|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK|doi=10.1057/9781137447104_10|isbn=978-1-349-68593-6|access-date=2021-05-25}}</ref>

====Population control====

In Hardin's essay, he proposed that the solution to the problem of overpopulation must be based on "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" and result in "relinquishing the freedom to breed". Hardin discussed this topic further in a 1979 book, ''Managing the Commons,'' co-written with [[John A. Baden]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Chaddha|first=Shane|date=2011|title=Hardin Goes to Outer Space{{snd}} 'Mutual Coercion, Mutually Agreed Upon By The Majority of People Affected'|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1763740|journal=SSRN Electronic Journal|doi=10.2139/ssrn.1763740|s2cid=154257809|issn=1556-5068}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ecobooks.com/books/commons.htm |title=Managing the Commons by Garrett Hardin and John Baden |publisher=Ecobooks.com |access-date=22 October 2013}}</ref> He framed this prescription in terms of needing to restrict the "[[reproductive rights|reproductive right]]", to safeguard all other [[rights]]. Several countries have a variety of [[Antinatalistic politics|population control laws]] in place.<ref>{{Citation|title=Reproductive Rights as an International Norm|date=2017-07-05|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315254180-5|work=Global Population Policy|pages=135–166|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9781315254180-5|isbn=978-1-315-25418-0|access-date=2021-05-25}}</ref>

In the context of United States policy debates, Hardin advocated restrictions on migration, particularly of non-whites. In a 1991 article, he stated

{{blockquote |text =  Popular anthropology came along with its dogma that all cultures are equally good, equally valuable. To say otherwise was to be narrow-minded and prejudiced, to be guilty of the sin of ethnocentrism. In time, a sort of Marxist-Hegelian dialectic took charge of our thinking: ethnocentrism was replaced by what we can only call ethnofugalism—a romantic flight away from our own culture. That which was foreign and strange, particularly if persecuted, became the ideal. Black became beautiful, and prolonged bilingual education replaced naturalization. Immigration lawyers grew rich serving their clients by finding ways around the law of the land to which they (the lawyers) owe their allegiance. Idealistic religious groups, claiming loyalty to a higher power than the nation, openly shielded and transported illegal immigrants.
<ref>{{cite web |last1=Hardin |first1=Garrett |title=Conspicuous Benevolence and the Population Bomb |url=https://chroniclesmagazine.org/web/conspicuous-benevolence-and-the-population-bomb/ |website=Chronicles |date=October 1991 |access-date=30 August 2024}}</ref>}}

====Privatization====
One solution for some resources is to convert common good into private property (Coase 1960), giving the new owner an incentive to enforce its sustainability.<ref>{{Cite thesis|title=Owner Incorporation : a trick or a solution to private residential property management|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b3196942|publisher=The University of Hong Kong Libraries|first=Hiu-yeung, Tony|last=Li|year=2003 |doi=10.5353/th_b3196942}}</ref> [[libertarianism|Libertarians]] and [[classical liberalism|classical liberals]] cite the tragedy of the commons as an example of what happens when [[John Locke|Lockean]] property rights to homestead resources are prohibited by a government.<ref>{{Citation |first=Robert J. |last=Smith |title=Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private Property Rights in Wildlife |url=http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/1981/11/cj1n2-7.pdf |publisher=[[Cato Institute]] |series=[[Cato Journal]] |volume=1 |issue=2 |date=Fall 1981 |pages=439–468}}</ref> They argue that the solution to the tragedy of the commons is to allow individuals to take over the property rights of a resource, that is, to privatize it.<ref>[[John Locke]], "Sect. 27" and following sections in [https://web.archive.org/web/20070304114414/http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/locke/locke2/locke2nd-a.html#Sect.%2025.#Sect.%2027. ''Second Treatise of Government''] (1690). Also available [https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7370 here.]</ref>

In England, this solution was attempted in the [[inclosure act]]s. According to [[Karl Marx]] in {{lang|de|[[Das Kapital]]}}, this solution leads to increasing numbers of people being pushed into smaller and smaller pockets of common land which has yet to be privatised, thereby merely displacing and exacerbating the problem while putting an increasing number of people in precarious situations.<ref>{{Citation|first=Karl| last=Marx| date=1867 |title=[[Das Kapital|Capital]] |volume= 1|publisher=Penguin UK|chapter=Twenty-Seven: Expropriation of the Agricultural Population from the Land}}</ref> Economic historian [[Bob Allen (economic historian)|Bob Allen]] coined the term "[[Engels' pause]]" to describe the period from 1790 to 1840, when British working-class wages stagnated and per-capita [[gross domestic product]] expanded rapidly during a technological upheaval.<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1016/j.eeh.2009.04.004 |title = Engels' pause: Technical change, capital accumulation, and inequality in the british industrial revolution |journal = Explorations in Economic History|volume = 46|issue = 4|pages = 418–435|year = 2009|last1 = Allen|first1 = Robert C.}}</ref>

====Regulation====
In a typical example, governmental regulations can limit the amount of a common good that is available for use by any individual.<ref>{{Citation|last=Wray|first=HA|title=Chapter 11: U.S. Governmental Regulatory Agencies{{snd}}Governmental Regulations|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1520/mnl10538m|work=Manual on Flash Point Standards and Their Use: Methods and Regulations|year=1992|pages=102–123|location=West Conshohocken, PA|publisher=ASTM International|doi=10.1520/mnl10538m|isbn=978-0-8031-1410-4|access-date=2021-05-25}}</ref> Permit systems for extractive economic activities including mining, fishing, hunting, livestock raising, and timber extraction are examples of this approach.<ref>{{Citation|date=2013-10-28|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203039915-11|work=Aegean Civilization|pages=181–191|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9780203039915-11|isbn=978-0-203-03991-5|access-date=2021-05-25|title=Agriculture, Cattle-Raising, Hunting, and Fishing}}</ref> Similarly, limits to pollution are examples of governmental intervention on behalf of the commons.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Pieraccini|first=Margherita|date=2015-09-18|title=Democratic legitimacy and new commons: examples from English protected areas|journal=International Journal of the Commons|volume=9|issue=2|pages=552|doi=10.18352/ijc.509|issn=1875-0281|doi-access=free}}</ref> This idea is used by the [[United Nations]] [[Moon Treaty]], [[Outer Space Treaty]] and [[Law of the Sea Treaty]] as well as the [[UNESCO]] [[World Heritage Convention]] (treaty) which involves the international law principle that designates some areas or resources the [[Common Heritage of Mankind]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Frakes |first=Jennifer |date=2003 |title=The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations Reach a Compromise |journal=Wisconsin International Law Journal |volume=21 |issue=2|pages=409–434|id=[[HeinOnline|HOL]] [https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/wisint21&div=18 wisint21_18]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bin|first=Cheng|date=1997-12-18|title=Part III United Nations Treaties on Outer Space, 9 The 1967 Space Treaty|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198257301.003.0010|journal=Studies in International Space Law|doi=10.1093/law/9780198257301.003.0010}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=N.|first=Scheiber, Harry|title=Law of the sea : the common heritage and emerging challenges|date=2000|publisher=Martinus Nijhoff Publishers|isbn=90-411-1401-7|oclc=44019679}}</ref>

German historian [[Joachim Radkau]] thought Hardin advocates strict management of common goods via increased government involvement or international regulation bodies.<ref name="Rad">{{Cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mvQYxDG6QkoC | title=Nature and Power: A Global History of the Environment| isbn=978-0-521-85129-9| last1=Radkau| first1=Joachim| year=2008|publisher=Cambridge University Press}}</ref> An asserted impending "tragedy of the commons" is frequently warned of as a consequence of the adoption of policies which restrict [[Property#Theories|private property]] and espouse expansion of public property.<ref>{{Cite journal |title=Socialism and the Tragedy of the Commons: Reflections on Environmental Practice in the Soviet Union and Russia |date=January 1995 |journal= The Journal of Environment & Development|doi=10.1177/107049659500400105 |last1=Mirovitskaya |first1=N. |last2=Soroos |first2=M. S. |volume=4 |number=1 |pages=77–110|s2cid=155028630 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |author-link=Mark J. Perry |first=Mark |last=Perry |title=Why Socialism Failed |date=June 1995 |journal=[[The Freeman]] |url=http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/why-socialism-failed/ |volume=45 |number=6 |access-date=2011-06-08 |archive-url=http://arquivo.pt/wayback/20090629100228/http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/why-socialism-failed/ |archive-date=2009-06-29 |url-status=dead }}</ref>

Giving legal rights of personhood to objects in nature is another proposed solution. The idea of giving land a legal personality is intended to enable the democratic system of the rule of law to allow for prosecution, sanction, and reparation for damage to the earth.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hermitte |first=Marie-Angèle |date=2011 |title=La nature, sujet de droit ? |url=https://www.cairn.info/revue-annales-2011-1-page-173.htm?contenu=article |journal=Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales |volume=66 |issue=1 |pages=173–212 |doi=10.1017/S0395264900005503 |s2cid=162165853 |via=CAIRN}}</ref> For example, this has been put into practice in Ecuador in the form of a constitutional principle known as "Pacha Mama" (Mother Earth).<ref>{{Cite journal |date=2015-06-10 |title=The Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador: Pachamama Has Rights |url=https://doi.org/10.5282/rcc/7131 |journal=Environment & Society Portal |language=en |doi=10.5282/rcc/7131|last1=Berros |first1=María Valeria }}</ref>

====Internalizing externalities====
Privatization works when the person who owns the property (or rights of access to that property) pays the full price of its exploitation.<ref>{{Cite book|date=2004-03-22|title=Who owns the intellectual property rights when an invention, copyright work or design is outsourced?|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.18356/f2dc0688-en|access-date=2021-05-25|doi=10.18356/f2dc0688-en}}</ref> As discussed above negative externalities (negative results, such as air or water pollution, that do not proportionately affect the user of the resource) is often a feature driving the tragedy of the commons.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=1987-08-01|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/annhyg/31.3.285|journal=The Annals of Occupational Hygiene|doi=10.1093/annhyg/31.3.285|issn=1475-3162|title=Do Negative Air Ions Affect Human Mood and Performance?|pmid=3426028|last1=Hedge|first1=A.|last2=Collis|first2=M. D.|volume=31|issue=3|pages=285–290}}</ref> ''Internalizing the externalities'', in other words ensuring that the users of resource pay for all of the consequences of its use, can provide an alternate solution between privatization and regulation.<ref>{{cite web|url= https://heliocene.org/knowledge-bank/what-is-a-sustainable-business/externalities-and-internalisation/|title= Externalities and Internalisation|work= Heliocene|date= 5 March 2021|accessdate=2 Aug 2022}}</ref> One example is gasoline taxes which are intended to include both the cost of road maintenance and of air pollution.<ref>{{Citation|last1=Austin|first1=David|title=Clearing the air: The costs and consequences of higher CAFE standards and increased gasoline taxes|date=2018-12-20|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351161084-23|work=Controlling Automobile Air Pollution|pages=449–469|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-351-16108-4|access-date=2021-05-25|last2=Dinan|first2=Terry|doi=10.4324/9781351161084-23}}</ref> This solution can provide the flexibility of privatization while minimizing the amount of government oversight and overhead that is needed.<ref>{{Citation|last1=Fullerton|first1=Don|title=Can Taxes on Cars and on Gasoline Mimic an Unavailable Tax on Emissions? 1|date=2018-12-20|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351161084-13|work=Controlling Automobile Air Pollution|pages=243–266|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-351-16108-4|access-date=2021-05-25|last2=West|first2=Sarah E.|doi=10.4324/9781351161084-13|s2cid=239069281}}</ref>

=== The mid-way solution ===
One of the significant actions areas which can dwell as potential solution is to have co-shared communities that have partial ownership from governmental side and partial ownership from the community.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Quan|first1=Qi|last2=Huyghebaert|first2=Nancy|date=2007|title=Ownership Dynamics After Partial Privatization: Evidence from China|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.966679|journal=SSRN Electronic Journal|doi=10.2139/ssrn.966679|issn=1556-5068}}</ref> By ownership, here it is referred to planning, sharing, using, benefiting and supervision of the resources which ensure that the power is not held in one or two hands only.<ref>{{Citation|title=China: Designing policies and laws to ensure fair access and benefit sharing of genetic resources and participatory plant breeding products|date=2012-03-15|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203156032-21|work=The Custodians of Biodiversity|pages=120–146|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9780203156032-21|doi-broken-date=1 November 2024 |isbn=978-0-203-15603-2|access-date=2021-05-25}}</ref> Since, involvement of multiple stakeholders is necessary responsibilities can be shared across them based on their abilities and capacities in terms of human resources, infrastructure development ability, and legal aspects, etc.<ref>{{Cite book|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315859590|title=Euro-Librarianship: Shared Resources, Shared Responsibilities|date=2018-10-24|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9781315859590|isbn=978-1-315-85959-0|s2cid=239912609|editor-last=Pisani|editor-first=Assunta}}</ref>